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A growing body of empirical research reveals that implicit biases manifest in 
many of our actions. It has been suggested that there is a fundamental distinction 
between (i) our implicit biases and the actions which they influence; and (ii) 
attitudes such as beliefs that we attribute to persons and think of as agential, and 
the actions that they guide. Call these the ‘substantial distinction’ (SD) views.  
 According to SD arguments, implicit biases are distinguishable from 
beliefs and other agential attitudes, on the basis of one or more of the following 
features: 
 
•  We lack awareness of our implicit biases. 
•  Implicit biases are associative, and so they lack the appropriate 
structure to enter into logical inference relations with mental states 
that have propositional content. 
•  We lack control over the formation of our implicit biases, and over 
the execution of our implicitly biased actions. 
 
Some SD theorists have further argued that because implicit biases and implicitly 
biased actions lack one or more of the above features, they are not appropriate 
candidates for normative evaluation, and we are therefore not morally responsible 
for our implicitly biased actions. 
 I reject the central claim of the SD view, namely, that there is a 
fundamental distinction between implicit biases and agential attitudes such as 
beliefs, and the actions guided by each. I argue that at least some of our implicit 
biases are propositional in structure, and that we have the same kind of awareness 
and control of at least some of them, and the actions that they guide, as we do of 
at least some of our beliefs, and belief-guided actions. As a result, there is no 
principled way in which to maintain the required substantial distinction. Having 
shown that the SD view fails, I develop a ‘continuum thesis’ on which implicit 
biases and beliefs are not fundamentally discontinuous, and at least some of the 
former share all of their characteristics with at least some of the latter. I argue that 
this account is best able to accommodate the findings on implicit bias. According 
to the continuum thesis, we have a sufficient level of awareness and control such 
that at least some implicit biases are agential, and at least sometimes, agents are 
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A growing body of research reveals that individuals often make choices or 
perform actions which suggest that they associate negative qualities with, or that 
they have negatively evaluated, members of a particular social group, even though 
the individuals in question seem to be unaware that this is the case, and do not 
intend their behaviour to exhibit such disfavouring treatment. For example, people 
perform more quickly and accurately on laboratory tasks when matching concepts 
in accordance with a social stereotype (such as when matching concepts denoting 
men with those denoting career achievement; and those denoting women and with 
the notions of family and caregiving) as opposed to when matching concepts 
counter to a social stereotype. Further, results on these laboratory matching tasks 
correlate with real-world discriminatory actions, such as subtly hostile behaviour 
(in body language and demeanour, for instance) towards members of particular 
racial groups in certain social interactions; as well as preferential treatment of 
some social groups in more deliberative scenarios, such as when evaluating C.V.s, 
hiring candidates or prescribing medication.1 Whilst a number of different 
psychological mechanisms may be implicated in guiding the different actions 
mentioned above, psychologists and philosophers alike have labelled such actions 
as cases of ‘implicit bias’, or, more precisely, as actions which manifest implicit 
bias. 
The term ‘implicit bias’ is often used to refer to an attitude which guides 
an action. However, it is also sometimes used to refer to a specific episode of 
biased behaviour such as the following: ‘His hiring of Eleanor over Asha, who is 
clearly more skilled, was a case of implicit bias’, or ‘Dan is concerned because of 
the implicit bias in Rosie’s marking’, both of which might be understood as 
referring to actions which have been guided, at least in part, by a biased attitude. 
To avoid confusion, I will reserve the term ‘implicit bias’ for referring to the first 
sense, to the attitude, and will say that an action can be implicitly biased, and that 
                                                
 
1 For results on laboratory matching tasks, see: Greenwald, et al., 1998; Nosek and Banaji, 2001; 
Nosek et al., 2007; for subtly differential treatment in social interactions see Chen & Bargh, 1997; 
Dovidio, et al., 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Wilson et al., 2000; and for preferential 
treatment in more deliberative scenarios see Ulhmann & Cohen, 2005; Green, et al., 2007; Rooth, 
2007. I will give a more thorough overview of these results in Chapter 1. 
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implicit bias may ‘manifest in an action’, if that action is influenced by an 
implicitly biased attitude.  
There is disagreement among scientists, and among philosophers, as to 
exactly what is ‘implicit’ about implicit bias. I will outline the background to the 
empirical definition in Chapter 1, §1.2. Further to this, a number of philosophers 
have argued that implicit biases are a sui generis kind of state, or, at least, that 
they are fundamentally different in kind to more familiar attitudes such as beliefs 
which we tend to attribute to persons, and to think of as agential, insofar as the 
latter sort of attitudes are part of the agent’s evaluative perspective.2 This sort of 
argument is proposed on the basis that implicit biases appear to lack particular 
properties that are characteristic of beliefs. These philosophers point out, for 
example, that we seem to be unaware of our implicit biases, or that we seem to be 
unable to control their influence on our actions. These claims are examples of 
what I will refer to as the ‘substantial distinction’ view (or ‘SD’ view for short). A 
subset of these SD theorists argue that, because of the ways in which implicit 
biases differ from agential attitudes and actions, implicit biases, and the actions 
that they influence, fail to meet at least some of the criteria necessary for moral 
responsibility, and so we cannot be morally responsible for having implicit biases, 
or for manifesting implicit bias in our actions. I will refer to this subset of views 
as the ‘Substantial Distinction: Responsibility’ views, or ‘SDR’ views for short.  
One might think that something like the SD, and the related SDR views 
are an intuitive interpretation of a set of surprising and unsettling empirical 
findings. My aim in this thesis, however, is to show that we are unable to provide 
an account which picks out the class of implicit biases and shows them to be 
substantially distinct from the class of agential attitudes, such as beliefs: any 
account that is broad enough to include all cases of implicit bias, and the actions 
that they influence, will be too permissive to do the required SD work, and will 
also include at least some agential attitudes, such as beliefs, and the actions that 
they guide. I argue that there is no way to draw a principled distinction between 
implicit biases, and the actions that they influence, on one hand, and agential 
attitudes such as beliefs, and the actions that they guide, on the other. As such, 
any construal of the SD account will fail, and since the SDR account depends on 
the SD account, with the failure of the latter will come the failure of the former. 
                                                
 
2 I will characterise the term ‘agential’ and its cognates more fully in Chapter 2. 
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For the time being, then, talk of ‘implicit biases’ is intended to pick out the set of 
attitudes which are the subject of a number of empirical studies (as we shall see in 
Chapter 1), where participants are shown to associate particular social groups with 
certain stereotypical traits, without implying a deeper ontological commitment to 
a distinctive kind of attitude.  
The argument will proceed as follows: In Chapter 1, I present a summary 
of evidence of implicit bias from cognitive science. There, I outline the main 
research paradigms and and offer a working definition of the phenomenon. In 
Chapter 2, I present the accounts of five philosophers who argue that there is a 
substantial distinction between our implicit biases and the actions which they 
influence, and agential attitudes such as beliefs, and the actions which they guide. 
The philosophical accounts that I shall focus on are those of Daniel Kelly and 
Erica Roedder (2008); Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008a, 2008b); Jennifer Saul 
(2013); and Neil Levy (2013, 2014a, 2014b). These are the main proponents of 
the SD view of implicit bias that I mentioned above. I will also outline the 
‘substantial distinction: responsibility’ views or ‘SDR’ views in Chapter 2. The 
SD and SDR arguments share a number of common themes concerning  
 
(1) awareness of the attitudes in question, and how they guide actions;  
(2) the structure and processing of attitudes; and  
(3) control over the attitudes and the actions that they guide.  
 
In response to the SD and SDR views, I will defend a ‘continuum thesis’ of 
implicit bias, according to which, and contrary to the SD and SDR claims, there is 
in fact no single characteristic that all beliefs, and belief-guided actions have that 
all implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions fail to have. I address SD(R) 
claims made on the basis of characteristics (1)-(3) over the following three 
chapters.  
 In Chapter 3, I consider arguments that focus on (1) as above, and argue 
that there is no substantial distinction between (i) implicit biases, and the actions 
that they influence; and (ii) agential attitudes such as beliefs, and the actions that 
they guide, on the basis of the kind of awareness that we have of each. Following 
Jules Holroyd (2015), I argue that we have as much inferential and observational 
awareness of at least some of our implicit biases, and of their influence on our 
actions, as we do of at least some of our beliefs, and of their guidance of our 
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actions. I suggest that if we adopt Christina Borgoni’s (2015) ‘ordinary’ notion of 
introspective awareness, we count as introspectively aware of at least some of our 
implicit biases and their influence on our actions. Holroyd (2015) maintains that it 
is not possible to be introspectively aware of the influence of implicit bias on 
action, but argues that there are cases of agential actions in which people are not 
introspectively aware of the attitudes that guide such actions. Holroyd’s point 
would seem to count against the SD theory, but it is open to an objection 
articulated by Levy in his (2014a) account: Succinctly, agents who act without 
occurrent introspective awareness of the guiding role played by their agential 
attitudes may nevertheless still be able to ‘effortlessly recall’ these attitudes—that 
is, become occurrently introspectively aware of them in the presence of an 
‘ordinary cue’.3 The same is not true in the case of implicit bias, and so, if Levy’s 
account is correct, this would appear to reinstate the substantial distinction 
between implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of introspective awareness. In 
response to Levy, I argue that effortless recall of the attitudes which guide an 
action in the presence of an ordinary cue for those attitudes is not a necessary 
condition for an action to be agential. Accordingly, I show that we have the same 
kind of awareness of at least some of our implicit biases and their influence on our 
actions as we have of at least some of our beliefs and their influence on our 
actions. This stands, even if we don’t assume Borgoni’s ordinary notion of 
introspection.  
The chapter also contains a positive account of the awareness that we have 
of at least some of our implicit biases. In §3.3, I introduce the notion of an 
‘observable class preference’. An agent has an observable class preference when 
they (i) have made multiple evaluations of some entities, evaluations of which 
they are introspectively aware, and (ii) the entities in question belong to the same 
class, and are evaluated to have qualities of the same kind and valence. I give four 
examples of everyday observable class preferences, to demonstrate that this is a 
common phenomenon. I then argue that at least some implicit biases are 
observable class preferences, and that we have the same kind of awareness of 
these implicit biases as we do of at least some of our everyday agential observable 
class preferences.  
                                                
 
3 I will say more about Levy’s (2014a) notion of an ‘ordinary cue’ in Chapter 2, and offer a more 
critical exposition in Chapter 3. 
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This outcome of the argument against the SD view—that there is no 
substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of 
awareness—enables us to refute the related SDR claims. Contra the relevant SDR 
views, I argue that if it turns out that we do lack moral responsibility for our 
implicit biases, and their influence on our actions, it will not be because we lack 
awareness of them, but because of some other distinguishing feature. 
In Chapter 4, I consider arguments that focus on (2) above: the structure 
and processing of attitudes. I argue that there is no substantial distinction between 
(i) the structure of implicit biases, and the way in which they are processed; and 
(ii) the structure of beliefs (as an example of agential attitudes), and the way in 
which they are processed. I first outline the psychological theory that underpins 
the SD argument here, namely dual process theory. According to dual process 
theory, the mind is comprised of two systems, (i) the propositional system, which 
is sensitive to relational information; and (ii) the associative system which is 
sensitive only to the frequency with which a person has witnessed two things 
together. Supposedly, these systems process two distinct kinds of mental entities: 
propositions, and associations, in fundamentally different ways. In light of these 
claims, the relevant SD arguments are that implicit biases and beliefs are 
structured and processed in fundamentally different ways: associatively in the 
case of the former, and propositionally in the case of the latter.  
These SD claims generate two testable hypotheses. HYPOTHESIS 1 is that 
that implicit biases are necessarily associative. HYPOTHESIS 2 is that beliefs 
change in response to changes in evidence. I show that both hypotheses are false. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 is falsified by findings discussed both Jan de Houwer (2014) and 
Eric Mandelbaum (forthcoming), which show that implicit biases (and implicit 
social attitudes more broadly) do update in accordance with propositional 
information. By describing a number of cases in which beliefs fail to update in 
accordance with new evidence I then show that HYPOTHESIS 2 is false. I also 
consider whether the claim in HYPOTHESIS 2 should be interpreted as a normative 
claim, but suggest that this would not reinstate the desired substantial distinction, 
since it is plausible that implicit attitudes in general are governed by the same 
epistemic norms as beliefs. 
 I also consider a more recent argument from Levy (2015) in which he 
acknowledges that implicit attitudes may be sensitive to propositional 
information, and may feature in some inferential transitions. Despite this 
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concession, Levy still upholds an SD view that implicit biases are distinguishable 
from beliefs, in virtue of his argument that beliefs are ‘inferentially promiscuous’: 
featuring in a much broader range of inferential transitions, and sensitive to a 
greater range of evidence, than implicit biases. I demonstrate that Levy’s 
argument fails because there are some beliefs, in particular, some explicit 
prejudices, which are evidence sensitive to a lower degree than the most evidence 
sensitive implicit attitudes. Consequently, at least some of our implicit biases are 
propositional in structure, and feature in evidence-sensitive inferential transitions 
in the same way that many beliefs do.  
It may seem that if implicit biases were associatively structured, and failed 
to be evidence sensitive, then this would rule out moral responsibility for having 
or acting on them, as SDR theorists maintain. Following the argument against the 
SD view in this chapter, I show that, if it turns out that we do lack moral 
responsibility for our implicit biases, and their influence on our actions, then it 
will not be because of their structure and the way in which they are processed. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with claim (3) as above, the claim that implicit 
biases and beliefs (and the actions guided by each) may be distinguished by the 
kind of control that we exert over each. I first provide an overview of the main 
notions of agential control that appear in the philosophical literature, which will 
be relevant to the dialectic: (i) voluntary control; (ii) reasons responsiveness; and 
(iii) deep self accounts; as well as of some important distinctions in this context: 
(a) direct vs. indirect control; (b) initiation vs. intervention control; and (c) 
deliberative vs. non-deliberative control. I discuss SD claims on the basis of the 
control that we exert over the acquisition and update of each sort of attitude (§5.2) 
before moving to a discussion of control over the relevant actions (§5.3), and 
show, for each, that there is no way to maintain a strong distinction account. 
 As regards the discussion of attitudes, I show that if one thinks that we 
exert indirect voluntary control over belief acquisition and update, then, following 
a number of empirical findings, implicit bias acquisition and update can also 
sometimes be indirectly voluntary. I also show that if one is committed to direct 
doxastic control, then one is also committed to direct control of the acquisition 
and update of at least some implicit biases. As regards action control, I 
demonstrate that three distinct strategies are effective for controlling implicitly 
biased actions, which are also the only strategies available to us for controlling at 
least some of our everyday agential actions: (i) indirect, intervention control; (ii) 
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deliberative, direct, intervention control; and (iii) non-deliberative, direct, 
intervention control. Consequently, the SD theorist’s claim that there is a kind of 
control that we have over all of our agential attitudes, and agential actions; that we 
do not have over our implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions, is false.  
I subsequently consider SDR claims on the basis of control. There, I also 
consider how awareness interacts with the control that we exert over implicitly 
biased attitudes and actions, should the (apparent) lack of awareness and the 
(apparent) lack of control be jointly sufficient support for the SDR claim that we 
lack moral responsibility for implicit biases and the actions that they guide. I 
argue that SDR claims on the basis of both awareness and control are insufficient 
to uphold the desired substantial distinction. 
 These three chapters rule out all of the supposedly distinguishing features 
that were introduced in Chapter 2 as able to uphold a substantial distinction 
between implicit biases and agential attitudes, and the actions associated with 
each. In the final chapter, Chapter 6, I address the question of whether, following 
the arguments of Chapters 3-5, implicit biases, and the actions that they guide, 
implicate us as agents after all. I outline why I think it is plausible that, at least 
sometimes, we are the proper agential subjects of, and are sometimes morally 
responsible for, our implicitly biased actions.  
Given the evidence surveyed in the previous chapters, I propose that the 
best account of the relationship between implicit biases and beliefs is one on 
which both sorts of attitudes are ordered along a continuum. At one extreme end 
of this continuum, we may find some beliefs which are effortlessly accessible to 
introspective awareness, and some actions under our immediate, direct control; 
whilst, at the other extreme end, we may find attitudes which are extremely 
difficult to introspect, and actions which may require considerable effort before 
they are amenable to any kind of control. However, in the middle of the 
continuum, there is a considerable area of overlap in which we find both a 
significant number of implicit biases (and implicitly biased actions) as well as 
many beliefs, (and belief-guided actions). To the extent that we hold agents to 
account, and praise or blame them for agential actions which lie in the overlap 
zone of the continuum, it is also appropriate to hold agents morally responsible 
for the implicitly biased actions which populate the same section of the 
continuum.  
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Any effort to try to save the SD(R) account by insisting that those beliefs 
which populate the same region of the continuum as implicit biases are not 
agential after all considerably restricts the account of human agency, because, as I 
demonstrate, we end up having to accept that a significant set of activities, some 
of which epitomise human flourishing, are not agential after all. And this, I show, 
commits us to an unsatisfactory and incomplete picture of human agency. As 
such, the continuum thesis remains the account that is best able to accommodate 
the findings on implicit bias, and further grants that at least some implicit biases 




CHAPTER 1: THE EVIDENCE 
 
This thesis examines the nature of implicit biases, whether they are substantially 
distinct in kind from the cognitive phenomena to which we are already committed 
(such as beliefs), and whether we are morally responsible for the actions that they 
influence. In order to do this, we need an understanding of the empirical evidence 
for the existence of implicit biases. To this end, this chapter summarises a range 
of results from cognitive science regarding implicit attitudes, and in particular, 
implicit biases and their manifestation in action.  
 In what follows, I provide an overview of the paradigms in which implicit 
attitudes are measured (§1.1) and a summary of the evidence which reveals that 
implicit biases are pervasive, and manifest in many everyday actions (§1.2). I then 
provide a brief elucidation of the apparent implicit/explicit distinction as it has 
been drawn by psychologists (§1.3)—although the question of whether this 
distinction picks out characteristics that all explicit attitudes have, which all 
implicit attitudes fail to have, or vice versa, will be the subject of later chapters. 
As I reject that there is a substantial distinction between implicit biases and 
attitudes which have been identified by my opponents as explicit (such as beliefs) 
I will also explain how I intend to use the term ‘implicit’ in the argument to come. 
 
1.1. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLICIT ATTITUDE MEASURES 
Experimental measurement of implicit social bias follows findings in two research 
streams that focus (1) on how concepts are classified in, and retrieved from, 
memory, and (2) on the conditions under which mental processing occurs without 
attention (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). A significant finding within the first stream 
is the 1970s discovery (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Neely 1977) that presenting a person with a word facilitates their access to other 
words which are conceptually related to the first, enabling them to more quickly 
access and employ such words on various lexical classification tasks. For 
instance, Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) demonstrated that when English 
speaking participants are tasked with indicating whether a string of letters forms 
an English word under time pressure, they are quicker to recognise, for example, 
‘butter’ as an English word when first presented with the word ‘bread’, compared 
to a word that is unrelated to ‘butter’, such as ‘window’ or ‘doctor’. Results 
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gained from these lexical decision-making tasks and other experiments in similar 
paradigms led to the proposal that activation of a mental entity tends to co-
activate other entities which are closely associated in long-term memory (Meyer 
& Schvaneveldt, 1976; Anderson, 1983).  
Meanwhile, in research stream (2), psychologists investigated the ways 
that stimuli to which participants were not directing their attention could 
nevertheless affect mental processing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Posner & 
Snyder, 1975). For instance, Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) observed that when 
participants were extensively trained to pay attention to a target stimulus, and that 
target stimulus was later displayed in the corner of the screen during another task, 
participants performed more poorly on the task. This was not the case for symbols 
participants had not been trained to pay attention to. This, and related results, led 
to widespread acceptance of the view that, whilst some mental processing is 
initiated by an intention, and requires effort on the part of the subject, other 
processing can occur despite the absence of intention and effortful control. 
Processing with these latter properties acquired the adjective ‘implicit’, with the 
former being referred to as ‘explicit’. I will say more about the implicit vs. explicit 
distinction in §1.3, but it is perhaps worth pointing out now, after Payne and 
Gawronski (2010), that in the early days of research into implicit and explicit 
processes, reference to conscious awareness was not a vital part of the distinction.  
 These findings set the stage for broader research programmes into so-
called ‘implicit social cognition’, exploring how people memorise, access and 
process cultural stereotypes: the coupling of social group concepts and traits, such 
as that of men with career concepts, as I mentioned in the introduction. 
Psychologists have referred to such stereotypes as items of cultural “knowledge” 
(Devine, et al., 2002: 846). However, given that stereotypes are not necessarily 
truth-tracking, this definition presents problems for philosophers, who almost 
universally think that knowledge is factive. This is not to say that psychologists 
are committed to the idea that stereotypes are founded on truth—just that the word 
‘knowledge’ means something slightly different in each discipline. I take a 
‘stereotype’ to be a publicly available conceptual construct in which some people, 
who are perceived to belong to a particular social group, are assumed to have one 
or more character traits—traits which may have a positive or negative valence. I 
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stress that, on this understanding, stereotypes do not have to track truth, or to even 
be founded in some modicum of truth.4 
In 1983, Gaertner and McLaughlin used a lexical decision-making task 
inspired by Meyer and Schvaneveldt’s (1971) paradigm to investigate whether 
words denoting racial categories facilitated response times to stereotype congruent 
concepts. Participants in Gaertner and McLaughlin’s experiment had to determine 
whether a pair of words were English words or nonsense words. It turned out that 
white participants were significantly faster to correctly identify English word pairs 
featuring terms denoting positive social traits (such as ‘ambitious’ or ‘smart’) 
when the other word was ‘White’ as compared with pairs featuring a positive 
social trait and the word ‘Black’ or ‘Negro’. In line with their aforementioned 
model, (as well as that of Anderson, 1983) Gaertner and McLaughlin suggested 
that this indicated that positive social traits are more closely associated in long 
term memory with the category ‘White’ than with the category ‘Black or Negro’.5 
 Working in a slightly different paradigm, Dovidio, Evans and Tyler (1986) 
found a significant relationship between the word ‘black’ and the speed at which 
white participants access negative social traits. Specifically, they discovered that 
when participants were presented with the words ‘black’ or ‘white’, and then 
asked to indicate whether a given trait ‘could ever be true’ of these words, white 
participants were reliably faster to identify negative social traits (such as ‘lazy’) as 
true of the category ‘black’ than of the category ‘white’.6 Participants were also 
faster to indicate that positive social traits could be true of the category ‘white’ 
                                                
 
4 For example, to observe that, in some cultures, characteristics such as ‘hysterical’ and ‘weak’ are 
assumed to be had by (people perceived to be) women, is not to say that therefore, in those 
cultures, it is generally true of the people in question that they are both hysterical and weak. The 
reasons for which particular character traits become associated with particular social groups is a 
valuable research avenue that likely involves probing the (often appalling) historical and structural 
injustices in social and economic power but I do not have space to explore this here. For brevity, I 
will talk about ‘stereotype congruence’ and ‘stereotype incongruence’, but I am not thereby 
committed to there being anything essential or revealing about the character traits predicated of 
people who (are perceived to) belong to particular social groups according to the dominant social 
stereotypes of any one culture, and do not look upon these stereotypes uncritically. 
5 Whilst ‘Negro’ is clearly a racialised term, one may reasonably question whether the terms 
‘White’ and ‘Black’ definitely activate racial categories as opposed to metaphorical concepts 
denoting positivity and negativity in Gaertner and McLaughlin’s (1983) results. 
6 The concern that ‘black’ and ‘white’ activate metaphorical concepts denoting negativity and 
positivity, rather than racial concepts, is also valid here. In isolation of other corroborating results, 
whether the associations observed in these experiments hold between racial or metaphorical 
concepts remains open. However, the introduction of laboratory tasks which included pictorial 
representations of people perceived to be from different racial categories would later resolve this 
ambiguity, as I discuss in the main text shortly. 
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than of the category ‘black’, as was the case with participants in Gaertner and 
McLaughlin (1983).  
The emergence of the Implicit Association Test, or ‘IAT’ for short, 
allowed researchers to measure the differential association between two target 
concepts and social attributes (see for example, Dovidio et al., 1997; Greenwald, 
McGhee & Schwartz, 1998; Dasgupta & Greenwald 2001; Nosek et al., 2007). 
The IAT enabled researchers to run trials in which participants matched pictures 
of people (or names) representing two different races or genders, with evaluative 
tokens (positive and negative words). A typical IAT trial might require 
participants to focus on a screen with evaluative tokens of opposing valence (the 
words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for instance) displayed in the top left and top right 
corners. Participants will then be presented with a series of target items—often 
pictures of people of different races or genders, or words evoking racialised or 
gendered characteristics—and instructed to ‘classify’ them with the evaluative 
tokens on either side of the screen, by pressing either a left or a right key. For 
instance, on one trial, participants might have to classify pictures of black people 
with ‘good’ and pictures of white people with ‘bad’, and then on a later trial, 
classify black people with bad and white people with good. The order of these 
critical trials is usually reversed for some subset of participants to ensure that 
results are not just a function of the order in which the classification tasks are 
completed. Participants also undergo training rounds prior to the critical trials to 
ensure they are able to classify examples of, for instance, racialised names with 
the appropriate racial categories, as well as classifying examples of evaluative 
tokens with the appropriate valence. This ensures that results are not just a 
function of a participants’ familiarity with one category over another. 
Participants must respond as quickly as possible, whilst doing their best to 
avoid errors. In light of the hypothesis that the activation of mental constructs 
tends to facilitate access to other constructs with which the first are closely 
associated (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971), it was hypothesised that participants 
would be quicker to classify target concepts with stereotype congruent evaluative 
tokens than with stereotype incongruent evaluative tokens. It was discovered that 
participants are faster to pair racialised-as-white names with positive terms than 
they are to pair racialised-as-black names with positive terms, (Greenwald, 
McGhee and Schwartz, 1998), and faster to pair black faces with negative terms 
than with positive terms, (Dovidio et al., 1997). Participants are also significantly 
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faster to respond on stereotype congruent trials when matching gender and career 
concepts, gender and science concepts, and age and valenced concepts (Nosek, 
Greenwald and Banaji, 2005) as well as sexuality and valenced concepts 
(Dasgupta and Rivera, 2006) and disability and valenced concepts, (Lane, Banaji, 
Nosek and Greenwald, 2007).  
One criticism levelled against the IAT paradigm is that because it only 
enables the measurement of differential response times, it cannot tell us about the 
specific content of an implicit attitude. For instance, if a person is faster to 
respond on IAT trials matching ‘white’ with ‘good’ than ‘black with ‘good’, we 
still do not know whether this is because they associate ‘white’ with ‘good’, or 
because they fail to associate ‘black’ with ‘good’. Acknowledgment of this 
limitation gave rise to several adjusted paradigms that are able to determine which 
concepts the activated association holds between. The first of these is Nosek and 
Banaji’s (2001) Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT), which, unlike the IAT, 
requires participants to respond to just one target object and evaluative category, 
rather than comparing response latencies between two target objects. For instance, 
participants must indicate whether stimuli represent either the target category in 
question, or a particular attribute, but refrain from responding to distractor items. 
If subjects are both faster and more accurate to respond when target category A is 
paired with good words rather than bad words, researchers infer that the 
underlying attitude mediating these responses is an affirmation of category A and 
words of positive valence. It turns out that subjects are both faster and more 
accurate to identify ‘white’ with ‘good’ than ‘white’ with ‘bad’, and faster to 
identify ‘black’ with ‘bad’ than ‘black’ with ‘good’ (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). So, 
facilitated stereotype-congruent responses, at least in this task, were likely 
mediated by an affirmation of both the positive white stereotype and of the 
negative black stereotype.7  
                                                
 
7 As Payne and Gawronski (2010: 8) point out, some remain suspicious that when participants 
respond to multiple presentations of stimuli in the block format of both the IAT and the GNAT, 
they may develop their own heuristic to group salient categories together, and if this was the case, 
then neither the IAT nor the GNAT would record stable underlying attitudes of the participants, 
but instead attitudes which are simply a function of the sorting task. Further paradigms correct for 
this worry, for instance by presenting both stereotype congruent and incongruent tasks randomly 
within a single block, as in De Houwer’s Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer, 2003). See 
also the Single-Block IAT (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer, and Rothermund, 2008) and the Recoding-
Free IAT (Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, Gast, and Wentura, 2009). 
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 One might reasonably wonder whether being slower to match stereotype-
incongruent concepts than stereotype-congruent concepts in an abstract 
experimental setting has any particular implications for behaviour outside the 
laboratory. It turns out that it does, as I demonstrate in the next section. 
 
1.2. IMPLICIT ATTITUDE MEASURES PREDICT BIASED BEHAVIOUR 
Plenty of studies show that people who exhibit stereotype-congruent responses on 
tests like the IAT (call them people who are ‘high’ in IAT bias) are more likely to 
perform a range of stereotypical behaviours in both experimental simulations of 
real-world contexts, and in actual everyday decisions. I give an overview of just 
some of the results in the following. 
Scores on implicit measures of attitude predict a range of 
‘microbehaviours’—subtly discriminatory behaviour. For instance, McConnell 
and Leibold (2001) had participants undertake a race IAT and then put them in a 
number of scenarios which required social interaction with black and white 
experimenters. It turned out that people with high stereotype-congruent responses 
on the IAT are more likely to exhibit signs of social unease when conversing with 
a black experimenter. In particular higher IAT biases “predicted greater speaking 
time, more smiling, more extemporaneous social comments, fewer speech errors, 
and fewer speech hesitations in interactions with the White (vs Black) 
experimenter,” McConnell and Leibold, (2001).8 Scores on implicit attitude 
measures also predict less eye contact and increased blinking when in 
conversation with a black experimenter (Dovidio et al., 1997), as well as 
predicting the number of times participants touch the hand of a black 
experimenter, (Wilson et al., 2000).  
 IAT bias also predicts a range of ‘real-world’ discriminatory behaviours. 
Doctors with high IAT race bias are less likely to offer treatment to black patients 
with the clinical presentation of heart disease than to white patients with the same 
clinical presentation of the disease (Green, et al., 2007). Swedish recruiters with 
high IAT race bias are significantly less likely to offer a job interview to an 
applicant with a name that they perceive as belonging to a Muslim, as compared 
to applicants with a Swedish name (Rooth, 2007). Judges with high IAT race bias 
                                                
 
8 Social interactions were observed by the experimenters themselves, as well as two trained judges 
via videotape. There was good agreement across all observers, (McConnell and Leibold, 2001).  
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gave harsher (mock) sentences to defendants when primed with information 
associated with black people than those who exhibited less IAT bias (Rachlinski 
et al., 2009). White student participants with high IAT race bias are more likely to 
recommend disproportionate budget cuts for Jewish, Asian and Black student 
organisations, (Rudman and Ashmore, 2007).9 These results were observed, even 
when participants indicated on questionnaires (where participants report the 
attitudes they take themselves to have, without the significant time pressure of the 
IAT and similar measures) that they have broadly egalitarian attitudes. Indeed, 
there is typically no or only a low correlation between IAT (and similar) measures 
of attitude and prejudice exhibited on self-report questionnaires, a fact which is 
often taken to be indicative that implicit bias is a distinct phenomenon from the 
kind of attitudes that people profess to have on self-reports (Nosek et al. 2007). 
 Even more worryingly, those required to make fast—often life-ending—
decisions about whether a person is carrying a weapon are also likely to be 
affected by implicit bias. When participants in an experiment are pressed to 
respond quickly, those who see a black face before they see either a gun or a non-
gun object are more likely to mistake a non-gun object for a gun than when they 
see a white face (Payne, 2005, 2006). This phenomenon, which Payne terms 
‘weapon bias’, correlates with IAT bias (Payne, 2005). Weapon bias has been 
shown to affect US police officers in an experimental setting (Plant & Peruche, 
2005). 
 There are a number of other experiments which show bias in behaviour, 
without correlating such bias with scores on an implicit attitude measure, such as 
the IAT, but which take other measures to demonstrate that participants do not 
seem to intend to make discriminatory choices. Insofar as bias seems to manifest 
in action automatically, these results are also generally considered to reveal cases 
of implicitly biased behaviour. A notable example is found in Uhlmann and 
Cohen (2005), who had participants assess the resumes of two candidates, and 
then judge who is most suited to a professional role. Uhlmann and Cohen divided 
participants into two groups and asked them to rate the suitability of two (made 
up) candidates for the role of police chief, then asked them to decide who they 
                                                
 
9 These participants are also more likely to report having engaged in racial discrimination in the 
past, including using verbal slurs, exclusion behaviours and even physical harm, although these 
would seem to be discriminatory behaviour of which the participants in question may well be 
aware. 
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would hire and to give their reasons as to why. In group A, candidates are 
presented with an educated but not very streetwise woman, and a streetwise, but 
not very educated man. In group B, candidates are presented with an educated but 
not very streetwise man, and a streetwise, but not very educated woman. On 
average, both groups preferred the man, with participants in group A citing his 
streetwise credentials as the desired criteria for the role, whilst group B cited their 
preferred candidate’s educated background. The candidate descriptions were 
copied verbatim, differing only for the gender of the name, and so the implicitly 
preferred ‘qualification’ would seem to be neither education nor streetwise 
credentials—but gender. During questioning, however, participants make no 
reference to gender as a factor in their deliberation.  
 A range of other studies are often quoted in the implicit bias literature, 
which might be described as investigating the extent to which phenomena 
Uhlmann and Cohen (2005) observed in the laboratory affect actual hiring and 
candidate appraisal. For instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) sent a sample 
of C.V.s with similar qualifications to a number of US employers, which appeared 
to come from either ‘Emily’ or ‘Greg’ (typical racialised-as-white American 
names), or ‘Lakisha’ or ‘Jamal’ (typical racialised-as-black American names). It 
turned out that US employers are far more likely to offer job interviews to ‘Emily’ 
or ‘Greg’ than to ‘Lakisha’ or ‘Jamal’, despite the fact that the C.V. differed only 
in the names at the top. In a similar vein, Milkman (2014) showed that when 
university faculty are contacted by fictional prospective students seeking to 
discuss research opportunities, they ignore requests perceived to come from 
women and non-Caucasian candidates at a significantly higher rate than those 
perceived to come from Caucasian men, even though the content of the emails 
remains unchanged. Further, Budden et al. (2008) report that the representation of 
women authors in the journal Behavioural Ecology increased by 33% when they 
started practising anonymous submission so that editorial decisions could not be 
influenced by the apparent gender of the author.  
 Whilst these results are at least sometimes referred to as examples of 
implicit bias, I think that we ought to proceed with caution before concluding that 
the discrimination observed above by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), 
Milkman (2014) and Budden et al. (2008) is determinately the result of implicit 
bias. My concern with these three studies, as compared to those described 
previously, is that experimenters did not measure participants’ self-reported 
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attitudes, and so these results are consistent with the possibility that explicit 
racism and sexism accounts, at least in part, for the discriminatory behaviour 
observed. But even leaving these three studies aside, I take it that the other results 
presented in this section are sufficient for it being highly likely that bias manifests 
in the actions of people who profess to having egalitarian attitudes—attitudes 
which we might think ought to prevent their discriminatory actions, and yet, 
which seem to fail to. 
 Whether there is a robust distinction in kind between the attitudes which 
influence action in this way and the more everyday species of cognitive 
phenomena to which we’re already committed (such as beliefs) is one of the 
guiding questions of this thesis (wherein, in Chapters 3-5, I argue that no such 
principled distinction is defensible). In the remainder of this chapter, however, it 
will be useful to look at some of the ways in which the notion of the implicit has 
been characterised by psychologists, which will help to situate the argument to 
come.  
 
1.3. HOW IS THE NOTION OF THE IMPLICIT CHARACTERISED? 
One might wonder what it is that is supposed to be distinctly implicit about 
attitudes observed on the IAT and related paradigms, as well as the discriminatory 
behaviour with which these attitudes correlate. As I mentioned briefly in §1.1 
(following Payne & Gawronski, 2010), the implicit/explicit distinction within 
cognitive science was not, at least at first, defined with respect to the subject’s 
conscious awareness. Rather, the distinction as psychologists identified it had to 
do with the notion that the relevant processes are automatic as opposed to 
controlled: That is, they simply occur, without proceeding from an intention, and 
unfold without the guidance of attention when they influence behaviour—
Schneider and Shiffrin define an automatic process as that which is activated 
“without the necessity for active control or attention by the subject” (1977: 2). 
Note that a process’s being automatic in this sense is consistent with a person 
being aware that they are performing intention-incongruent behaviour. For 
instance, a patella-reflex movement is automatic, but an individual may be aware 
of it when it occurs. This is significant because, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 
2, many philosophers (Kelly & Roedder, 2008; Saul, 2013; Levy, 2014a) suggest 
that unavailability to awareness is an essential characteristic of an attitude’s being 
‘implicit’. As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 3, the fact that a process is 
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automatic is not incompatible with the subject’s having awareness that such a 
process is nonetheless operative. 
 According to Moors et al. (2010: 20), it is characteristic of an automatic 
process that it can result in effects when the subject in question did not have the 
goal of achieving such an effect. So one might think that further support for the 
notion that the IAT measures automatic processes comes from the finding that 
people cannot ‘fake’ an IAT test: Participants do not eliminate biased responses 
on stereotype incongruent trials just because they are instructed to do so (Banse, 
Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Steffans 2004).10 Relatedly, those who are asked to form a 
goal to not stereotype are not able to reduce the extent to which their responses 
are stereotyped on an IAT (Lowery et al., 2001).  
 Another way in which psychologists have distinguished implicit attitudes 
from explicit attitudes is with reference, not to the attitudes themselves, but with 
respect to the processes by which we measure them. (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). 
The IAT and related paradigms presented in §1.1 are often called ‘indirect’ 
measures of attitude. This is because on these indirect measures, attitudes are 
determined by requiring the participant to elicit some behaviour, other than 
directly telling the experimenter what their attitude is, from which an attitude may 
then be inferred. For example, if a person responds more quickly when pairing 
male concepts and career concepts than when pairing female concepts and career 
concepts, then it is inferred that an attitude in which male concepts are associated 
more closely with career concepts than are female concepts is guiding the 
behaviour in question. Whilst attitudes are inferred from behaviour on indirect 
measures, these measures demand fast responses, and participants have very little 
time to deliberate about how to respond, so it is thought that these measures reveal 
unmediated attitudes about the target items.  
 In comparison, asking participants to indicate whether they agree or 
disagree with a particular statement about a target item in a questionnaire, or to 
simply report their own attitudes to experimenters, are known as ‘direct’ measures 
of attitude. Here, there is no need to infer the attitude from behaviour, as it is 
explicitly expressed in what the participant says or writes. Whilst, as we will see 
in the coming chapters, many philosophers have argued that we should think that 
                                                
 
10 This result does not yet mean that participants are unable to control the manner in which implicit 
biases affect their behaviour in general, as I will argue more fully in Chapter 5. 
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the answers that people give on self-report questionnaires reveal their beliefs, it is 
worth being clear that, at present, there is no experimental measure which can 
deliver a wholly accurate, direct assessment of the statements and sentiments that 
participants genuinely believe: When participants respond to self-report 
questionnaires, they do have time to deliberate about how to respond, and so it is 
possible that the answers that they give are not a direct record of their attitudes, 
but a record of what they would like to be seen to believe, for instance. Research 
demonstrates that self report measures are open to modification when subjects are 
motivated to comply with social norms of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998; Nier, 
2005). For example, participants express more highly prejudiced racial attitudes 
on a self-report measures when their responses are anonymous as compared to 
when they are reported to the experimenter (Plant & Devine, 1998). Further, if 
participants are led to believe that experimenters will know if their self-reports do 
not match their ‘genuine’ personal attitudes, (thus reducing the motivation to 
report socially desirable attitudes in place of accurate personal attitudes) then 
participants report attitudes which do correlate with their IAT scores (Nier, 2005). 
 None of this is to doubt that the experiments presented in this chapter pick 
out genuine discriminatory effects that are prevalent in our social interactions in 
the world beyond the laboratory—far from it. I think that the evidence suggests 
that these effects are real and pervasive. Rather, my contention is with the way in 
which the attitudes implicated should be characterised. So, I emphasise that when 
I use the term ‘implicit bias’, or more generally ‘implicit attitude’, I do not intend 
to refer to a sui generis kind of mental entity, distinguishable from beliefs on 
account of failing to lack a set of properties that beliefs have. Instead, I use the 
term ‘implicit bias’ to pick out the set of attitudes which are the subject of the 
foregoing studies, and which have been shown to manifest in all kinds of social 
interactions, without yet being committed to there being any particular 
characteristics which all implicit biases share, and that all beliefs, for instance, 
lack.   
 
SUMMARY 
An extensive body of research reveals that people harbour what have been termed 
‘implicit biases’, in which social groups are associated with stereotypical traits, 
and which appear to guide behaviour automatically, often without the subject’s 
awareness of the guiding role that these biases play. These attitudes may be 
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observed on a variety of ‘indirect’ measures, typically do not correlate with the 
beliefs and values that people profess to hold on ‘direct’ measures, and are highly 
likely to manifest in many real-world decisions and actions. Whether these 
implicit biases are substantially distinct from more familiar cognitions such as 
beliefs, or whether they lie on a continuum with beliefs, is one of the guiding 
questions of this thesis. In the next chapter, I present a range of arguments for the 
former ‘substantial distinction’ view, before arguing (in Chapters 3—5) that each 
version of the substantial distinction view fails.   
24 
CHAPTER 2: THE SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION VIEW OF 
IMPLICIT BIAS 
 
The chapter presents a view about the nature of implicit attitudes defended by 
several philosophers: Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder (2008), Tamar Szabó 
Gendler (2008a, 2008b), Jennifer Saul (2013), and Neil Levy (2013, 2014a, 
2014b). According to these philosophers, implicitly biased attitudes have certain 
characteristics concerning awareness, structure and processing, and control. These 
philosophers further claim that, because implicit biases have these characteristics, 
there is a distinction in kind between (i) our implicit biases, and the actions that 
they guide; and (ii) attitudes that we attribute to persons and think of as agential, 
such as beliefs and desires, and the actions that they guide. I call this the 
‘substantial distinction’ view of implicit bias or ‘SD’ for short.  
A subset of SD theorists, for instance, Kelly and Roedder, Saul, and Levy, 
argue that, because of the ways in which implicit biases differ from agential 
attitudes and actions, implicit biases and the actions that they influence, fail to 
meet at least some of the criteria necessary for moral responsibility, and so we 
cannot be morally responsible for having implicit biases, or for manifesting 
implicit bias in our actions. I will refer to this subset of views as the ‘Substantial 
Distinction: Responsibility’ views, or ‘SDR’ views for short.  
I first identify some key concepts that are central to the dialectic, and 
explain how I shall be using them (§2.1). Following this, I present the views of 
the five philosophers as above who have recently written on the topic of implicit 
bias and who defend versions of the SD view: Jennifer Saul; Daniel Kelly and 
Erica Roedder; Tamar Szabó Gendler; and Neil Levy (§2.2). I then identify some 
common themes in the SD arguments (§2.3). Accordingly, arguments for a 
substantial distinction between implicit biases and agential attitudes are made on 
the basis of 
 
(i) our awareness of the attitudes and how they guide actions;  
(ii) the structure and processing of the attitudes; and  
(iii) our control over the attitudes and the actions that they guide. 
 
These three factors will be the focus of the three subsequent chapters.  
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In the summary of this chapter, I outline the account that I will present in 
this thesis, for which I will gradually build support in the dialectic to come. As I 
respond to SD arguments made on the basis of (i)-(iii) over the course of Chapters 
3-5, I gradually build support for what I call the ‘continuum thesis’ of implicit 
bias. According to the continuum thesis, there is no single characteristic that all 
beliefs and belief-guided actions have; that all implicit biases, and implicitly 
biased actions lack. Because SDR views rely on the truth of SD views, the 
establishment of the continuum thesis gives us a response to SDR views ‘for free’. 
 
2.1 TERMINOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS 
Before presenting the SD and SDR arguments, it will be helpful to have some 
background on two concepts to which the forthcoming arguments will frequently 
refer. These are the concepts of agency and responsibility. In what follows, I will 
briefly outline how these terms are to be understood in my discussion. 
 
2.1.1. Agency 
Much philosophy is premised on the idea that humans (and perhaps also some 
non-humans) are agents, beings who have the capacity to bring about changes in 
their bodies and beyond in accordance with attitudes such as their desires, beliefs, 
and intentions, although the precise details of how they do this differ across 
accounts.11 There are at least some bodily changes which are considered to be 
uncontroversially non-agential, at least in part because they are not guided by 
these sorts of attitudes. For instance, both the activity of digestion and reflex 
movements bring about changes in the agent’s body but they do so without the 
guidance of desires, beliefs or intentions, and so are typically considered to be 
non-agential occurrences. 
It is widely thought that attitudes such as desires, beliefs, and intentions 
involve the agent in some important sense. Exactly what this amounts to differs 
across accounts. For instance, according to Neil Levy (2014a), for an attitude that 
P to be agential, the agent has to have a particular sort of awareness of P. 
According to Pamela Hieronymi (2008, 2009), for an attitude that P to be 
agential, the agent has to have ‘settled the question’ of whether P. When agential 
                                                
 
11 For some example accounts of agency see Davidson, 1971; Watson, 1975; Dennett, 1987; 
Velleman, 1992; Mele, 2003; Hornsby, 2004; Hieronymi, 2009. 
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attitudes bring about changes in the agent’s movements, or further changes in the 
agent’s attitudes, these changes are, at least sometimes, considered to be actions 
which are rightly identified with the agent in question. For instance, raising a 
glass of water to one’s mouth is an agential action, if it is guided by attitudes 
which involve the agent, such as a desire to quench one’s thirst, the belief that 
water quenches thirst, and the intention to utilise the thirst-quenching properties 
of the water to quench one’s thirst.  
My aim in this thesis is not to offer an account of agency. Instead, my aim 
is to investigate whether the conditions which, it has been argued, are necessary 
for an attitude such as a belief to be agential, as well as the conditions necessary 
for belief-guided actions to be agential, are also present in the case of at least 
some implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions. I shall approach that question 
by identifying three conditions that have been said to be necessary for agency: 
awareness, structure and processing of attitudes, and control. In §2.2 I outline and 
examine a number of arguments for the claim that implicit biases, and implicitly 
biased actions, do not fulfil one or more of the conditions which render attitudes 
such as beliefs, and the actions that they guide, as agential. 
 
2.1.2. ‘Responsibility’ 
There is a large and diverse literature on what being responsible amounts to (for a 
detailed overview, see Fischer, 1999). Generally, there is agreement across most 
accounts that to be responsible for some episode of ϕ-ing is to be liable for praise 
or blame from one’s community. A common theme between a number of accounts 
is that it is a necessary condition on an agent’s being responsible for some ϕ-ing, 
that the ϕ-ing in question is, in some sense, agential. For instance, I cannot be held 
responsible for digesting my sandwich, because digestion is not an agential action. 
Accordingly, some (such as Wolf, 1990; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998) hold that 
(moral) responsibility is a matter of the agential ability to respond to (moral) 
reasons. If ϕ-ing conforms with or violates some moral norm, then agents are 
morally responsible for ϕ-ing if they are able to act in light of reasons they see 
there to be for ϕ-ing. Others (such as Watson, 1996; Smith, 2008; Hieronymi, 
2008) suggest that (moral) responsibility is a matter of the manifestation one’s 
agential attitudes. Here, if ϕ-ing conforms with or violates some moral norm, then 
agents are morally responsible for ϕ-ing if ϕ-ing flows from the agent’s evaluative 
judgements and other agential commitments. Another suggestion is that agents are 
27 
morally responsible for ϕ-ing, if, in ϕ-ing, they are the proper subjects of 
particular sentiments (the ‘reactive attitudes’) that arise as a result of their 
“participation with others in interpersonal human relationships” (Strawson 1962). 
On this account, judgments of moral responsibility track the natural reactions that 
we have to the actions of other people, which are expressive of how much we care 
about their actions on the basis of our joint participation in a social relationship. 
 Some have distinguished between ‘backward-looking’ and ‘forward-
looking’ notions of responsibility (Goodin, 1995; van de Poel, 2011). Backward-
looking notions of responsibility have to do with actions that an agent has already 
performed, whilst forward-looking notions address the obligations people might 
have to performing various future actions. My focus here (as well as the focus of a 
number of views with regards to implicit bias that I will shortly present) is 
primarily on backwards-looking notions of responsibility: on the question of, 
given the nature of implicit biases, whether agents could be morally responsible 
for the implicitly biased actions that they have already performed.   
Here are some examples of how philosophers concerned with implicit bias 
understand the notion of moral responsibility. Jules Holroyd (2015), for instance, 
maintains that an agent is morally responsible when they are liable to praise or 
blame, or other sorts of sanctions, and suggests that these are appropriate if the 
agent ϕ-ed intentionally, where ϕ-ing violates some moral standard. 
 
To say that the agent is blameworthy, then, is to say that they have 
intentionally done something that violated a moral standard that we expected 
them to maintain, and as a result certain responses would be warranted: 
disapprobation or other forms of informal sanction on the part of others; 
resentment on the part of the wronged party; guilt on the part of the wrong-
doer, and resolution to avoid such behaviours or actions in future (indeed, to 
take responsibility for that) (Holroyd, 2015: 513). 
 
Neil Levy (2014a) also couches moral responsibility in terms of how 
agents are permissibly treated by others in the wake of acting, suggesting that 
blameworthiness informs further social interactions, such as the distribution of 
burdens. Accordingly 
 
…an agent is morally responsible for an action or omission if the fact that 
they have performed that action, in the circumstances and manner in which 
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they acted, is relevant to how they may permissibly be treated when it comes 
to the distribution of benefits and burdens. To say an agent is blameworthy 
for an action, for instance it to say that (ceteris paribus), because they have 
acted in that way, they may permissibly be punished or that, if burdens are to 
be distributed, it is better that they fall on them rather than on others who are 
not blameworthy (Levy, 2014a: 2-3). 
 
As with the notion of ‘agential’, my aim in this thesis is not to offer an 
account of moral responsibility. Instead, I will present a number of accounts on 
which it is argued that implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions, fail to meet 
some of the preconditions for their agents to be considered morally responsible. I 
will then respond arguing that at least some implicit biases, and implicitly biased 
actions do meet these conditions which SDR theorists maintain are necessary for 
moral responsibility. 
Let us now turn to the SD and SDR views. 
 
2.2. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION (SD) ACCOUNTS 
In the following, I give an overview of the substantial distinction (SD) arguments, 
that there is a distinction in kind between our implicit biases and the actions 
which flow from them, and attitudes that we attribute to persons and think of as 
agential (such as beliefs and desires) and the actions which flow from them. I also 
give an overview of the related substantial distinction: responsibility (SDR) 
arguments that, in the manner that they differ from beliefs, and belief guided 
actions, implicitly biased actions fail to meet at least some of the criteria 
necessary for moral responsibility, and so we can be morally responsible neither 
for having implicit biases, nor for manifesting implicit bias in our actions. For 
clarity of exposition, I will label the various SD(R) theorist’s main claims with 
their author’s initials. I will then assess these claims in the final section of this 
chapter and identify three common themes: those of (i) awareness, (ii) structure 
and processing, and (iii) control.  
 
2.2.1. Jennifer Saul (2013) 
Jennifer Saul characterises implicit biases as ‘unconscious’, suggesting that:  
 
The implicit biases that we are concerned with here are unconscious biases 
that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the 
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groups that our biases “target”. …in the case of women in philosophy, 
implicit biases will be unconscious biases that affect the way we judge (for 
instance) the quality of a woman’s work, leading us to evaluate it more 
negatively than it deserves… (Saul: 2013, 40) 
 
She also contrasts implicit biases with ‘traditionally understood bias’ which she 
suggests is constituted by conscious belief (2013: 39-40). 
 
By focusing on the phenomena that I discuss in this chapter, I don’t mean to 
suggest that bias as traditionally understood (e.g., the conscious belief that 
women are bad at philosophy) is a thing of the past. Unfortunately, it does 
still exist. (Saul: 2013, 39-40) 
 
There are a number of ways in which the categorisation of an entity as conscious 
or unconscious may be philosophically significant. It might be 
phenomenologically, metaphysically, or epistemologically significant, for 
instance. In Saul’s case, maintaining that implicit biases are unconscious seems to 
be an epistemologically relevant characterisation, since, in the above quotation, 
implicit biases are said to distort our epistemic practices—our judgements and 
evaluations. In other words, for Saul, it would seem that what is significant about 
our implicit biases, from the agential perspective, is that we do not know about 
them. 
However, as Holroyd (2012, 2015a) has suggested, Saul’s characterisation 
of implicit bias as unconscious is ambiguous. On one interpretation, it is implicit 
biases, qua attitudes, that are unconscious—a person is not conscious that they 
have the attitude, and is not conscious of its content. On the other, it is the 
influence of a person’s implicit biases on their actions that is unconscious. 
Possibly, Saul thinks that both are the case.  
Perhaps owing to the fact that the main focus of the 2013 paper is to make 
the case for how prevalent implicit bias is likely to be in philosophy departments, 
and what we ought to do about it, however, Saul’s argument is somewhat quick. 
In the following, oft quoted passage, she makes a number of other claims about 
what characterises implicit biases, and why we ought not to be held morally 
responsible for our implicit biases. (Again, this SDR claim is ambiguous between 
moral responsibility for having implicit biases or moral responsibility for the 
influence of our implicit biases on action): 
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A person should not be blamed for an implicit bias of which they are 
completely unaware that results solely from the fact that they live in a sexist 
culture. Even once they become aware that they are likely to have implicit 
biases, they do not instantly become able to control their biases, and so they 
should not be blamed for them. (They may, however, be blamed if they fail 
to act properly on the knowledge that they are likely to be biased—e.g., by 
investigating and implementing remedies to deal with their biases.) (Saul: 
2013, 55) 
 
In addition to the claim that we are not consciously aware of our implicit 
biases, on either of the two interpretations given above,  Saul adds a claim about 
the genesis of our implicit biases: that they result solely from our living in a 
bigoted culture.12 This latter claim would seem to be about how we came to have 
our implicit biases and how much control we have over them: if implicit biases 
result solely from our culture, then this implies that we do not exert control over 
the acquisition of our implicit biases. Saul accepts that we are able to become 
aware that we are likely to have implicit biases, through learning about the 
empirical studies that reveal the prevalence of such biases and the mitigation 
strategies that are effective.  
As Holroyd has pointed out, the relevant sense in which people are 
unaware of their implicit biases for Saul is that they cannot introspect on their 
implicit biases or the influence of these biases on action. Holroyd summarises 
introspective awareness in the following: 
 
One might have introspective awareness with respect to whether certain 
beliefs or feelings are playing a role in one’s decisions: one can ask oneself, 
and on reflection give an answer. But, the claim goes, one cannot simply 
introspect and discern if an implicit bias is operating in the production of 
action. (Holroyd, 2015: 513) 
 
Indeed, other theorists have claimed that lack of introspective awareness is a 
distinguishing feature of implicit bias: 
                                                
 
12 The quoted claim (and the main focus of Saul’s paper) is about implicit biases against women, 
but we can assume that the point generalises to biases against all stigmatised groups, which Saul 
does discuss elsewhere in the paper. 
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…a wealth of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that we are lousy at 
introspection. ...implicit biases are those that we carry without awareness or 
conscious direction. (Kang et al. 2012: 2)  
 
(See also Kelly and Roedder (2008) in the next section for corroboration of the 
claim as regards introspective awareness.) However, in the second sentence of the 
last quote from Saul, it is clear that she does concede that people may have some 
kind of awareness that they have implicit biases, they may have inferential 
awareness of this. After learning about the various data such as that presented in 
Chapter 1, people can infer that they, like the majority of the population, are likely 
to be implicit biased. I will investigate the introspective/inferential distinction in 
much more detail in Chapter 3. Even inferential awareness that one may have 
implicit biases is not, for Saul, sufficient for being able to exert control over the 
influence of implicit biases on action. Accordingly, I think that we can attribute 
the following three key claims to Saul: 
 
JS1:  Implicit biases are unconscious (implicit biases and/or their 
influence on our actions are not available to introspective 
awareness) 
JS2:  We are not able to exert control over the acquisition of our implicit 
biases, in virtue of the fact that they result solely from our living in 
a bigoted culture. 
JS3:  Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is 
not sufficient for control over implicit biases 
 
Saul does not expressly contrast implicit biases with agential states. 
However, she is committed to an SDR claim—that is, a claim about our 
responsibility for implicit bias, in virtue of the distinguishing features that she 
thinks implicit biases have. She suggests that because of JS1, JS2 and JS3 people 
should not be blamed for their implicit bias: either for having an implicit bias or 
for acting on its influence.  
In order for Saul’s blamelessness claims to go through, though, some extra 
premises are needed:  
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JS4:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is introspectively aware of m/that m influences action. 
JS5:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is able to control the acquisition of m. 
JS6: It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for action 
influenced by mental state m, that when an agent becomes 
inferentially aware that she has m, she is [instantly] able to control 
the influence of m on action. 
 
It is not clear if Saul thinks that it is the conjunction of S1, S2 and S3 (together 
with the implicitly held S4, S5 and S6) that entail that agents are not morally 
responsible for implicit biases, or whether each claim is sufficient on its own to 
deliver blamelessness. I’ll explore this in more detail in the chapters to come. 
 
2.2.2. Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder (2008) 
Daniel Kelly and Erica Roedder (2008) put forward a case for thinking that 
certain features distinguish implicit biases from the agential attitudes and actions 
for which we are morally blameworthy. Like Saul (2013)—or, more precisely, 
Holroyd’s (2015) interpretation of Saul—Kelly and Roedder (2008) think that we 
lack introspective awareness of our implicit biases: 
 
Neither introspection nor honest self-report are reliable guides to the 
presence of such mental states, and one may harbor implicit biases that are 
diametrically opposed to one’s explicitly stated and consciously avowed 
attitudes. (Kelly and Roedder, 2008: 532) 
 
Their main claims, then, are: 
 
K&R1:  People cannot reliably introspect on the presence of their implicit 
biases 
K&R2:   The [apparent] content of our implicit biases may be diametrically 
opposed to the content of our explicitly stated and consciously 
avowed attitudes  
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I think K&R2 has to be formulated as a claim about the content of the states 
instead of the states themselves: it not clear what it is for a mental state to oppose 
another mental state, other than in terms of their contents. But since there is a 
debate about whether implicit biases are contentful states, at this stage, we should 
accept that implicit biases might only seem to have a content in terms of the way 
that they affect action, whilst possibly not being the right kind of entities 
themselves to have a content.13 (I will explore whether implicit biases have a 
content, and what sort of content this is, more fully in Chapter 4).  
 Kelly and Roedder (2008) also consider our reasoning capacities to be 
‘impaired’ in harbouring implicit biases, and say that we have no introspective 
access to that impairment (2008: 532): 
 
…if you harbor a racial bias, then you are not responding to reasons in the 
way that you ought to. (Kelly and Roedder, 2008: 532) 
 
There is some ambiguity in this claim. Firstly, it is not clear whether Kelly and 
Roedder mean that people do not respond to reasons when they acquire an 
implicit bias, or whether they do not respond to reasons when an implicit bias 
influences action. Secondly, it is not clear whether they mean that implicit biases 
could not be responsive to reasons, or whether we just are not in fact responsive to 
reasons when we acquire/are influenced by them. So I’ll represent all of these 
possibilities:  
 
K&R3:  Implicit biases cannot respond/do not happen to respond to 
reasons, when acquired/when influencing action.  
 
Another notable characteristic that Kelly and Roedder attribute to implicit 
biases is evident in the following: 
 
…the IAT requires subjects to make snap judgments that must be made 
quickly, and thus without moderating influence of introspection and 
deliberation and often without conscious intention. Biases revealed by an 
                                                
 
13 For arguments to the effect that implicit biases don’t have propositional content, see Gendler, 
2008a, 2008b, and Levy, 2014a, and for arguments in favour, see and de Houwer, 2014 and 
Mandelbaum, forthcoming. 
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IAT are often thought to implicate relatively automatic processes. (Kelly and 
Roedder, 2008: 525) 
 
This would appear to be a claim about how implicit biases operate to 
influence action. So: 
 
K&R4: Implicit biases influence action automatically 
 
Kelly and Roedder make a claim about the features that establish that we are not 
morally responsible for harbouring implicit biases in the following passage: 
 
Particularly in the case of implicit attitudes, it is salient that their acquisition 
may be rapid, automatic, and uncontrollable. These features, it might be 
thought, are related to features that establish blameworthiness – such as 
identification (Frankfurt) or reasons-responsiveness (Fischer and Ravizza). 
For instance, it might be said that the implicitly racist person doesn’t identify 
with his implicit attitude, or that the attitude isn’t responsive to reasons; thus 
we cannot hold a person fully accountable for those implicit attitudes. If this 
is right, one might say that such attitudes are morally wrong – and 
condemnable – but that the person himself cannot be blamed for having 
them. (Kelly and Roedder, 2008: 532)  
 
Two things should be noted here, before the relevant claims are formulated. 
Firstly, Kelly and Roedder suggest that they are reluctant to embrace the claim 
about a lack of responsibility wholeheartedly, should further research render this 
claim inaccurate: for instance, if narrow-mindedness were to partially explain the 
acquisition of implicit bias (2008: 532). Secondly, they clarify, in a footnote, the 
importance of coupling a relevant theory of moral responsibility with the claim 
that the acquisition of implicit biases is uncontrollable:  
 
We have stated that it is more salient that implicit attitudes are 
uncontrollable. That’s because, arguably, the acquisition of most explicit 
attitudes is uncontrollable as well; it’s just not salient at first glance. One 
does not control one’s acquisition of, for instance, one’s beliefs about plants, 
one’s attitudes towards pets, etc. So one will need to appeal to more complex 
or carefully delineated features – perhaps identification or reasons-
responsiveness – if one wants to claim that implicit attitudes are not proper 
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subjects of blame, but that explicit attitudes are. (Kelly and Roedder, 2008: 
537-8fn) 
 
Accordingly, then, we can ascribe to them the following claims: 
 
K&R5:  Implicit biases are acquired rapidly, automatically, and 
uncontrollably 
K&R6:  If moral responsibility for having mental state m turns on whether 
state m was not acquired rapidly, automatically, and 
uncontrollably, then people are not morally responsible for their 
implicit biases. 
 
Of course, it might be that moral responsibility does not turn on whether the 
relevant mental states are acquired rapidly, automatically, and uncontrollably, but 
nevertheless does turn on something like identification (Frankfurt, 1971) or 
reasons-responsiveness (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998)—characteristics which turn out 
to not be present in the case of implicit biases. It is beyond the scope of Kelly and 
Roedder’s (2008) paper to explore this possibility, and so it would be unwarranted 
to attribute any related claims to them. Since other SD theorists make more direct 
reasons-responsiveness and control claims (as we shall see shortly) I can focus on 
those.  
 
2.2.3. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008a, 2008b) 
Two things make Tamar Szabó Gendler’s position different from the views that 
we have just seen Saul, and Kelly and Roedder defend. Firstly, Gendler is not 
concerned with whether we are morally responsible for implicit bias, rather, she is 
interested in the features which distinguish implicit biases from some agential 
attitudes—beliefs in particular. Secondly, unlike Saul, and Kelly and Roedder, 
who discuss features that they think characterise implicit biases, but who do not 
explicitly state that no agential attitudes also share these characteristics, Gendler 
(2008a, 2008b) does present an explicit case for there being a substantial 
distinction between implicit biases on the one hand and agential attitudes such as 
beliefs on the other.  
Gendler thinks that implicit biases are “automatic associations” that are 
“inevitably” encoded, where people typically “disavow the normative content of 
these associations,” (2011: 38-9).  For Gendler, implicit biases are a subclass of a 
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kind of attitude which generates actions that subjects do not seem to fully 
endorse—a sui generis kind of mental state which she calls ‘alief’. Aliefs are 
supposed to be fundamentally different from agential attitudes such as beliefs. 
Unlike a belief, which might just have a representational component, and which 
figures in practical reasoning in virtue of its propositional content, a paradigmatic 
alief is an attitude with a representational component, an affective component and 
a behavioural component, all of which are “associatively linked” Gendler, 2008a: 
642). Gendler spells out this idea further, as follows: 
 
In paradigmatic cases, activated alief has three sorts of components: (a) the 
representation of some object or concept or situation or circumstance, 
perhaps propositionally, perhaps nonpropositionally, perhaps conceptually, 
perhaps nonconceptually; (b) the experience of some affective or emotional 
state; (c) the readying of some motor routine. (2008a: 643)  
 
An attitude’s being ‘associative’ means that its constituent concepts are not 
coupled together in virtue of their propositional contents. This is a technical 
psychological notion that I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, but it raises 
the possibility that some aliefs may bring about actions which are discordant with 
an agent’s beliefs, in that they contradict the contents of these beliefs. 
According to Gendler, aliefs generate actions in a number of instances 
where subjects have reason to refrain from engaging in such actions. To illustrate 
the point, let’s look at her treatment of another subclass in the alief taxonomy: 
unwarranted disgust responses. She appeals to a series of experiments from Rozin 
and colleagues (Rozin et al., 1986; Rozin et al., 1990) which reveal that 
participants show reluctance to put their mouths on perfectly clean pieces of 
plastic that are shaped like vomit; prefer not to eat soup from a brand-new bed 
pan; and generally chose to drink from a glass labelled ‘table sugar’ over one 
labelled ‘not poison’, even though they know there is no poison in either glass. 
Gendler suggests that whilst they believe that the plastic is sterile, for instance, 
seeing something shaped like vomit activates an alief with the representational 
content of vomit, as well as the affective content of disgust, which in turn 
activates an avoidance motor routine.  
Unwarranted fear responses are also a part of the alief taxonomy. Gendler 
notes that some people who believe a high glass platform to be perfectly 
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structurally sound nevertheless experience feelings of fear and vertigo as they 
walk across it, with some reluctant to walk across it at all. In this instance, whilst 
people believe that the bridge is safe, seeing the drop activates an alief with the 
representational content of height, and the affective content of fear, which, again, 
activates some avoidance behaviour. Well rehearsed, but misapplied behaviour 
routines also count as aliefs. In another example, after forgetting her wallet and 
borrowing cash from a friend, Gendler reaches for her wallet to stow the cash—
finding that she does not have it on her person, which was of course the very 
reason she borrowed the cash in the first place. (In this last example, it is not clear 
what the affective component of the alief in question is supposed to be, but 
perhaps this is an example of a non-paradigmatic alief). Note that Gendler is not 
committed to the idea that an alief’s becoming activated entails that a subject will 
carry out a particular behavioural routine, instead she suggests that activation of 
the alief “renders it more likely that the routine will actually be performed” 
(Gendler, 2008a: 644).  
Whilst Gendler does not give a particularly extended exposition of implicit 
bias insofar as it is an example of alief, she suggests that it is alief states that bring 
about cases of implicitly biased action, such as those described in the following: 
 
An avowed anti-racist exhibits differential startle responses when Caucasian 
and African faces are flashed before her eyes. (2008b: 553)  
 
She goes on to suggest that:  
 
What the IAT unquestionably reveals—as its name indicates—are implicit 
associations...between certain racial categories, and highly-valenced 
affective content. (2008b: 577) 
 
Whilst the person in the first quotation above believes in racial equality, seeing an 
‘African’ face activates an alief with that representational content, which activates 
some negative affect, which in turn readies a motor routine for some sort of 
behaviour—perhaps an avoidance behaviour. And even if the person in question 
believes in racial equality, and has good reasons for such a belief, according to 
Gendler, the aliefs which govern her implicit responses do not change. Her aliefs 
are just not sensitive to the propositional information encoded in her belief, 
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information which promotes egalitarian actions, not discriminatory actions. But 
once the representational component of the alief is activated, the (discriminatory) 
behavioural routine is executed; or, at least, the agent is primed to execute it, and 
therefore more likely to execute it than she would have been, should the 
representational and affective components of the alief not have been activated. 
Let us take stock, and summarise the key claims so far: 
 
TG1:  Implicit biases are aliefs: sui generis tripartite mental states with a 
representational component, an affective component, and a 
behavioural component, which are ‘associatively linked’. 
TG2:  Activation of the representational content of an implicit bias 
renders it more likely that an implicitly biased behavioural routine 
will actually be performed. 
 
Beliefs, according to Gendler, are importantly different to aliefs. She holds that: 
 
If I believe that P, and subsequently learn that not-P, I will revise my 
belief... Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease alieving that P... 
alief just is not reality-sensitive in the way belief is. Its content does not 
track (one’s considered impression of) the world. (2008a: 651) 
 
She also says: 
 
Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence; aliefs change in response 
to changes in habit. If new evidence won't cause you to change your 
behaviour in response to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is due to 
alief rather than belief. (2008b: 566) 
 
As Gendler is talking more generally about what she sees as the differences 
between aliefs and beliefs in these sections, she does not appeal directly to any 
evidence to support the idea that implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, do not 
update in response to evidence. Perhaps she has in mind the idea that explicit 
egalitarian attitudes (as measured by self-report questionnaires) appear to co-exist 
alongside implicit biases (Nosek et al, 2007). If we suppose that people hold their 
explicit egalitarian attitudes in light of egalitarian reasons, but then observe that 
they have implicit biases with (apparent) contents that contradict that of the 
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explicit attitudes, then we might conclude that implicit biases have failed to 
respond to the reasons that the person in question evidently sees there to be when 
forming and acting in accordance with their explicit beliefs.14 
When Gendler suggests, in the above passages, that beliefs will be revised, 
and that they change in response to evidence, whilst aliefs do not, it is not clear 
whether these are descriptive or normative claims. If descriptive, then the claim is 
that beliefs in fact do change in response to evidence, whilst aliefs, in fact, do not. 
But then consider what Gendler says elsewhere:  
 
…belief aims to ‘track truth’ in the sense that belief is subject to immediate 
revision in the face of changes in our all-things-considered evidence. When 
we gain new all-things-considered evidence—either as the result of a change 
in our evidential relation to the world, or as a result of a change in the 
(wider) world itself—the norms of belief require that our beliefs change 
accordingly. (2008b: 565, emphasis mine) 
 
If normative, then the claim is that beliefs are governed by norms that require that 
they change in response to evidence, even if, in fact, they do not always change 
accordingly, whilst aliefs are either governed by no norms at all, or they are 
governed by norms that differ from those which govern belief. (Although, as I 
shall argue in Chapter 4, neither possible claim succeeds as a means to distinguish 
beliefs from aliefs in general, and implicit biases specifically.) 
So, we have some further important claims as regards implicit biases 
(insofar as they are aliefs), and how they supposedly differ from beliefs: 
 
TG3:  Implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, are not sensitive to the 
propositional information encoded in mental states such as beliefs: 
Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease having an 
implicit bias with the apparent content that P. 
TG4:  Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence, implicit 
attitudes change in response to changes in habit. If new evidence 
won't cause you to change your prejudiced behaviour in response 
                                                
 
14 Indeed, Gendler’s remarks in the Philosophy TV debate with Schwitzgebel appear to support 
this interpretation. See http://www.philostv.com/2010/09/02/tamar-gendler-and-eric-schwitzgebel/  
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to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is due to an implicit 
attitude rather than belief.15  
 
2.2.4. Neil Levy (2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015) 
Neil Levy has written extensively about implicit attitudes generally, and more 
specifically on whether implicit biases are agential or non-agential attitudes, as 
well as on whether agents are morally responsible for implicit bias. I am going to 
focus mainly on the thorough exposition that Levy gives in his 2014 book, 
Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (denoted as ‘2014a’), which builds on 
ideas presented in the 2013 paper, and which, very helpfully, gives clear 
desiderata for when an attitude is supposedly available to conscious awareness. 
Levy’s aim in the book is to present a comprehensive SDR account: that 
is, an account on which we are only morally responsible for actions generated by 
attitudes of which we have a particular kind of awareness, which will be defined 
shortly. The ensuing SDR argument may be summarised in what Levy calls ‘the 
consciousness thesis.’ In the interests of recording Levy’s key claims, as I have 
been doing for all SD(R) theorists in this chapter, I’ll take the whole quotation in 
which the consciousness thesis is stated, and label it as the first key claim, as 
follows: 
 
NL1:  …only when we are conscious of the facts that give our actions 
their moral significance are those actions expressive of our 
identities as practical agents and do we possess the kind of control 
that is plausibly required for moral responsibility, (2014a: 1). 
 
As Levy argues in the 2014 book, if an attitude fails to be conscious, then it does 
not constitute the agent’s evaluative stance—the perspective from which they act 
agentially—and, consequently, the agent cannot be morally responsible for any 
actions guided by the attitude in question. (And so, as we will see shortly, the 
SDR argument relies on the success of a related SD argument.) 
Let us explore Levy’s argument in more detail. Levy has a nuanced notion 
of the sort of conscious awareness an agent needs to have to render the decisions 
and actions which flow from these attitudes as agential. Like Saul, he is not 
                                                
 
15 As mentioned above, this is currently ambiguous between a normative interpretation or a 
descriptive interpretation. I will discuss this further in Chapter 4. 
41 
interested in the phenomenal content of conscious attitudes, but in their 
informational content, and in whether this is readily accessible for use in 
reasoning, judgement and action (Levy, 2014a: 29). As Levy acknowledges, this 
notion of accessibility requires further analysis, for a state may be available to be 
used in reasoning, say, because the agent in question is occurrently aware of its 
content, or because it has a dispositional profile such that the agent would become 
occurrently aware of it in some possible scenario. Levy suggests that occurrent 
awareness is too demanding a notion for the sense of accessibility that is relevant 
to agency, because our beliefs may guide agential behaviour, even though we are 
not consciously attending to them at every moment during this process (2014a: 
31). Consider driving home ‘on autopilot’, for instance, and indicating to turn left 
without attending to the fact that you have done so—it would seem incorrect to 
suggest that because you were not occurrently aware that the next left is the way 
to your house, your action was therefore not agential. As such, for Levy, occurrent 
awareness is too restrictive a notion of the kind of consciousness that is necessary 
for agency and moral responsibility.  
The above suggests that the conscious awareness necessary for agency is 
dispositional in kind. Accordingly, one may count as conscious that P in the actual 
sequence of events, as long as there is some counterfactual scenario in which one 
would become occurrently aware that P. However, one might think that there is a 
lower boundary on the closeness of counterfactual scenarios in which one would 
become occurrently aware that P, below which it no longer makes sense to 
consider one as conscious that P in the actual sequence of events. To see this, 
suppose that I am not occurrently aware that today is your birthday. Further, 
suppose that the only counterfactual scenario in which I would become 
occurrently aware that today is your birthday, is if I were to see two red balloons 
floating in the sky. If this is the only scenario in which I would recall the 
information that it is your birthday, then one might think that it is odd to suggest 
that in the actual sequence of events, where it is very unlikely that I’ll see two red 
balloons, I was nonetheless consciously aware that it is your birthday. For Levy, I 
should not be held morally responsible for forgetting that it is your birthday in this 
sort of case (Levy, 2014a: 34). As such, Levy thinks that unrestricted dispositional 
awareness is too permissive a notion of the kind of consciousness that is necessary 
for agency and moral responsibility. 
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For Levy, this does not necessitate that we revert back to occurrent 
awareness to characterise the kind of consciousness that is necessary for agency 
and moral responsibility (which, as we saw above, was too restrictive), but that 
we apply some restrictions to the dispositional account. In light of this, Levy 
proposes a new understanding of awareness that he terms ‘personally availability’ 
to characterise the kind of awareness that is necessary for agency and moral 
responsibility. An attitude is personally available if it fulfils two conditions: (i) 
being online; and (ii) being effortlessly recallable, (2014a: 33). An attitude is 
online if it is currently guiding some behaviour and it is effortlessly recallable if it 
would become occurrently conscious in the presence of a large range of ‘ordinary 
cues’ (2014a: 34): 
 
Information is available for easy and effortless recall if it would be recalled 
given a large range of ordinary cues: no special prompting (like asking a 
leading question) is required. For instance, for [an agent who is not 
occurrently aware that it is her friend’s birthday] to have the information 
personally available to her, the presence of a telephone would likely cause 
her to be occurrently aware of her friend’s birthday. (2014a, 34) 
 
From now on, I will notate Levy’s specialised notion of consciousness as personal 
availability, as it is defined above, as ‘consciousnessPA’. Accordingly we get: 
 
NL2:  A state is consciousPA when it is (a) online, and (b) effortlessly 
recallable. Being consciousPA is a necessary condition for mental 
states and their guidance of actions to be agential. 
 
Levy does not detail a set of conditions that makes an item or an event an 
‘ordinary cue’ for the effortless recall of an attitude, and so this might be up to our 
intuitions on a case by case basis. In his defence, we might think that there is a 
sense in which a telephone is more likely to prompt effortless recall of the 
information that it is a friend’s birthday than, say, a desk or a window, as well as a 
sense in which a telephone is a more ‘ordinary’ cue for recall than two floating 
balloons of a specific colour. I do, however, think that this notion is far from 
watertight, and I am not sure that it will do the required work, as I will argue in 
Chapter 3.  
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In later chapters of his 2014 book, Levy argues that consciousnessPA 
matters for agential and morally responsible actions, because an agent’s attitudes 
being integrated with each other is a necessary feature of a set of agential 
attitudes.16 For Levy, an agent’s attitudes are integrated if they have broadly 
consistent contents: when an agent detects that they have attitudes with content 
that contradict the content of other attitudes, these are either updated or rejected. 
Levy argues that attitudes may only be integrated with each other in accordance 
with their content if they are consciousPA, and maintains that this claim is 
supported by various evidence. For instance, according to Baumeister and 
Masicampo (2010), when nonconscious systems are primed with two-word 
phrases, each word has an independent priming effect, which suggests that some 
unconscious processes are not sensitive to semantic content in the way that some 
conscious processes are, and therefore that they are unable to integrate attitudes in 
accordance with their semantic content. Levy also appeals to evidence from 
Deutsch, Gawronski and Strack (2006); Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) which 
suggests that some nonconscious processes are blind to other logical constructs 
such as negation (or, at least, they tend to represent the contents of a negated term 
as asserted).17 Summarising the relevant results, Levy says: 
 
Activating concepts nonconsciously has effects on subjects’ attitudes, but 
these effects are associative and not logical. All of this appears to be 
evidence of an absence of the capacity to integrate the content of 
representations; whereas nonconscious processing of contents may cause the 
activation of semantically related content, only when the processing is 
conscious is the activation logically coherent. Priming contents facilitates 
access to semantically related contents, but not in a coherent or integrated 
manner. (2014a, 53) 
 
For Levy, these results show that when a person’s attitudes are activated and 
processed nonconsciously, their logical contents are not preserved or integrated 
with the person’s other attitudes. The SD arguments of both Gendler and Levy 
rely on there being a fundamental difference between ‘associative’ and ‘logical’ 
                                                
 
16 See chapters 3 and 4 of Levy’s 2014a for a full exposition of this view. 
17 Actually, the research that Levy cites in fact suggests that such processes may be trained to 
represent negation, but without such training they remain typically bad at doing so. 
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processing, and both rely on results in the empirical literature to back up this 
supposed distinction. I will give a more detailed and critical exposition of the 
relevant empirical claims which allegedly support the distinction between 
‘associative’ and ‘logical’ in Chapter 4. For present purposes, it is sufficient to say 
that Levy’s claim is that when informational states are activated and processed 
nonconsciously, they cannot be integrated with the agent’s “personal level” 
attitudes, by which I think he means something close to ‘agential’ attitudes as 
discussed in §2.1.1. 
Levy motivates the idea that integration of states is a necessary feature of a 
set of personal-level attitudes by making reference to somnambulists, who 
perform complex behaviours but are in a sleep-like, and so nonconscious, state at 
the time. He suggests that there is no basis on which we can attribute 
somnambulist actions to agents, for the very reason that the attitudes that guide 
somnambulist actions are not integrated with personal level attitudes. One of the 
starkest examples in the legal responsibility literature is the case of Ken Parks, 
who attacked his step-parents with a kitchen knife, presented in Broughton et al. 
(1994).18 Parks was acquitted on the grounds that he acted during a state of 
somnambulistic automatism, a result which Levy argues is philosophically 
significant because it shows that when the information which guides behaviour is 
not properly integrated with the rest of an agent’s attitudes, we do not think that 
the resulting behaviour reflects their agency, and so this behaviour is not the kind 
of thing for which an agent may be morally, or legally, responsible.  
Let us summarise Levy’s relevant SD claim as follows: 
 
NL3:  Being integrated with each other is a necessary condition for 
mental states and their guidance of actions to be agential.  
                                                
 
18 The case occurred in May 1987, when Parks, a Canadian man, rose from his bed one night and 
climbed into his car, and driving several blocks to the home of his parents-in-law, he retrieved a 
knife from the kitchen and proceeded to stab both in-laws repeatedly, causing the death of one of 
them. There was enough evidence to suggest that he carried out his actions during a state of 
somnambulistic automatism. According to the details of the case, Parks did not have any particular 
ill-will against his in-laws, at least not that he was consciousPA of, and believed that stabbing 
someone to death is wrong. According to Levy, because the attitudes which guided Parks’ 
somnambulism were neither online, nor effortlessly retrievable, crucially, Parks was unable to 
compare his actions for consistency with his personal level attitudes. His actions and the attitudes 
which guide them remained unintegrated with his personal level attitudes. 
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Let us now turn to Levy’s position on implicit bias. Whilst implicit biases 
might meet the first condition of Levy’s notion of ‘consciousPA’, in that they can 
be online and guiding behaviour, they fail to meet the second condition, because 
we are apparently not able to effortlessly recall—or even to recall at all—the 
contents of our implicit biases (Levy, 2014a: 95).19 So we can ascribe to Levy: 
 
NL4:  Implicit bias is not consciousPA. 
 
Levy supports this claim with reference to a range of empirical results, many of 
which I discussed in Chapter 1, and in particular with reference to the Uhlmann 
and Cohen (2005) police chief hiring experiment, arguing that participants 
“lacked the ability to detect the processes that generated their confabulated 
criteria” and “lacked the capacity to see that the choice was not in fact objective” 
(2014a: 95). 
In addition to the claim that implicit attitudes are not conscious in the 
sense required for them to be personally available, Levy (at least, in his 2014 
book and 2014 paper) agrees with Gendler (2008a, 2008b) that implicit attitudes 
are associatively structured:  
 
…though implicit attitudes may have quite broad contents, these contents are 
bound together associatively rather than propositionally. (Levy, 2014b: 31)20 
 
Levy further suggests that implicit attitudes are encoded following the repeated 
co-occurrence of two stimuli, suggesting that implicit biases are: 
 
 …probably acquired by associative systems which respond to regularities in 
the environment. (2014a: 98)  
 
Accordingly: 
                                                
 
19 I will argue against this claim in Chapter 3. 
20 Levy (2015) revises this claim in response to a paper from Mandelbaum (forthcoming), which 
presents a range of evidence to suggest that implicit attitudes encode, and update in accordance 
with propositional information. In the 2015 paper, Levy argues that implicit biases are not quite 
like beliefs, but not quite like straightforward associations either. I will discuss both 
Mandelbaum’s argument that implicit attitudes are propositional (forthcoming) and Levy’s (2015) 
response in Chapter 4. 
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NL5:  Implicit biases are associative, not propositional, in structure. 
 
Levy echoes arguments made by Gendler (2008a, 2008b), to demonstrate 
that implicit biases are not judgement-dependent, and that it is misleading to think 
of them as beliefs. 
 
...there is good reason to think that the claim that implicit attitudes belong to 
the class of judgement-dependent attitudes carves up the territory in such a 
way as to obscure central characteristics of such attitudes. These attitudes 
are, as we just saw, acquired in ways that bypass rational control, and they 
are altered in ways that resemble those in which they are acquired. Indeed, 
as Gendler (2008[b]) suggests, insensitivity to reasons is what distinguishes 
‘aliefs’ (a category of mental state that overlaps considerably with implicit 
attitudes), from beliefs... Implicit attitudes are not judgement-dependent. It is 
misleading to regard them as a subcategory of the state ‘belief’; misleading 
because it masks the fact that judgement-insensitivity is the hallmark of such 
states. It is characteristic and perhaps even definitive of such states that they 




NL6:  It is characteristic and perhaps even definitive of implicit biases 
that they do not respond to our reasons. 
 
Further, for Levy, the associative nature of implicit attitudes, and their 
resistance to reasons, has implications for the kind of control that we are able to 
exercise over our implicit attitudes, once we know about them. He suggests: 
 
we can influence our implicit attitudes only indirectly: by the same kinds of 
methods whereby we acquired them in the first place (by attempting to form 
new associations). Whether these methods are arduous, slow, and extremely 
uncertain (Devine, 1989), or on the contrary relatively rapid, remains 





NL7:  We can influence our implicit attitudes only indirectly, by 
attempting to form new associations. 
 
The notion that implicit biases do not respond to propositional information 
encoded in our reasons plays an important role in Levy’s SDR argument. He 
suggests that implicit biases “express nothing more than facts like: there is a 
statistical association between being male and being a police chief” (2014: 102) 
and that: 
 
In expressing these attitudes, we do not express anything that is a target of 
moral condemnation: the fact that I associate X and Y, nonconsciously, is no 




NL8:  The fact that I associate X and Y, nonconsciously, is no basis for 
holding me morally responsible. 
 
Having established that implicit biases are not consciousPA, and that they 
are not appropriately structured to respond to reasons, Levy then suggests that we 
cannot be morally responsible for actions influenced by implicit bias: 
 
When agents are aware neither of the mental states that are responsible for 
the moral significance of an action, nor of that moral significance in itself, 
neither states nor significance is globally broadcast, and the agent cannot 
assess either for consistency or conflict with their personal level beliefs. The 
action therefore does not express their evaluative agency. There are good 
reasons to think that actions like this are not even expressions of morally 
significant implicit attitudes that cause them. The attitudes involved do not 
have the right kind of contents to play the role of reasons for actions: they 
are too disunified and too thin for that, and they are neither acquired nor 
maintained in a manner that is regarded by the agents (even nonconsciously) 
as reason giving. Insofar as moral responsibility depends on expression (of 
evaluative agency or even of attitudes), we ought to deny that agents are 
morally responsible for these actions. (2014a: 102-103). 
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2.3. ORGANISING THE KEY ARGUMENTATIVE CLAIMS 
As suggested earlier, I think that three themes emerge from the SD and SDR 
arguments summarised in the foregoing section. Broadly speaking, they are: 
 
(I) AWARENESS:  we lack awareness of our implicit biases, and lack 
awareness that they influence actions 
(II) STRUCTURE & PROCESSING: implicit biases are associative (rather 
than propositional), and so are not structured in a manner appropriate 
to enter into logical inferences 
(III) CONTROL: we lack control over the formation or modulation of our 
implicit biases, and over the influence of our implicit biases on our 
actions. 
 
Clearly, not all of the arguments presented in §2.2 support just one claim out of 
(I)-(III). Further, the themes are somewhat interrelated, and some arguments are 
mutually supportive. For example, control claims are sometimes based on either 
awareness, or structure and processing claims (or both). To reflect this, my 
discussion of each theme in the chapters to come will take into account arguments 
from the other themes. However, I think that categorising the key arguments from 
different philosophers in accordance with the three categories as above is useful 
because there are clearly some common themes, which it makes dialectical sense 
to address concurrently. Accordingly, each of the three chapters to follow focuses 
on one of the three themes.  
The claims by the various philosophers discussed are classified under the 




SD claims based on awareness 
 
JS1:  Implicit biases are unconscious (implicit biases and/or their 
influence on our actions are not available to introspective 
awareness) 
K&R1:  People cannot reliably introspect on the presence of their implicit 
biases 
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NL2:  A state is consciousPA when it is (a) online, and (b) effortlessly 
recallable. Being consciousPA is a necessary condition for mental 
states and their guidance of actions to be agential. 
NL4:  Implicit bias is not consciousPA. 
 
SDR claims based on awareness (I) 
 
JS4:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is introspectively aware of m/that m influences action. 
NL1:  …only when we are conscious of the facts that give our actions 
their moral significance are those actions expressive of our 
identities as practical agents and do we possess the kind of control 
that is plausibly required for moral responsibility, (2014a: 1). (Also 
in control section) 
 
(II) STRUCTURE AND PROCESSING 
 
SD claims based on structure and processing 
 
K&R2:   The [apparent] content of our implicit biases may be diametrically 
opposed to the content of our explicitly stated and consciously 
avowed attitudes 
K&R3:  Implicit biases cannot respond/do not happen to respond to 
reasons, when acquired/when influencing action. 
TG1:  Implicit biases are aliefs: sui generis tripartite mental states with a 
representational component, an affective component, and a 
behavioural component, which are ‘associatively linked’. 
TG3:  Implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, are not sensitive to the 
propositional information encoded in mental states such as beliefs: 
Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease having an 
implicit bias with the apparent content that P. 
TG4:  Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence, implicit biases, 
insofar as they are aliefs, change in response to changes in habit. If 
new evidence won't cause you to change your prejudiced 
behaviour in response to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is 
due to an implicit attitude, insofar as it is an alief, rather than 
belief. 
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NL3:  Being integrated with each other is a necessary condition for 
mental states and their guidance of actions to be agential.  
NL5:  Implicit biases are associative, not propositional, in structure. 
NL6:  It is characteristic and perhaps even definitive of implicit biases 
that they do not respond to our reasons. 
 
SDR claims based on structure and processing 
 
NL8:  The fact that I associate X and Y, nonconsciously, is no basis for 




SD claims based on control 
 
JS2:  We are not able to exert control over the acquisition of our implicit 
biases, in virtue of the fact that they result solely from our living in 
a bigoted culture. 
JS3:  Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is 
not sufficient for control over implicit biases 
TG2:  Activation of the representational content of an implicit bias 
renders it more likely that an implicitly biased behavioural routine 
will actually be performed. 
K&R4:  Implicit biases influence action automatically. 
K&R5:  Implicit biases are acquired rapidly, automatically, and 
uncontrollably 
NL7:  We can influence our implicit attitudes only indirectly, by 
attempting to form new associations. 
 
SDR claims based on control 
 
JS5:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is able to control the acquisition of m. 
JS6:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for action 
influenced by mental state m, that when an agent becomes 
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inferentially aware that she has m, she is instantly able to control 
the influence of m on action. 
K&R6:  If moral responsibility for having mental state m turns on whether 
state m was not acquired rapidly, automatically, and 
uncontrollably, then people are not morally responsible for their 
implicit biases. 
NL1:  …only when we are conscious of the facts that give our actions 
their moral significance are those actions expressive of our 
identities as practical agents and do we possess the kind of control 
that is plausibly required for moral responsibility, (2014a: 1). (Also 
in awareness section) 
 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER AND DIALECTIC TO COME 
In this chapter, I have presented a number of SD views, according to which there 
is a substantial distinction between a) our implicit biases and the actions which 
they influence, and b) attitudes that we attribute to persons insofar as they are 
agential (such as beliefs and desires) and the actions which they guide. I then 
outlined the arguments of a subset of SD theorists (the SDR theorists) that, in the 
manner that they differ from agential attitudes and actions, implicit biases and 
implicitly biased actions fail to meet at least some of the criteria necessary for 
moral responsibility.  
In response to the above arguments, some philosophers, such as Natalia 
Washington and Daniel Kelly (2016), concede that implicit biases may well be 
distinct from agential attitudes, but reject the SDR arguments which proceed from 
the relevant SD claims—arguing instead that the actions for which we may be 
morally responsible extend beyond that set of actions that are guided by agential 
states, and that we have resources at our disposal to stop them manifesting in 
action. Washington and Kelly defend an account on which moral responsibility 
for action tracks two things. Firstly, it tracks the role that a person plays in the fair 
distribution of social goods; and, secondly, it tracks our expectations that, 
depending on their role, a person should know about the empirical findings on 
implicit bias and the relevant mitigation strategies, rather than tracking whether or 
not the action in question was guided by agential attitudes. On Washington and 
Kelly’s account, whilst implicitly biased actions are not guided by agential 
attitudes, a person may still be morally responsible for them if they (i) occupy a 
role in which they are expected to distribute goods fairly (such as a person who 
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regularly makes recruitment decisions), and (ii) fail to put in place measures that 
prevent their implicit biases from manifesting (such as anonymising C.V.s).  
I will not pursue this sort of response to the SDR arguments.21 Rather, I 
shall argue that, for each of the features that SD theorists propose that agential 
attitudes have, and that implicit biases lack (features on the basis of awareness, 
processing and control) there is, in fact, no principled way to maintain a 
substantial distinction between (i) all implicit biases, and the actions that they 
influence, and (ii) all agential attitudes, and the actions that they guide. That is to 
say that, even when considering the main SD arguments in the philosophical 
literature on implicit bias, there is in fact no single characteristic that all beliefs, 
and belief-guided actions have, that all implicit biases, and implicitly biased 
actions lack (and vice versa). As such, I will argue that the SD view does not 
reflect reality, and should be rejected.  
In light of the failure of the SD account, I will be defending what I call the 
‘continuum thesis’, on which implicit biases and beliefs are not discontinuous 
from one another, and may be ordered on a continuum in accordance with the 
level of awareness and control that we have of them. One extreme end of this 
continuum may be populated only by implicit biases (and related actions), while 
the other extreme end may be populated only by beliefs (and related actions). 
However, in the middle, there is a considerable area of overlap in which we find 
both a significant number of implicit biases (and implicitly biased actions) as well 
as many beliefs, (and belief-guided actions). 
Because SDR arguments rely on the truth of SD arguments, by showing 
that there is no substantial distinction between implicit biases and implicitly 
biased actions, and the more familiar agential cognitions such as beliefs, and 
belief-guided actions, we get a refutation of the SDR argument ‘for free’: Insofar 
as some implicit biases, and the actions which flow from them, share 
characteristics with some agential attitudes and actions—namely those in the 
overlap zone of the continuum—if it is appropriate to hold agents morally 
responsible for the latter agential attitudes or actions, then it is also appropriate to 
hold agents morally responsible for the former implicitly biased attitudes or 
                                                
 
21 I am convinced by Holroyd’s (2015: 517) response to Washington and Kelly’s (2016) argument, 
that almost everyone will turn out to be a goods distributor in a variety of social interactions, but it 
is unreasonable to suggest that, therefore, everyone ought to know about the relevant empirical 
findings on implicit bias, as I outline in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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actions. I will show that it is indeed sometimes appropriate to hold agents morally 
responsible for agential actions in the overlap zone, and so it is also appropriate to 
hold agents morally responsible for the implicitly biased actions which share 
features with these former agential actions, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 6. I 
will argue that trying to save the SD(R) account by insisting that those beliefs in 
the overlap zone are not agential after all, considerably restricts the account of 
human agency, because we end up having to accept that a significant set of human 
activities, some of which epitomise human flourishing, are not agential after all—
and this commits us to an unsatisfactory and incomplete picture of human agency. 
With this map of the dialectic in place, let us now turn to the first set of SD 
claims: those made on the basis of awareness. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESPONDING TO SUBSTANTIAL  
DISTINCTION CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF  
AWARENESS 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that a number of philosophers think that there is a 
fundamental distinction in kind between (i) implicit biases, and the actions that 
they guide; and (ii) agential attitudes such as beliefs, and the actions that they 
guide, on the basis of characteristics had by (ii) that are not had by (i) (and vice 
versa). I called this the ‘substantial distinction’ (SD) view. In this chapter, I shall 
examine and respond to arguments for the SD view of implicit bias on the basis of 
the agent’s awareness. The central claim is that none of the arguments succeed: no 
substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs (and the influence of 
each on action) can be established on the basis of the kind of awareness that we 
have of each. Rather, I will argue that we have the same kind of awareness of at 
least some of our implicit biases, and their influence on our actions, as we have of 
at least some of our beliefs, and their guidance of our actions. The SD view 
cannot accommodate this data. I argue, instead, that with respect to our awareness, 
implicit biases and beliefs lie on a continuum, on which there is significant 
overlap between the set of implicit biases and the set of beliefs.  
To show this, I outline the three senses of awareness which, according to 
Holroyd (2015), have been at issue in the philosophical literature on implicit bias: 
(a) introspective awareness; (b) inferential awareness; and (c) observational 
awareness, (§3.1). I examine whether there is a substantial distinction between 
implicit biases, and their influence on actions, and beliefs, and their influence on 
actions, on the basis of each of these senses of awareness (§3.2). Following 
Holroyd (2015), I demonstrate that we have as much inferential and observational 
awareness of at least some of our implicit biases, and of their influence on our 
actions, as we do of at least some of our beliefs, and of their guidance of our 
actions. There are various accounts of introspective awareness in the 
philosophical literature, and so whether agents have introspective awareness of 
their implicit biases depends on which account one adopts. I argue that if we 
adopt Borgoni’s (2015) ‘ordinary’ notion of introspective awareness, on which we 
may use observations of our own mental states as evidence of what we believe, 
then we may count as introspectively aware of at least some of our implicit biases 
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and their influence on our actions. This supports the continuum thesis, on which 
there no substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs (and their 
influence on action) on the basis of introspective awareness. 
Holroyd maintains that it is not possible to be introspectively aware of the 
influence of implicit bias on action, and so she perhaps is working with an 
account of introspection different from Borgoni’s. However, Holroyd also 
maintains that there are some cases of arguably agential actions in which people 
are not introspectively aware of the attitudes which guide such actions. This 
would seem to count against the SD theory. But Holroyd’s argument is open to an 
objection articulated by Levy in his 2014 book. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, Levy argues that agents do not need to be occurrently introspectively 
aware that a particular attitude guides action in order to count as having 
introspective awareness of the attitude’s guiding role. For Levy, as long as an 
agent would effortlessly recall the attitude’s role in action in the presence of an 
‘ordinary cue’ for that attitude,22 they count as introspectively aware that the 
attitude in question guides action. So, SD theorists may argue that agents in the 
sorts of situations described by Holroyd, whilst not occurrently introspectively 
aware that their beliefs guide their actions, would nonetheless effortlessly recall 
these facts in the presence of appropriate ordinary cues, and would, therefore 
count as introspectively aware that their beliefs guide their actions. If this 
argument succeeds, then there will be a substantial distinction between our 
awareness of how implicit biases guide actions as compared to beliefs—namely 
that we may only effortless recall the influence of the latter, and not the former, in 
the presence of an ordinary cue.  
In response to this argument, I show that it is not the case for all belief-
guided actions that, in the presence of an ordinary cue for the relevant belief, the 
agent will recall the guiding role of that belief—however, effortless recall is not a 
necessary condition for an action to be agential. As a result, even those who do 
not rely on Borgoni’s ordinary notion of introspection, will not be able to identify 
a substantial distinction between our introspective awareness of how our implicit 
biases and beliefs guide actions. Even though we may fail to effortlessly recall the 
                                                
 
22 As we saw in Chapter 2, Levy relies on an intuitive notion of what sort of objects count as 
ordinary cues for particular mental states. For instance, a telephone counts as an ordinary cue for 
the notion that it is a friend’s birthday, (2014a: 34). I will explore this account more critically in 
this chapter. 
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influence of the former, we may also sometimes fail to effortlessly recall the 
guidance of the latter, but this alone does not render the actions in question as 
non-agential: such actions may well fulfil personal level goals and objectives. 
In the final section of the chapter (§3.3) I give a positive account of the 
awareness that we have of at least some of our implicit biases. There, I introduce 
the notion of an ‘observable class preference’. An agent has an observable class 
preference when they (1) have made multiple evaluations of some objects of 
which they are introspectively aware, and (2) the objects in question belong to the 
same class and are evaluated to have qualities of the same kind and valence. I give 
four examples of everyday observable class preferences, to demonstrate that they 
are a sufficiently common phenomenon in much of our everyday agential action. I 
then argue that at least some implicit biases are observable class preferences. This 
argument works regardless of which account of introspective awareness described 
above we endorse. If one accepts Borgoni’s account of introspective awareness, 
on which making inferences from evidence of our own psychology counts as 
introspecting, then it is plausible to argue that we can discover our observable 
class preferences through acts of introspective awareness. If one accepts an 
account of introspective awareness other than Borgoni’s, on which we don’t count 
as introspecting if we make inferences from any kind of evidence, including the 
psychological, then it is plausible to argue that we discover our observable class 
preferences through acts of observational awareness. Regardless of whether one 
holds Borgoni’s (2015) account or not, we have the same kind of awareness of 
those implicit biases which are observable class preferences as we do of at least 
some of our everyday observable class preferences. The SD theory is inconsistent 
with this result. Instead, we must adopt a continuum thesis to account for the case 
of observable class preferences. I defend this account against three objections.  
In light of my reply to SD arguments on the basis of awareness above, I 
then consider the status of the related SDR claim that our (apparent) lack of 
awareness renders us unable to be morally responsible for actions influenced by 
implicit bias. As noted in the previous chapter, SDR theorists rely on arguments 
about awareness of the guiding role of implicit bias to show that we are not 
morally responsible for actions influenced by implicit bias. My response is that, if 
it turns out that we do lack moral responsibility for our implicit biases and their 
influence on our actions, it will not be because we lack awareness of them, but 
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perhaps because of some other distinguishing features, features that I will discuss 
in more detail in the following chapters. 
  
3.1. THREE KINDS OF AWARENESS  
As we saw in Chapter 1, the idea that implicit biases are necessarily unconscious 
states, states of which participants could never become aware, was not part of the 
original distinction between the implicit and the explicit: the original distinction 
was made on the basis of controlled vs. automatic process (Payne and Gawronski, 
2010). As we saw in Chapter 2, however, many philosophers argue that the data 
reveals that we lack awareness of our implicit biases and their influence on our 
actions. In a 2015 paper, Holroyd demonstrates that there are three senses of 
awareness in play in philosophical discussions of implicit bias, and puts forward 
the case for distinguishing them. They are: 
 
•  introspective awareness 
•  inferential awareness 
•  observational awareness 
 
Holroyd’s 2015 paper is about the epistemic preconditions for moral 
responsibility, and whether we meet these conditions in the case of actions 
influenced by implicit bias. She is interested in which kind of awareness of 
attitudes and their influence on action, if any, is necessary to have in order to be 
morally responsible for the action in question. Ultimately, Holroyd argues that 
only one of the three kinds of awareness (observational awareness) is a plausible 
epistemic condition for moral responsibility. She maintains that we do in fact 
meet this condition in the case of implicitly biased actions, and that if any 
conditions absolve us of moral responsibility for implicitly biased actions, then 
they will not be conditions based on awareness. 
My main focus in this section is on Holroyd’s claims regarding the three 
distinct kinds of awareness that we may have of attitudes and their influence on 
action. I will briefly outline Holroyd’s definitions of each different notion of 
awareness, before considering, in the following subsection, whether any may be 




It is plausible that we typically think about introspective awareness when 
questioning whether we have any awareness of implicit bias. However, the 
philosophical literature on exactly what introspection amounts to is vast, and 
contains a number of distinct accounts. Some philosophers propose that 
introspection is a kind of ‘inner sense’ which enables us to gain awareness of our 
mental states in a similar way to that in which our other senses deliver information 
about the external world (Kant, 1781/2009; Armstrong, 1968/1994). Others have 
argued that introspection is a kind of direct acquaintance with our mental states, in 
which the introspecting person cannot be wrong that they are entertaining 
particular mental states with a particular content (Russell, 1912; Shoemaker, 
1968; Davidson, 1984). More recently, Borgoni (2015) has argued for what she 
calls an ‘ordinary’ account according to which introspecting on one’s mental 
states involves simply noticing and analysing the occurrence of particular 
psychological events. On this account, introspection is: 
 
…active self-reflection and analysis of the manifestations of one’s mental 
states, such as thoughts, feelings, memories of one’s actions in particular 
circumstances and other mental states related to the one in question. …by 
introspecting, one is engaging in an activity in which one directs one’s 
attention to inner and outer manifestations of one’s mental states and 
eventually comes to understand them better. (Borgoni, 2015: 216) 
 
An agent introspects in this way not through some special perceptual faculty, or 
through some notion of privileged access, but simply by noticing the occurrence 
of particular psychological events. 
Holroyd suggests that agents gain introspective awareness “simply by 
reflecting on one’s internal states and processes,” (2015: 513). This much, at least, 
seems to be consistent with Borgoni’s (2015) ‘ordinary’ account of introspection, 
on which introspecting agents notice and reflect on the occurrence of 
psychological events. To have introspective awareness of an implicit association, 
Holroyd suggests that we would have to have “awareness of the implicit 
association itself, or its operation” (2015: 514). And she maintains that we do not 
have this sort of awareness in the case of implicit biases. In particular, she says: 
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One might have introspective awareness with respect to whether certain 
beliefs or feelings are playing a role in one’s decisions: one can ask oneself, 
and on reflection give an answer. But, the claim goes, one cannot simply 
introspect and discern if an implicit bias is operating in the production of 
action (2015: 513). 
 
Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 2, this is the sense of awareness that is in play in 
Saul (2013) and Kelly and Roedder’s (2008) arguments. Their key claims were 
paraphrased as follows: 
 
JS1:  Implicit biases are unconscious (implicit biases and/or their 
influence on our actions are not available to introspective 
awareness) 
K&R1:  People cannot reliably introspect on the presence of their implicit 
biases 
 
I also think that Levy has in mind introspective awareness in his (2014a) 
claim about consciousness as personal availability, and in the claim that implicit 
bias is not personally available, which I paraphrased to: 
 
NL2:  A state is consciousPA when it is (a) online, and (b) effortlessly 
recallable. Being consciousPA is a necessary condition for mental 
states and their guidance of actions to be agential. 
NL3:  Implicit bias is not consciousPA. 
 
As I noted in the previous chapter, Levy’s account is more complex because what 
agents are consciousPA of depends in part on what they are disposed to become 
occurrently conscious of when they encounter certain features of their 
environment. In particular, agents are only consciousPA of the states which guide 
their actions if they would effortlessly recall them in the presence of an ordinary 
cue for that mental state. Nonetheless, when agents effortlessly recall the guiding 
role of a mental state, this is an act of introspective awareness. Accordingly, 
Levy’s account of consciousnessPA also relies on the notion of introspective 
awareness, with some dispositional conditions. I will give a critical exposition of 
Levy’s (2014a) account in the next section, §3.2.  
60 
So, to conclude this subsection, the notion of introspective awareness is in 
play in a number of the SD claims, and there are number of different accounts in 
the philosophical literature of exactly how agents introspect on their mental states. 
These distinctions will become relevant in my critical discussion in §3.2. 
 
Inferential awareness 
For Holroyd, inferential awareness is “awareness of the body of knowledge about 
people’s tendencies to harbour, and display, implicit bias” (2015: 514). The object 
of which one is inferentially aware with respect to implicit bias, then, is that one is 
very likely to be biased, given the relevant findings in experimental cognitive 
science (Holroyd, 2015: 513). Accordingly, it is worth highlighting that Holroyd 
is using the term ‘inferential awareness’ in a somewhat specialised sense, as 
compared with other notable accounts in the philosophical literature on the 
inferential/introspective divide.23 For Holroyd, a person becomes inferentially 
aware that they are likely to be implicitly biased by (i) becoming aware of the 
body of empirical findings which show that the majority of people are implicitly 
biased, and (ii) inferring that they are likely to be implicitly biased (2015: 514).  
Holroyd notes that it is inferential awareness that is at issue in Saul’s claim 
that “Even once [people]…become aware that they are likely to have implicit 
biases, they do not instantly become able to control their biases” (Saul, 2013: 55; 
in Holroyd, 2015: 513) relies on the notion of inferential awareness.24 Inferential 
awareness is also at issue in Washington and Kelly’s (2016) paper (the main 
thrust of which I outlined briefly in the previous chapter) in which an externalist 
epistemic condition for moral responsibility is proposed. That is, they maintain 
that the extent to which people should be expected to know about empirical 
findings of implicit bias is indexed to the kind of role they play in society, i.e. 
whether or not their job involves regularly hiring candidates, for instance. I think 
that Washington and Kelly’s (2016) proposal is an interesting one, but I also think 
                                                
 
23 In particular, we should not confuse Holroyd’s characterisation of the notion of inferential 
awareness, which is specifically to do with awareness of empirical findings, with, for instance, 
Ryle’s (1949) more general notion of inferential awareness of attitudes, which incorporates 
awareness of empirical findings about attitudes, as well as awareness of one’s attitudes gleaned on 
the basis of one’s behaviour. Awareness of one’s attitudes on the basis of one’s behaviour is 
accounted for in Holroyd’s characterisation of ‘observational awareness’, which I come to in the 
main text shortly. 
24 This is the claim that I paraphrased to JS3 in Chapter 2—the claim that having inferential 
awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is not sufficient for control over implicit 
biases.  
61 
that Holroyd (2015) raises some difficult problems for their account. I will talk in 
more detail about Washington and Kelly’s (2016) argument, and Holroyd’s 
(2015) critique in Chapter 6.  
 
Observational awareness  
The third kind of awareness identified by Holroyd is observational awareness. 
According to her, this is awareness of the manifestation of bias in behaviour 
(2015: 514). For example, a person undertaking an IAT test might become aware 
that are matching stereotype-incongruent items more slowly than the speed at 
which they matched stereotype-congruent items, as discovered by Monteith et al. 
(2001). The claim that people can have observational awareness that they are 
implicitly biased is supported by a number of empirical findings that I discuss in 
more detail below.  
 
3.2. IS THERE A SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION, ON THE BASIS OF ANY OF 
THESE KINDS OF AWARENESS, BETWEEN IMPLICIT BIASES AND 
BELIEFS? 
As mentioned above, Holroyd’s aim in her 2015 paper is to discern which, if any, 
of these kinds of awareness is necessary for moral responsibility. My aim in this 
section is slightly different. I am interested in whether any of these kinds of 
awareness may be used to uphold a substantial distinction between implicit biases, 
and the actions that they influence; and beliefs, and the actions that they guide. I 
will assess this question starting with the last notion discussed, namely 
observational awareness. 
 
3.2.1. The SD thesis and observational awareness 
It seems likely that we sometimes discover what we believe through acts of 
observational awareness. For instance, I might observe myself being unpleasant to 
a new acquaintance at a party, and realise that I have taken a disliking to him, 
which has surfaced in my short comments about his music tastes. I might observe 
the mess in the kitchen and realise that it didn’t bother me enough to tidy it up last 
time I was in the kitchen. I might observe that I tend to pick up and coo over my 
tortoiseshell cat more than my tabby cat, and realise that I prefer my tortoiseshell 
to my tabby. These three examples demonstrate that it is possible to have 
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observational awareness of at least some of our beliefs and their influence on our 
actions. 
What about observational awareness of our implicit biases? Holroyd 
(2015) summarises some compelling empirical evidence for the claim that 
individuals can have observational awareness that they act on implicit biases. A 
study from Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) found facilitated response 
times to pairing tasks involving stereotypically congruent items (in this case, with 
black names and unpleasant terms, and white names and pleasant terms) than 
stereotypically incongruent items (white names with unpleasant terms, black 
names with pleasant terms). After the study, Monteith and colleagues questioned 
participants, and discovered that a significant proportion of them (64%) 
recognised that they were responding differently on the incongruent trials as 
compared with the congruent trials.  
Participants were then asked to write down what might explain the 
difference in the timing of their responses. Their explanations were classified as 
appealing to factors which did implicate the participant in question as having 
biased racial or stereotypical associations, and those which did not.25 Of the 64% 
of participants who were observationally aware of their discrepant responses, one 
third explicitly attributed them to racial associations that they personally held (but 
did not necessarily endorse), saying things like “One typically hears unpleasant 
words paired with Black names, especially on the news. Unfortunately, I felt 
automatically drawn to the pairing of the two” and “It was easier to pair pleasant 
words with your own race” (Monteith et al., 2001: 408). The set of those who 
detected a discrepancy and attributed it to a racial association amounts to 
approximately 27% of the whole sample. The two thirds who did not mention 
racial factors in their explanations said things like “The Black names are 
unfamiliar and harder, so they went better with the unpleasant words” or because 
“Black is associated with the dark and scary negative things. White is associated 
with bright and happy things” (Monteith et al., 2001: 408).26 So, whilst it was by 
no means the majority who both detected and attributed their discrepant responses 
to a stereotypical racial association, this is persuasive evidence that it is at least 
                                                
 
25 Explanations were classified by two independent judges. There was agreement on 94% of the 
cases (Monteith et al., 2001: 408).  
26 One might think that these statements do imply stereotypical racial associations, but the point 
the experimenters seem to be making is that the participants themselves did not recognise them as 
racial. 
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possible to detect implicitly biased behavioural responses and to attribute these 
associations to oneself. Detection of the discrepant responses was also associated 
with feelings of guilt across the set of participants who were observationally 
aware of their discrepant responses, whether they attributed their responses to 
racial associations or not. One might think that feeling guilty is only appropriate 
when someone detects that they have done something wrong, even if they are 
unwilling or unable to articulate what the wrongness consists in. 
Holroyd cites some more recent evidence that people can have 
observational awareness both that they harbour implicitly biased attitudes, and 
that their actions may be influenced by such attitudes. Hahn et al. (2014) asked 
participants to think carefully about how they would respond on an IAT test. As 
Holroyd points out, Hahn and colleagues discovered that individuals were able to 
predict their experimental performance: Participants’ responses to questions such 
as “My sorting of [the congruent pairings] will be very/moderately/slightly 
easier…” corresponded with how they actually performed on the IAT. 
Participants also attributed the relevant associations to themselves: “My true 
implicit attitude is a lot/moderately/slightly more positive towards white,” (Hahn 
et al., 2014: 5-8; quoted in Holroyd, 2015: 519). Holroyd maintains that 
individuals were not merely reporting or using their explicit attitudes to make 
predictions here, because their predictions did not always match explicitly 
reported attitudes (Holroyd, 2015: 519-20). Further, she suggests that participants 
did not make their predictions on the basis of citing a general stereotype they took 
to be prevalent in society: there was divergence among individuals’ predictions of 
the general societal stereotype, whilst predictions of their own attitudes correlated 
with their IAT performance, (Holroyd, 2015: 519). Holroyd maintains that: 
 
This study is important, because it indicates that individuals are not only able 
to detect morally relevant features of their actions post hoc; they were also 
able to predict morally undesirable features ex ante. …it is surprising in the 
context of philosophical discussions that have supposed that implicitly 
biased behaviour is something of which individuals are not (in some sense) 
aware, and have elided the different notions of awareness at issue. But these 
assumptions are not supported: there is evidence that supports the claims 
that, with reflection, individuals are at least sometimes able to detect and 
predict discrepant responses. (Holroyd, 2015: 520) 
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As Holroyd points out, these findings are surprising in the context of at least some 
philosophical discussions which have tended to assume that we lack any 
awareness of implicit bias. But she reiterates the point that we have also seen 
Payne and Gawronski (2010) stress—that the original distinction between the 
implicit and the explicit was never made on the basis of awareness. In light of 
this, the above results are perhaps less surprising but nonetheless equally 
significant for our purposes.  
So, given that we may have observational awareness of at least some 
implicit biases (and their influence on our actions), there are no grounds for 
drawing a substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs, and their 
effect on our behaviour, on the basis of observational awareness. 
 
3.2.2. The SD thesis and inferential awareness 
It certainly seems possible for many individuals to gain inferential awareness of 
their implicit biases by acquainting themselves with the relevant empirical 
literature. However, SD theorists might argue that a major hurdle to gaining this 
sort of inferential awareness is that the majority of people do not have access to 
the relevant academic journals in which such research is published. Further, it 
might be suggested that one does not need to read any journals to know that they 
have beliefs, but arguably, one may need to read journals to become aware that 
they have implicit biases. 
I think that continuum theorists can say a number of things in response to 
these remarks. Firstly, lacking access to academic journals certainly is a hurdle to 
finding out about empirical research on implicit biases. But it is no less of a hurdle 
to gaining inferential awareness of academic research on beliefs. Surely this also 
involves accessing, and understanding, material published in access-limited 
academic journals.27 And so, whilst it might be the case that one does not have to 
read any journals to become aware that they have beliefs, this will not, by 
definition, be knowledge that they gained inferentially (but, either observationally 
or introspectively). Our question in this subsection is “is there any difference in 
                                                
 
27 For an example of a body of academic research on beliefs, see the ‘Cultural Cognition’ project 
based at Yale. This project has, for instance, assessed the US population’s beliefs about climate 
change (for example, see Kahan, D. et al. (2011) ‘Cultural cognition of scientific consensus’, 
Journal of Risk Research, 14:2, 147-174) as well as having assessed the US population’s political 
beliefs (for example, see Gastil, J. et al. (2011) ‘The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political 
Opinion’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 44:4, 711-714). 
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the inferential awareness that we have of our beliefs as compared to that which 
we have of our implicit biases?” So this possible response from the SD theorist is 
not appropriate to this section, and rather belongs in the discussion of 
observational awareness (where I have already refuted the SD view) or 
introspective awareness (where I will shortly refute the SD view). Further, given 
that there seems to be a recent rise in media coverage of implicit bias in the 
popular and business press, presented for non specialists, we might think that it is 
relatively easy to gain inferential awareness of academic research about implicit 
biases.28 
SD theorists might respond by arguing that perhaps the definition of 
inferential knowledge as knowledge of a body of academic research is too 
specialised, and that we can have a bank of cultural knowledge from which we 
may infer that we have beliefs, but not that we have implicit biases. But I think 
that the notion of the unconscious, and the legacy of Freudian psychology is also 
sufficiently part of the bank of at least western cultural knowledge that relaxing 
the definition of inferential awareness in this way will not generate a substantial 
distinction between (western) cultural awareness that we have beliefs and cultural 
awareness that there are elements of our psychology much like implicit biases.  
 So, given that it is possible to gain inferential awareness of both some 
beliefs and some implicit biases, there are no grounds for drawing a substantial 
distinction between implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of inferential 
awareness. 
 
3.2.3. The SD thesis and introspective awareness 
For there to be a substantial distinction between agential attitudes and implicit 
biases on the basis of introspective awareness, it must be the case that (i) we lack 
introspective awareness of all of our implicit biases and their influence on our 
actions; and that (ii) we have introspective awareness of all of our agential 
attitudes, such as our beliefs, and their guidance of our actions. In the following, I 
will show that both (i) and (ii) are false.  
  
                                                
 
28 For examples of such coverage in recent news, see Frith’s ‘How can we stop unconscious bias’, 
published on 28/11/15, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-34910954 
and Elsesser’s ‘Be Careful Hollywood: Raising Awareness Of Unconscious Bias May Backfire’, 
published on 02/12/15, available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/kimelsesser/2015/12/02/be-
careful-hollywood-raising-awareness-of-unconscious-bias-may-backfire/  
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Claim (i) is false. 
Borgoni (2015) raises a challenge against claim (i): that we lack introspective 
awareness of all of our implicit biases, and their influence on our actions. She 
argues that on her ‘ordinary’ notion of introspection, in which we direct our 
attention to the inner manifestations of our mental states, we do count as having 
introspective awareness of at least some of our implicit biases. Recall that on this 
account, introspection 
 
involves active self-reflection and analysis of the manifestations of one’s 
mental states, such as thoughts, feelings, memories of one’s actions in 
particular circumstances and other mental states related to the one in 
question. (Borgoni, 2015: 216) 
 
Borgoni illustrates her claim with the example of ‘Emilia’. Emilia is an 
academic in the humanities, who grew up in an environment where family and 
friends often asserted that women are not fit for politics. Despite this, Emilia has 
dedicated much of her research to gender issues, and, as a result, she now 
wholeheartedly rejects the assertions of family and friends in her childhood, and 
sincerely believes that the different genders are equally fit for political activity. 
Whilst Emilia’s research has prompted her to adopt explicit egalitarian beliefs, 
and to sincerely avow egalitarianism in conversation with colleagues, it turns out 
that Emilia is “sexist in most of her unguarded, instinctive and automatic behavior 
when it comes to assessing female performance in politics” (Borgoni, 2015: 213). 
For instance, it is the case for Emilia that 
 
women’s proposals and performance in political debates rarely seem as good 
as men’s. When they do, she is amazed by this fact. Sometimes Emilia 
catches herself thinking that a given female politician will not succeed in her 
position, without having any evidence in support of her prediction. But then 
she quickly represses such a thought. Emilia is aware of the pattern 
underlying her automatic reactions and tries to correct their impact on her 
explicit attitudes and decisions. (Borgoni, 2015: 213) 
 
Borgoni argues that Emilia is an agent with explicit egalitarian beliefs but 
with implicit attitudes with a somewhat contradictory content. For Borgoni, these 
attitudes count as implicit because they have not updated consistently with the 
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evidence that she has for egalitarian thinking, and they pop up in thought 
automatically, even though she has tried hard to suppress them in the past. Such 
features also render these attitudes as implicit for Gendler (2008a, 2008b, and as I 
summarised her in claims TG3 and TG4)29 who stresses that resistance to 
evidence characterises implicit bias. Borgoni argues that on her ordinary account 
of introspection, Emilia counts as introspectively aware both of her having 
implicit biases against women in the political sphere, and of how these biases 
manifest in judgement:  
 
She knows how she feels when assessing the prospects of female candidates. 
She knows the sorts of thoughts she has when she listens to the discourse of 
female candidates. She has first-personal access to her phenomenology and 
is able to acknowledge that this is evidence of her continuing to hold a 
prejudicial belief. She is able to know that she still holds the prejudicial 
belief from the inside. Such access amounts to traditional first-personal 
access to her thoughts. (2015: 216) 
 
In light of Borgoni’s argument, two options are open to SD theorists who 
wish to maintain the distinction between agential attitudes and implicit biases on 
the basis of introspective awareness. They can either (A) reject Borgoni’s 
‘ordinary’ account of introspection, or (B) deny that Borgoni’s description of the 
case is correct, and insist that the thoughts on which Emilia is introspecting are 
explicit agential attitudes after all. Option (A) involves committing to an account 
of introspection which builds in some extra criteria other than straightforward 
awareness, which agents like Emilia will not fulfil. As Borgoni (2015) suggests, 
one option here would be to adopt an account on which to count as introspecting, 
the agent must simultaneously judge the belief of which they are aware to be true 
(for example, see Moran’s 2001 account). Even here, though, the continuum 
theorist might push back and argue that Emilia, in the instant that she finds herself 
thinking that a female politician will not succeed in her position, genuinely does 
                                                
 
29 These claims were summarised as follows: 
TG3: Implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, are not sensitive to the propositional information 
encoded in mental states such as beliefs: Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease 
having an implicit bias with the apparent content that P. 
TG4: Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence, implicit attitudes change in response to 
changes in habit. If new evidence won't cause you to change your prejudiced behaviour in 
response to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is due to an implicit attitude rather than belief. 
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judge it to be the case that the female politician will not succeed. It’s just that she 
quickly goes back on this judgement immediately after she makes it. 
Accepting option (B) might therefore be preferable for the SD theorist. 
However, this option is not open to all SD theorists. By at least some SD 
theorist’s own lights, Emilia’s automatic thoughts cannot count as explicit, 
agential attitudes because they fail to have other characteristics which those SD 
theorists think are necessary for agential attitudes. For instance, they are resistant 
to her evidence, which, as I just mentioned, would render these attitudes as 
implicit for Gendler (2008a, 2008b). They fail to respond to reasons that Emilia 
sees there to be for egalitarianism, and so fail to be integrated with her endorsed 
egalitarian beliefs. As such, they fail to meet the necessary criteria for agential 
attitudes for Levy (2014a).30  
So, the thoughts on which Emilia introspects don’t seem like characteristic 
explicit beliefs, because as soon as she recognises that she is entertaining these 
thoughts, she does not endorse them, and attempts to suppress them. They look 
more like mental states that might be found somewhere in the middle of the 
continuum, with unconscious, unendorsed, evidence-insensitive attitudes at one 
end, and conscious, endorsed, evidence sensitive attitudes at the other. So, 
Borgoni’s (2015) argument presents something of a problem for SD theorists who 
claim that we have no introspective awareness of any of our implicit biases. 
 
Claim (ii) is false 
Claim (ii) is that we have introspective awareness of all of our agential attitudes 
and their guidance of our actions. Before presenting my main argument against 
(ii), it is worth pointing out that there is no consensus on (ii) across the 
philosophical community (Hume, 1748/1977; Ryle, 1949; Carruthers, 2011). For 
instance, for Hume, there are some agential attitudes which cannot be 
introspected, because being in an appropriate mental state to so introspect entails 
that we are no longer in those former attitudes which we intended to introspect in 
the first place, (Hume, 1748/1977: Introduction). Ryle summarises Hume’s point 
in the following:  
                                                
 
30 In particular, these claims were summarised to: 
NL3: Being integrated with each other is a necessary condition for mental states and their guidance 
of actions to be agential.  




There are some states of mind which cannot be coolly scrutinised, since the 
fact that we are in those states involves that we are not cool, or the fact that 
we are cool involves that we are not in those states. No one could 
introspectively scrutinise the state of panic or fury, since the 
dispassionateness exercised in scientific observation is, by the definition of 
‘panic’ and ‘fury’, not the state of mind of the victim of those turbulences. 
(Ryle, 1949: 147) 
 
It might be that these attitudes are available to retrospective awareness, but this 
opens up the potential for error, and mis-remembering (Ryle, 1949: page). So if 
one’s chosen theory of introspection involves a faculty which is direct and 
immediate, then there are at least some personal level mental states which are not 
available to this faculty. 
More generally, Ryle (1949) argues that theorising about introspective 
awareness is somewhat misdirected, and that really, we do no such thing as 
introspect when we want to discover the contents of our minds. Instead, according 
to Ryle, we observe our behaviour, or ask ‘dispositional questions’ about how 
would we respond in certain circumstances, and infer what we believe, or intend, 
or judge, and so on, from our observations (Ryle, 1949: 151). In a similar vein, 
Carruthers (2011) suggests that we employ a process of self-interpretation to 
become aware of our beliefs, intentions and judgements, rather than a process of 
introspection. These views, in effect, deny that there is any such thing as 
introspection, and maintain that we come to know about our personal-level mental 
states through the interpretation either of our actual actions, or those that we 
discover that we are disposed to perform in some hypothetical circumstances. If 
these views are right, and it is the case that our awareness of our own personal 
level mental states is observational (in Holroyd’s terminology; inferential in 
Ryle’s), and it is also true that we have observational awareness of at least some 
of our implicit biases, then there will be no distinction in kind between the 
awareness we have of our personal level mental states and of our implicit biases. 
The Ryle/Carruthers view is not the dominant one, however, and so I will not 
pursue it any further as a potential response to the SD theorist. But I think it is 
worth having this view in the background of the discussion to demonstrate that, if 
there is a distinctive faculty for introspection, then it is not immediately obvious 
as to what characterises it. 
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Holroyd (2015) presents another problem for claim (ii) which does not 
depend on the wholesale rejection of introspective awareness. She agrees with SD 
theorists Saul, and Kelly and Roedder that we don’t have introspective awareness 
of our implicit biases or their influence on our actions, (2015: 516). However, she 
argues that individuals may act agentially even when they lack introspective 
awareness of the agential attitudes and commitments which guide the action in 
question. To illustrate this claim, Holroyd borrows an example from Snow (2006), 
in which a person ‘instinctively’ intervenes when she observes an elderly woman 
being cheated by a sales clerk (Holroyd, 2015: 516). Holroyd maintains that:  
 
A central feature of Snow’s example is that the agent does not recognise that 
her sense of justice is activated (her justice related goals, in Snow’s terms); 
there are important aspects of her cognitions, then, in relation to which she 
lacks introspective awareness. But that she lacks awareness of this aspect of 
her cognition does not mean that she cannot be held responsible and praised 
for her actions. (Holroyd, 2015: 516).31 
 
Holroyd also talks about cases of forgetting, in which agents fail to have 
introspective awareness (or indeed any kind of awareness) of the cognitive 
processes which led them to forget, but in which, intuitively, the agents still seem 
to be morally responsible (and so, presumably, they also count as acting 
agentially). Holroyd appeals to Sher’s Hot Dog case (originally in Sher, 2006: 
286-7, see also Sher 2009) in which a person goes to pick up her children, and 
then has some unexpected issues to settle at school, forgetting that she has left her 
dog languishing in her increasingly hot car. Sher suggests, and Holroyd agrees, 
that even though the individual in question lacked introspective awareness of the 
processes that brought about her omission, she is not therefore exculpated of 
blame (and so we might also think that the omission should be thought of as 
agential). Speaking of the individual who defends the shop assistant, and the 
individual who forgets her dog, Holroyd argues that: 
 
                                                
 
31 I am assuming that Holroyd’s argument in the above quotation depends on an implicit premise 
that an action may be agential, and correctly attributable to the agent (which presumably is a 
necessary condition on its being culpable) even though the agent in question does not have 
introspective awareness of the cognitive processes which bring about their action.  
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…what these cases show is that merely lacking introspective awareness of 
the processes involved in deliberation and action does not suffice to 
exculpate, and is consistent with praiseworthy and blameworthy action. 
Nonetheless, the more familiar processes described above are similar in 
some important respects (whilst of course dissimilar in others) to those 
involving implicit associations that produce implicitly biased actions: they 
are fast, automatic, not readily under the agent’s deliberative control, 
unreflective, and (in the latter case) processes the agent would not endorse, 
and productive of morally undesirable outcomes. Unless a case can be made 
for implicit associations being treated differently, then the fact that an agent 
lacks awareness of the operation of implicit associations would not be 
grounds for exemption from responsibility. (Holroyd, 2015: 516) 
 
So, it appears that we cannot uphold a substantial distinction between implicit 
biases and beliefs, and the influence of each on action, with respect to 
introspective awareness: We may fail to have introspective awareness of the 
former, but we also sometimes fail to have introspective awareness of the latter.  
However, this argument from Holroyd is open to an objection articulated 
by Levy in his account of consciousnessPA (2014a): that occurrent introspective 
awareness is too stringent a criterion for a mental state to count as agentive: 
Holroyd’s cases are those in which agents lack occurrent introspective awareness 
of the influence of their beliefs on their actions. That is, they are not aware that 
these attitudes guide their behaviour in the actual sequence of events. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, for Levy (2014a), being occurrently aware of the 
influence of an attitude on an action was too stringent a criterion for the attitude 
and the action which it guides to count as agentive. Accordingly, he argued that 
even if the agent is not occurrently aware that an attitude guides an action, as long 
as the guiding role that the attitude plays is effortlessly recallable, then the action 
may be agentive. Recall from Chapter 2 that, for Levy, an attitude is taken to be 
available for effortless recall if the presence of an ordinary cue for that attitude 
causes the agent to become occurrently aware of the attitude and the guiding role 
that it plays (Levy, 2014a: 34). 
Holroyd maintains that it is not possible to have occurrent introspective 
awareness of an implicit bias and its influence on behaviour (2015: 516), and so it 
would seem that implicit biases will fail to be available for effortless recall, at 
least according to Holroyd’s account. If Holroyd is right about this, then it would 
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seem to follow that no implicit biases have ever been occurrently tokened. If an 
implicit bias has never been occurrently tokened, then it cannot be recalled in the 
presence of an ordinary cue—indeed, Levy would likely argue that there are no 
ordinary cues for implicit biases and therefore that we are not consciousPA of our 
implicit biases.  
If Levy is right, then we should conclude that there is a distinction between 
our awareness in the case of implicitly biased action, compared to at least some 
cases of agential action: Whilst both the shopper and the implicitly biased agent 
are not occurrently introspectively aware of the influence of their attitudes on 
their actions in the actual sequence of events, the shopper’s justice-related 
attitudes may be effortlessly recallable for her (rendering her consciousPA of the 
attitude’s action-guiding role) whilst an implicit bias is never effortlessly 
recallable (and so agents can never be consciousPA that implicit biases guide 
action). 
However, I am not convinced that this new SD argument that relies on 
Levy’s (2014a) account of consciousnessPA works. In the remainder of this section 
I raise some problems for it. Specifically, I argue that (a) the notion of availability 
to effortless recall is vague, due to problems specifying what counts as an 
ordinary cue; and that even if we put that problem aside and characterise 
availability in terms of an unspecified but intuitive notion of what counts as an 
ordinary cue, (b) effortless recall of the guiding attitudes is not a necessary 
condition for an action to count as agential. In response to my objections, SD 
theorists may seek to make the distinction between the awareness that we have of 
beliefs and implicit biases, and the influence of each on our actions, by appeal to 
an alternative account to consciousnessPA. Anticipating this possibility, I will 
show how the problems that I raise for the distinction on the basis of 
consciousnessPA will be inherited by alternative accounts. 
Recall that on Levy's account of consciousnessPA, an attitude which brings 
about some action is considered to be a personal-level state, and part of their 
evaluative stance, if it fulfils two conditions: firstly, that of being online; and 
secondly, that of being effortlessly recallable (2014a: 34). An attitude is online if 
it is playing some role in guiding action. An attitude is effortlessly recallable if a 
large range of ‘ordinary cues’ would render the state occurrently conscious (in 
that the person in question would become occurrently aware of the attitude, or, in 
Levy’s words ‘occurrently token’ its content, were they to encounter such cues). 
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According to Levy, no special prompting, such as asking a leading question, 
should be required for a state to be effortlessly recalled—if it is, then the state 
does not qualify as effortlessly recallable (2014a: 34). For instance, according to 
Levy, a telephone counts as an ordinary cue to prompt recall of the information 
that it is a friend’s birthday. If someone does not recall that it is their friend’s 
birthday in the presence of a telephone, then the information that it is their 
friend’s birthday is not effortlessly recallable for them.  
This account of effortless recall might seem intuitive. But on closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that the notion of what counts as an ordinary cue is 
underspecified. How are we to understand what constitutes an ‘ordinary cue’? Is it 
the case that the same set of cues C count as ‘ordinary’ for all agents to recall 
some content P? For instance, is it the case that telephones always prompt recall 
of the fact that it is a friend’s birthday for agents who are consciousPA that it is 
their friend’s birthday? Or is there some agent-specificity as to what counts as 
ordinary from one agent to the next? It would seem that the former is a little too 
strong: surely telephones can only count as ordinary cues for recalling that it is a 
friend’s birthday for agents who own and utilise telephones, which is by no means 
the case for all agents who remember birthdays. So it seems that the kind of items 
that count as ordinary cues for the recall of certain information are going to be at 
least partly specified by variations in different agents’ environments. Given the 
diversity of cultural practices and substantial variation in the material 
environments of different agents the world over, there will be considerable inter-
agent variation in terms of what counts as an ordinary cue for the easy and 
effortless recall of P from one agent to the next. 
The SD theorist might respond to this concern in the following way: That 
there is inter-agent variation might not be too problematic, given that Levy’s 
consciousPA is about personal availability of attitudes. It might mean that it is hard 
to tell, for any one agent, whether some informational state P is effortlessly 
recallable for them, until we know a considerable amount of information about 
their interaction with various objects in their environment. But even if it is hard 
for us to determine what counts as an ordinary cue for any one agent, that in itself 
doesn’t mean that there isn’t some fact of the matter as to which objects are, for S, 
ordinary cues for the recall of some informational state that P. It just means that 
there aren’t easily knowable general facts about what counts as an ordinary cue 
for any one agent.  
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This might avert specificity concerns between agents. However, alongside 
inter-agent variation, I think there will also be considerable intra-agent variation. 
That is, there will be considerable variation in what counts as ordinary for the 
recall of some informational state P for one and the same agent at different times, 
depending on what else is currently occupying their attention. For instance, a 
telephone might prompt an agent to effortlessly recall that it is their friend’s 
birthday in a circumstance in which they are relatively cognitively unoccupied, 
but if, in another circumstance, they are waiting for an important call from the 
hospital regarding the health of a relative, encountering the telephone might fail to 
prompt their recall of the relatively less important birthday information.  
Indeed, it would seem that agents are frequently occurrently unaware that 
particular attitudes guide actions, even in the presence of objects that seem, 
intuitively, to be ordinary cues for recalling the mental states in question. A 
person getting ready in the morning may be deep in thought about the day ahead, 
and hence be occurrently unaware that beliefs about the benefits of tooth-
brushing, as well as beliefs about the spatial location of their toothbrush and 
toothpaste guide their tooth-brushing actions. But if any object serves as an 
ordinary cue for recalling the mental states which guide tooth-brushing, then it 
seems that it would be either a toothbrush or a tube of toothpaste. Similarly, an 
audience member in a lecture might reach for a pen to write down an interesting 
point without being occurrently aware that their beliefs about the capacity of the 
pen to record information guide their reaching action, even though, if any object 
serves as an ordinary cue for recalling pen related beliefs, then it would seem to 
be a pen.  
When it comes to the intervening shopper, we might ask, what sort of 
objects would have cued her to become occurrently aware of the justice related 
beliefs as they guided her action? Since she wasn’t occurrently aware of those 
beliefs as they guided her action in the actual sequence of events, just 
encountering the person in distress that she acted to help wasn’t sufficient to cue 
her recognition of the justice related beliefs as they guided the intervening action. 
But if the presence of the person in distress isn’t an ordinary cue for the recall of 
the relevant beliefs in this instance, then it is hard to imagine what sort of object 
would serve this purpose in her case. So, now we have a putatively agential action 
that fails Levy’s test for the necessary preconditions of awareness for agential 
actions, making his effortless recall condition seem too restrictive. 
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The SD theorist might try to respond by arguing for something like the 
following:  
 
If some ordinary cue O sometimes causes S to effortlessly recall (and so to 
become occurrently introspectively aware of) their belief that P, and that P 
guides action, but sometimes doesn’t cause S to effortlessly recall their belief 
that P, and that P guides action, depending on what else is occupying their 
attention, then one and the same belief that P, and the role that P plays in 
guiding action, are sometimes consciousPA and sometimes not.  
 
But the problem with this is that the actions of the intervening shopper, the tooth-
brushing agent, and the lecture note-taking agent do look like cases of agential 
action, even though the agents in question are not caused to become occurrently 
aware of the attitudes which guide their actions in the presence of what seem 
intuitively to be ordinary cueing objects for these attitudes. So, even if we accept 
some intuitive notion of what counts as an ordinary cue, there is still considerable 
intra-agent variation as to whether the presence of an ordinary cue for a particular 
attitude actually does cause the agent to become occurrently aware of the mental 
state, and the guiding role that it is playing in a number of agential actions. So, 
that a mental state is available for easy and effortless recall does not seem to be a 
necessary condition for the action that it guides to be agential. So, as per (a): the 
notion of availability to effortless recall is vague, and the notion of an ordinary 
cue is underspecified, and as per (b): effortless recall of the guiding attitudes is 
not a necessary condition for an action to count as agential after all. As such, 
consciousnessPA is too restrictive an account to characterise the kind of awareness 
that is necessary for agency.  
Supporters of the SD thesis might think that these conditions are too 
stringent, and that perhaps a state’s guidance of action only needs to be 
effortlessly recallable in the presence of an ordinary cue, but not necessarily 
effortlessly recalled. However, this would effectively be to abandon 
consciousnessPA and return to an unrestricted notion of dispositional awareness, 
the very sort of account of awareness which Levy (2014a) suggested is too 
inclusive to ground agency and moral responsibility. For Levy, effortless recall in 
the presence of an ordinary cue is supposed to be an analysis of the already 
dispositional notion of consciousnessPA. It is supposed to restrict an attitude’s 
disposition to become occurrently conscious. Accordingly, an attitude is 
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consciousPA only if it is available for effortless recall. A state is available for 
effortless recall if the presence of an ordinary cue causes the agent to become 
occurrently aware of the state and its role in action. That is to say: should an agent 
be in the presence of an ordinary cueing object, they will, in that sequence of 
events, effortlessly recall and so become occurrently aware of the mental state in 
question, and how it guides behaviour (Levy, 2014a: 34). To maintain instead that 
the presence of an ordinary cueing object renders the states which guide action 
effortlessly recallable, but not necessarily effortlessly recalled, does not offer an 
analysis of what it is for a mental state to be consciousPA. It simply introduces 
another disposition. If SD theorists do not specify the conditions under which 
agents would become occurrently introspectively aware of the mental states which 
guide agential actions, and rather maintain that there is just some unanalysable 
sense in which they could become aware of them, then we’re back to an 
unrestricted dispositional account, the very account that the effortless recall 
condition of consciousPA was designed to improve upon. 
At this point, an SD theorist might accept that Levy’s requirement that the 
states which guide actions are available for effortless recall is not a necessary 
condition for the actions in question to be agential. But they might maintain that 
there is still a difference in what agents could be introspectively aware of in the 
case of tooth-brushing and lecture note taking actions, and implicitly biased 
actions. Here, SD theorists may argue that agents who prepare to brush their teeth 
and who reach for pens, without occurrent introspective awareness of the attitudes 
which guide these actions, have, at least at some point, been occurrently 
introspectively aware of the mental attitudes which guide action. In contrast, 
agents have never been occurrently introspectively aware of their implicit biases, 
or how they guide actions. Because of this, it may be argued, implicit biases are 
not even in principle recallable. The relevant difference in awareness, then, is that 
agential actions are guided by states of which the agent has at some point been 
aware, even if they are not occurrently introspectively aware of the role that these 
states play in the present action, whilst implicitly biased agents have never been 
occurrently introspectively aware of the attitudes which guide their implicitly 
biased actions. 
However, I do not think that this response enables SD theorists to 
distinguish between all agential attitudes and their guidance of agential actions, 
and implicit biases and their guidance of implicitly biased actions. This is because 
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there seems to be many cases in which agents acquire attitudes, which then go on 
to guide what look very much like agential actions, without the agents in question 
being occurrently consciously aware of the guiding role of these attitudes. 
Consider the following cases. 
 
Lights: Muhammed is tidying the kitchen one evening when, all of a sudden, 
the lights go out. Before he has time to reflect on what he is doing, he has 
reached up through the darkness to find the handle to the cupboard where the 
torch is kept, even though he was not occurrently introspectively aware of 
forming a belief about where the cupboard door was in relation to him before 
the lights went out. 
 
Flat warming: Laura goes to Aisha’s flat warming party. When she gets to 
Aisha’s building, she glances at the sign to number 22, and ascends two 
flights of stairs, whilst writing a long text message to another friend about 
how to get to Aisha’s building, before arriving outside flat 22, Aisha’s door. 
Later on, Aisha bemoans the lack of a lift in her building, to which Laura 
replies “You’re lazy if you want a lift to the second floor!” Laura says this 
even though she was not occurrently consciously aware of forming the belief 
that Aisha lives on the second floor, nor of how this belief guided her action 
as she climbed the stairs to Aisha’s flat. 
 
Mushrooms: Naveen returns from the shops and unpacks the shopping. Julia 
asks “did you buy any mushrooms?” and Naveen replies “yes, bottom shelf 
of the fridge, in the black punnet.” He performs this utterance automatically, 
even though he wasn’t occurrently introspectively aware of the colour of the 
container as he unpacked the shopping—instead he was in deep thought 
about those revisions to his latest paper. Nevertheless, he formed a belief 
about the colour of the punnet without occurrent awareness, a belief which 
went on to guide his utterance without his occurrent awareness. 
 
In these three examples, agents are not occurrently introspectively aware of either 
forming an attitude, or of having an attitude, before it goes on to guide action, 
which it does without the agent’s occurrent introspective awareness. However, 
Muhammed’s reaching action, Laura’s successful navigation to Aisha’s flat, and 
Naveen’s utterance to Julia nonetheless all look like examples of agential actions. 
So, the requirement that an agent has to have been occurrently introspectively 
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aware of an attitude at some point before it goes on to guide an action will not 
distinguish all agential actions from implicitly biased actions. Instead it 
distinguishes some agential actions from some other agential actions and 
implicitly biased actions. That is not enough to establish the required substantial 
distinction. 
To sum up my argument against SD claim (ii) that we have introspective 
awareness of all of our agential attitudes, and their guidance of our actions, I have 
argued that: (1) It is not necessary that an agent should be occurrently 
introspectively aware of an attitude and how it guides action, for the action to be 
agential; (2) It is not necessary that an agent should effortlessly recall, and thus 
occurrently introspect, the action guiding role of an attitude in the presence of an 
ordinary cue for that attitude, for the action to be agential; and (3) it is not 
necessary that an agent should ever have been occurrently introspectively aware 
of an attitude, or its guidance of behaviour, for an action guided by that attitude to 
be agential.  
So, contra SD claim (i), I conclude that we sometimes do have 
introspective awareness of our implicit biases and their guidance of our actions (if 
one is convinced by Borgoni’s 2015 account); and contra SD claim (ii), I conclude 
that we sometimes lack introspective awareness of our agential attitudes, and their 
guidance of our actions. So, the SD claim as regards introspective awareness is 
false, and does not help to draw the required distinction. 
 
3.3. IMPLICIT BIASES AND OBSERVABLE CLASS PREFERENCES  
Let us take stock of the argument so far. We have seen that SD theorists may not 
generate a substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs (and the 
influence of each on action) on the basis of any of the senses of awareness 
relevant to the implicit biases literature: observational, inferential, and 
introspective awareness. We have the same kind of observational, inferential and 
(at least on Borgoni’s account) introspective awareness of at least some of our 
implicit biases, and their influence on action, as that which we have of at least 
some of our beliefs and their influence on action. For those unconvinced by 
Borgoni’s account, there is still no substantial distinction between implicit biases 
and beliefs (and the influence of each on action) on the basis of introspective 
awareness, because beliefs may guide actions agentially, even when the agent has 
never been occurrently introspectively aware of the belief in question. 
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In this final section, I offer a positive account of awareness of implicit 
bias. I do so by introducing the notion of what I call an ‘observable class 
preference’ and arguing that both everyday agential attitudes and at least some 
implicit biases constitute observable class preferences. I argue that, with 
reflection, we are able to become aware of at least some of our implicit biases 
insofar as we may reflect on our preferences and observe them. If so, and relying 
on Borgoni’s (2015) account of introspection, it follows that we will count as 
having introspective awareness of our observable class preferences, including 
those which are implicit biases, in this way.  
Of course, it is open to my opponents to reject Borgoni’s account of 
introspection. In that case, the conclusion would be restricted: we will only have 
observational awareness of our implicit biases which are observable class 
preferences. However, this is not sufficient to generate the kind of substantial 
distinction the SD theorist requires, because crucially, it will follow that we also 
only have observational awareness of our everyday, agential class preferences too. 
Therefore, whether or not one accepts Borgoni’s account of introspection, my 
conclusion stands: we have the same kind of awareness of those implicit biases 
which are observable class preferences as we do of at least some of our everyday, 
agential observable class preferences. 
 
3.3.1. Introducing observable class preferences 
Consider the following case: 
 
Trees 
Sara walks past a willow tree on the way to work. She thinks to herself that 
the willow tree has a graceful shape. She finds it quite aesthetically pleasing. 
Accordingly, it seems correct to say that Sara believes that ‘the willow tree 
has a graceful shape’. Sara also likes to spend time in the local park with her 
grandchildren. She often takes her camera, and particularly likes the photos 
where the children are playing beside a row of mature cedars. With their 
striking spread of branches, Sara likes the way that the cedars look. It seems 
correct to say that Sara believes that ‘the cedars are striking’. When Sara was 
looking for a new place to live, she chose a flat with a view of some silver 
birch trees. She liked the idea of being able to see their elegant silhouettes 
against the morning sun whilst she drinks her coffee, finding their outlines 
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pleasing. It seems correct to say that Sara believes that ‘the silver birches are 
elegant’. 
 
I am going to argue that the agent in the example ‘Trees’ has what I will call an 
‘observable class preference’. To have an observable class preference, an agent 
must meet the following two conditions: 
 
Observable Class Preferences 
 
(1) Introspective awareness of some singular manifestations, where: 
(1a) S evaluates a as p 
(1b) S evaluates b as q 
(1c) S evaluates c as r  
   …etc 
 
(2) A general preference is inferable from (1): 
(2a) a, b and c are all instances of some class of Fs  
(2b) p, q and r are all qualities of the same class and valence 
 
In order to fulfil (1), S will have undertaken some evaluative judgement that a is 
p, (and that b is q, and that c is r), and, accordingly, formed a belief with the 
content that a is p, (and that b is q, and that c is r) of which she is introspectively 
aware. The items a, b and c may be a broad range of entities. They might be 
objects, but they might also be more abstract items such as pieces of music, or 
films. They might be events, such as holidays, or festivals, or they might be 
activities, such as cycling or playing football. a, b and c do not necessarily need to 
pick out entities as a whole, they might instead pick out particular characteristics 
of an entity.  
As regards (2), I rely on an intuitive notion of what it takes for a set of 
entities to constitute a ‘class’, but I take it that all of the examples of classes that I 
will use in this section are relatively uncontroversial. For example, Hanukkah, Eid 
al-Fitr and Christmas are all instances of the class ‘religious festivals’, whilst 
football, hockey and rugby are all instances of the class ‘team sports’. I will be 
talking about grouping people into classes as regards social identity characteristics 
which are apparent to an observer. In doing so, I am not committed to the notion 
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that this exercise picks out properties which are essential to the identity of the 
people in question, as opposed to picking out socially constructed characteristics 
available to an observer. More broadly, in assuming that the notion of a ‘class’ is 
intelligible, I am not committed to any particular metaphysics—realism, for 
instance—about classes or the properties that serve to identify their members. 
Classes as I am using them here may also be social constructions, or useful 
fictions, and so on. 
Regarding (2b), I take qualities to be characteristics that the agent judges 
an entity to have. It might be that these qualities are properties which the entity in 
question actually instantiates, or it might be that they are apparent qualities of the 
entity that are experienced by some agents, but not others. Again, I rely on an 
intuitive notion on what constitutes a class of qualities. For instance, ‘tasty’, 
‘delicious’ and ‘flavoursome’ would all count as examples of the class of 
gustatory qualities. This particular set of qualities also shares the same (positive) 
valence, which is necessary for the fulfilment of (2b). 
In outlining the notion of an observable class preference, I specify that 
evaluations are made about three distinct entities, although it might well be that 
the agent has made more than that number of evaluations. I think that in some 
cases, it may be sufficient to have just two evaluations for a class preference to be 
observable. However, for the following examples, I will consider that at least 
three evaluations are made. Finally, for the kind of phenomenon that I have in 
mind, it is not necessary for the agent in question to have actually realised (2), for 
a class preference to be nonetheless in principle observable for that agent. 
With this in place, I argue that, in the ‘Trees’ example Sara counts as 
having an observable class preference. Here is how Sara meets the conditions. 
 
(1) Sara has introspective awareness of the following evaluations: 
 The willow tree has a graceful shape  
 The cedars are striking  
 The silver birches are elegant 
 
(2) A general preference is inferable from (1), because: 
 Willow, cedars and silver birches are all kinds of tree 




From this, it is inferable that Sara has a positive aesthetic preference for trees, as a 
class of objects. It might be that there is a particular feature of trees, their organic 
fractal pattern, for instance, that Sara is drawn to. Trees, as the objects of her 
evaluations, are a sufficiently similar set of entities to be considered members of a 
class. Meanwhile, ‘graceful’, ‘striking’ and ‘elegant’ are all positive aesthetic 
evaluations. So, it is inferable that Sara has a general aesthetic preference for 
trees.  
I am going to suppose that Sara has not yet become aware of her 
observable class preference. That is, she has not yet inferred from the fact that she 
believes that THE WILLOW TREE HAS A GRACEFUL SHAPE, THE CEDARS ARE 
STRIKING, and THE SILVER BIRCHES ARE ELEGANT that she has a general positive 
aesthetic preference for trees. This seems to me to be plausible. That is, it seems 
plausible for Sara to have made each evaluation on separate occasions with 
enough distance between each episode of belief formation for her to not have 
recognised the similarity between the beliefs she ends up forming. There isn’t 
anything conceptually problematic about Sara, as described. In short, Sara has an 
as yet unobserved, but nonetheless, in principle, observable class preference.  
That said, it seems quite possible for Sara to become aware of her class 
preference for trees. Perhaps looking at the photo of her grandchildren playing 
beneath the cedars prompts her to reflect on other trees that she has made aesthetic 
judgements about. Perhaps she thinks about her walk to work, and about the 
willow that she passes, which leads her to reflect on her experiences of other 
organic forms, and to realise that they too have been positive. Whichever it is, it 
seems that it is not beyond Sara’s capacities to reflect on one of her evaluations, to 
recognise both the entity and kind of evaluation that she has made, and to then 
reflect on other instances where she has encountered that entity and made an 
evaluation of the same kind. That is, it is possible for Sara to realise that she has a 
general positive aesthetic preference for trees. Even if she never had that moment 
of reflection in the actual sequence of events, it is still the case that she has an in 
principle observable class preference. 
 Does Sara discover her class preference through introspective or 
observational awareness? Sara is not directly acquainted with the general class 
preference, at least not when she first realises it, because making the discovery 
involved observing commonalities between her existing attitudes, and using them 
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as evidence to infer that she has this more general attitude towards trees as a class. 
So it might be argued that this is not an exercise of introspective awareness, but of 
observational awareness. Recall Holroyd’s (2015) examples of agents who 
observe their stereotypical behaviour on experimental trials, and who, from this, 
infer that their stereotypical attitudes must be guiding this behaviour, (from 
Monteith et al., 2001; Hahn et al., 2014). 
But it seems that Sara is doing something different to the agents in the 
Monteith et al. (2001) and Hahn et al. (2014) experiments. She is not observing 
her behaviour and inferring, on the basis of what she observes, that she must have 
certain attitudes. In fact, she is doing something that a third person would be 
unable to do: She is using her own attitudes as evidence to make first-personal 
ascriptions. According to Borgoni’s ‘ordinary’ notion of introspective awareness, 
this counts as introspection. The introspective process involves not only calling to 
mind certain attitudes, but using the attitudes that one calls to mind as evidence to 
learn about the attitudes that one has. As Borgoni puts it: 
 
…relying on evidence of oneself holding a certain belief to know about 
one’s own psychology does not need to lead to third-personal belief 
attributions. Introspection, a standard first-personal method of knowing 
one’s own beliefs, seems to involve reasoning from the evidence of oneself 
holding certain beliefs. (2015: 215) 
 
So, at least according to Borgoni’s ordinary notion of introspection, Sara counts as 
introspectively aware of her general aesthetic preference for trees, even if the 
outcome of her introspective reflection is a discovery for Sara herself.  




Reflecting on her TV watching preferences, Naomi realises that she’s started 
watching more nature documentaries. Nature documentaries are something 
that Naomi remembers, at least when she was much younger, being very 
bored by. However, in the last couple of years she has watched all of Frozen 
Planet, Life and Blue Planet. As she reflects on this, she realises that she 




Since becoming a vegetarian, Tom has learned that south Asian food (and 
the anglicised versions of that cuisine) contain a lot of meat-free options. 
Tom has always liked the tangy, lentil-based dhansak. Over time, two other 
dishes that emerged as favourites for him are the piquant ceylon and the hot, 
sharp pathia. Tom reflects on the recipes for these dishes and realises that 
they all contain souring agents (tamarind, vinegar and citrus juice 
accordingly) which give them the hot and sour flavour that he likes. 
 
‘Festival’ 
Clare loves drum and bass music. She discovered this after she went to her 
first music festival, where she looked forward to discovering some new 
artists. When she got home, she reflected on the artists that she particularly 
enjoyed, so that she could buy their records. These artists included Joanna 
Syze, London Elektricity and DJ Storm, who, as it turns out, are all drum 
and bass producers. Clare recognises the fast pace, the dropped third beat, 
and the bass driven sound which characterises the music of all three artists, 
and embraces her newly discovered preference for this genre. 
 
The agents in the three examples above have, on separate occasions, made similar 
evaluations about different entities which turn out to belong to the same class. 
Like Sara, they reflect on the individual evaluations, and realise that they feature a 
particular class of entities which are evaluated as having a particular set of 
qualities. That is, all of these agents reflect on their mental states to discover a 
general class preference for a set of entities. All of these agents engaged in some 
self-reflection to discover their class preferences. However, even if they did not 
take the time to do this in the actual sequence of events, this does not mean that 
their class preference is not, in principle, observable for them. Here are all the 
individual evaluations, and the class preferences which they constitute, from the 
above examples:  
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 Individual evaluations Observable class 
preference 
Trees That willow is graceful 
The cedars are striking 
The silver birch is elegant 
Trees are aesthetically 
pleasing 
TV I would watch Blue Planet again 
I enjoyed Life 
I thought Frozen Planet was beautiful 
Nature documentaries are 
enjoyable 
Vegetarian I have always loved a dhansak 
I enjoy a pathia 
I like ceylon 
I enjoy hot and sour 
curries 
Festival Joanna Syze has a great sound 
I enjoyed dancing to London Elektricity 
DJ Storm was great 
I like drum and bass 
music 
 
The above examples show that observable class preferences are a common feature 
of our everyday experiences of evaluating the merits of various entities. Agents 
evaluate the merits of one entity, and then go on to evaluate another entity from 
the same class in much the same way, without necessarily remembering how they 
evaluated the first entity, and without necessarily realising the commonalities 
between the evaluations. They may then introspect on the individual evaluations, 
and infer from these evaluations a more general class preference which they have. 
This attribution of a more general class preference to the self may count as an act 
of introspective awareness if one adopts Borgoni’s (2015) account. Or, it may 
count as an act of observational awareness if one holds an account which rules out 
inferences made on the basis of the contents of mental states as introspective. (The 
utility of this point will become clear in the next section, when I compare 
everyday observable class preferences to implicit biases and show that there is no 
difference in the kind of awareness that we have of each.)  
Regardless of whether the acknowledgement of a class preference is 
introspective or observational, once an agent has acknowledged that they have a 
class preference, it may function like a typical agential attitude. The agent might 
feel assent to the general class preference, and they might be disposed to assert the 
propositional contents of the general attitude in appropriate circumstances. For 
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instance, Sara might say “I find organic forms quite beautiful”. It also seems 
possible that, on recognising a general class preference, an agent might resent or 
even reject it: For instance, Clare might resent the realisation that she finds drum 
and bass catchy, because her friends (who are all into electro swing) think that 
drum and bass is awful and should have died in the late nineties. Recognition of a 
class preference might also guide behaviour. For instance, Naomi’s recognition 
that she now likes nature documentaries might guide her to purposefully search 
for new programmes of that genre when watching TV. 
 
3.3.2. Implicit biases manifest as observable class preferences 
In the following, I demonstrate that at least some implicit biases manifest as 
observable class preferences. Whether or not implicit biases have content, and 
whether that content is propositional, is the subject of the next chapter (where I 
will argue that at least some implicit biases do have propositional content, and that 
this gives us reason to doubt that other implicit biases are not propositional). For 
the time being, however, and regardless of what one thinks about the content 
debate, I think that we can still make some comparisons between implicit biases 
and less controversially propositional attitudes like beliefs, with regard to the way 
in which they influence our evaluations. I argue that we have the same kind of 
awareness of at least some of those implicit biases which are observable class 
preferences as that which we have of some of our everyday observable class 
preferences, such as those outlined in the examples of ‘Trees’, ‘TV’, ‘Vegetarian’, 
and ‘Festival’. 
As an example, imagine the case of Ben. Ben works for the police, and is 
often involved in promotion decisions. Ben takes himself to endorse equal 
opportunities, and thinks that people ought to be hired on the basis of merit, and 
certainly not on the basis of their gender. As such, Ben ticks the boxes to qualify 
as an agent who does not have explicit prejudices when it comes to hiring women. 
However, Ben does harbour implicit biases against women, which regularly 
influence his hiring decisions. This seems like a plausible scenario. Recall from 
Chapter 1 Uhlmann and Cohen’s (2005) experiment in which people prefer to hire 
a male candidate over a female candidate for police chief, even though the 
candidate profiles show that they are equivalently skilled: Participants presented 
with a streetwise candidate, who has a male name, and an educated candidate who 
has a female name, prefer the ‘streetwise’ candidate, whilst participants presented 
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with the same streetwise candidate, but this time with a female name, and the 
same educated candidate, but this time with a male name, tend to prefer the 
‘educated’ candidate. 
Suppose that Ben receives an application for promotion from Louise, an 
officer who has clocked a lot of hours on street patrols, made a lot of arrests, and 
been involved in a number of high-risk raids. Whilst Ben is impressed by Louise’s 
credentials, the fact that Louise has spent a lot of time on the street also indicates 
to him that Louise has not been involved in the more cerebral aspects of criminal 
investigation which happen in the office: piecing together evidence, liaising with 
forensic investigators, developing potential avenues for further enquiry, and so on. 
Because of this, Ben forms the belief that LOUISE IS NOT THAT SMART, and decides 
against promoting her. 
This also seems plausible. Recall that Uhlman and Cohen’s (2005) 
participants justified their implicitly biased hiring decisions by citing what they 
saw to be the strength of the preferred candidates or the weaknesses of the non-
preferred candidates. Indeed, Sandis (2015) suggests that agents whose hiring 
decisions are influenced by implicit biases nevertheless do have agential reasons, 
reasons of which they are occurrently aware at the time of the decision. According 
to Sandis (2015), for a person with an implicit gender bias, the fact that an 
applicant is female renders the features which count against her as more salient 
than such features otherwise would be if the candidate in question was a man. So, 
it is not the case that an implicitly sexist hirer is aware of nothing whatsoever 
when they reject an application from a woman, and that they can tell no story 
about why they did so. What they are aware of is that some negative features 
count against hiring a female applicant. What they are unaware of is that these 
negative features are more salient to them when the applicant is female, compared 
to when the applicant is male. So, it’s not the case that Ben isn’t aware of 
anything when he rejects Louise’s application for the promotion. What Ben 
believes, and what he is occurrently introspectively aware of in this scenario, is 
that LOUISE IS NOT THAT SMART.  
Ben is regularly involved in promotion decisions. He receives a number of 
applications from candidates who have a lot of patrol experience, but less 
investigatory experience. Some street-wise applicants are promoted, others are 
rejected, even though they have similar backgrounds and qualifications. Over 
time, a clear pattern emerges: Ben significantly favours applications for 
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promotion from men over those from equivalently qualified women. Ben rejects 
Priya’s application, even though she is just as qualified as many of the (male) 
applicants whom he has promoted, and does the same to Abby. At the time of 
rejecting these applications, he is occurrently introspectively aware that PRIYA IS A 
BIT DENSE and ABBY IS NOT VERY CLEVER. 
Ben has now made three separate evaluations, and now believes the 
following three propositions: LOUISE IS NOT THAT SMART, PRIYA IS A BIT DENSE 
and ABBY IS NOT VERY CLEVER, (although he has not yet been occurrently aware 
of these beliefs all at the same time). Louise, Priya and Abby are all women 
police, and Ben has evaluated all of them (negatively) on the basis of their 
intelligence. Accordingly, Ben meets the criteria as outlined above to have an, in 
principle, observable class preference, as follows: 
 
 
It seems possible for Ben to observe his class preference. Suppose that Ben 
was having a particularly self-reflective day, and was thinking about the people 
that he had promoted over the past year. Ben might think about Louise, and how 
she (appeared to him to be) not very smart. This might get him thinking about 
other women who have applied for promotion. He’d possibly then remember 
Priya and Abby, and his similarly negative evaluations of them. Ben could then 
call to mind all of the beliefs he formed about Louise, Priya and Abby at once, 
being then occurrently introspectively aware that LOUISE IS NOT THAT SMART, 
PRIYA IS A BIT DENSE and ABBY IS NOT VERY CLEVER. From this, he may infer that 
women, or at least, those in the police who have applied for a promotion, are just 
not that smart. That is, he may take these three attitudes as evidence for forming a 
new attitude, that WOMEN ARE NOT THAT SMART, just as Sara, Naomi, Tom and 
Clare did in the examples of everyday observable class preferences.  
As regards whether Ben’s attribution of a new attitude to himself is an act 
of introspective or observational awareness, the same point stands as it did for the 
everyday cases. If one’s chosen theory of introspective awareness permits the 
attribution of an attitude to the self on the basis of what one infers from one’s 
 Individual evaluations Observable class preference 
Ben Louise is not that smart 
Priya is a bit dense 
Abby is not very clever 
Women are not that smart 
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existing attitudes, then Ben is introspectively aware of his class preference. If 
one’s chosen theory of introspective awareness does not permit this, then Ben is 
observationally aware of his class preference. Either way, Ben has the same kind 
of awareness of his implicit bias as a general class preference as Sara, Naomi, 
Tom and Clare have of their everyday observable class preferences. Even if Ben 
never in fact has such a moment of reflection, in which he occurrently tokens the 
relevant proposition, that WOMEN ARE NOT THAT SMART, it nevertheless seems 
possible that he could. Accordingly, it is as possible for him as it is for Sara, 
Naomi, Tom and Clare to become occurrently aware of their everyday class 
preferences. 
I think this makes a strong case for my claim that at least some implicit 
biases are observable class preferences, and that we have the same kind of 
awareness of them as we have of our everyday observable class preferences. But I 
recognise that one may object to my account of implicit biases as observable class 
preferences in a variety of ways, namely, on the basis of (1) agential endorsement, 
(2) bias recognition and (3) extent of awareness. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
answer three such possible objections. 
 
3.3.3. Answering objections to the observable class preferences account 
Objection 1: Endorsement 
In the everyday cases, the agents in question endorse the class preference that they 
infer on the basis of the individual evaluations that they have made. By ‘endorse’ 
I mean that they take the proposition that the preference implies to be the true. For 
instance, Sara takes it to be true that TREES ARE AESTHETICALLY PLEASING, whilst 
Naomi takes it to be true that NATURE DOCUMENTARIES ARE ENJOYABLE, and so 
on. And even if Clare resents the fact that she likes drum and bass music, because 
all of her friends think it’s terrible, there is still a sense in which she endorses I 
LIKE DRUM AND BASS MUSIC insofar as she takes it to say something true. Ben, 
however, takes himself to endorse equal opportunities, and to not favour people 
for promotion on the basis of their gender. As such, it might be argued that Ben 
would reject the proposition implied by his observable class preference, taking 
WOMEN ARE NOT THAT SMART to be false. If that is the case, then it might be 
argued that this rejection would prevent him from attributing the proposition to 
himself. So, there is a difference between everyday observable class preferences 
and those implicit biases which are observable class preferences, in that agents 
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endorse the former, but not the latter, and this may then prevent them from 
recognising the attitude as their own—or so my opponent might argue. 
Firstly, it is not clear that rejecting the proposition implied by an attitude 
prevents one from attributing that attitude to oneself. This was evidenced in the 
Monteith et al. (2001) studies, where at least some participants did consider their 
actions to be explainable by their harbouring racial associations on some level. 
Further, Borgoni (2015) argues that Emilia (the agent who catches herself 
thinking biased thoughts about women in politics) is able to attribute her biased 
attitudes to herself, even though she is unable to endorse their contents. So, just 
because an agent does not endorse the contents of an attitude, it does not follow 
that they are prevented from being introspectively aware of that attitude as their 
own. 
Secondly, I think it is possible that Ben would endorse the proposition 
implied by his observable class preference. After all, Ben thinks that he’s got 
good reasons for thinking that women are not that smart: when he evaluated 
Louise’s application, he concluded that she is not that smart. The same is true for 
both Priya and Abby. In fact, the reasons that Ben takes himself to have for 
thinking that women are not that smart are the same reasons that Ben took himself 
to have for making his evaluations of each of the women in the first place, along 
with the recognition that the conjunction of these evaluations implies a general 
preference. So, given that Ben already thinks that Louise, Priya and Abby are not 
that smart, it seems at least possible that he will endorse the notion that women 
are not that smart, on observing his class preference.  
SD theorists might find this response unsatisfactory, because Ben has not 
recognised what seems like a crucial fact in this instance, namely that he is biased 
in believing as he does. I address this concern in the following. 
 
Objection 2: Recognising bias 
My opponents may argue as follows. Whilst Ben might introspect on the beliefs 
he formed when evaluating Louise, Priya and Abby, and use these as evidence to 
endorse WOMEN ARE NOT THAT SMART, he still remains unaware of a crucial fact, 
namely that he is not justified in evaluating Louise, Priya and Abby as he did. 
That is, he might recognise the proposition that is implied by his evaluations of 
the women, but fail to recognise the role of his implicit bias in shaping these 
evaluations. So, the inability to recognise the fact that his evaluations are 
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influenced by an implicit bias is the crucial distinction between the awareness that 
Ben has of his observable class preference and that which we have of our 
everyday observable class preferences. One might then argue that insofar as Ben 
does not recognise that his class preference is biased, it is not agential.32  
First of all, I do not think that it is impossible for Ben to recognise that his 
general hiring preferences are biased (though this may be incompatible with his 
endorsing the proposition implied by the general preference, but as I said above, I 
do not think endorsement is necessary for attributing an attitude to oneself). He 
could certainly discover his bias by comparing the C.V.s and qualifications of his 
successful applicants with those of his unsuccessful applicants, observing that he 
has hired many more men with exactly the same qualifications as many of the 
women that he rejected. Here, he is using the C.V.s as prompts: none of the 
information that he uses to discover his bias in this case is, strictly speaking, new 
to him—all of it has been occurrently tokened at some point, when he originally 
assessed each applicant, even if he forgot much of this information shortly 
afterwards. So, it might be that in comparing the C.V.s, he discovers his bias in an 
act of observational awareness, but this is only because his memory is limited. If 
he could remember all of the beliefs he formed about each applicant, then he 
could introspectively discover his bias, at least in Borgoni’s (2015) sense, without 
relying on the C.V.s, as he would be able to introspect on his attitudes about each 
applicant’s qualifications, and compare these to their gender. So, it is possible for 
Ben to discover that he is biased in his general class preference.  
Secondly, I don’t see why it is necessary for an agent to recognise that a 
particular attitude is biased in order for that attitude to be agential. To see this, 
consider cases of explicit prejudice in which the agent in question both assents to, 
and asserts, a general class proposition which couples a social group and a 
stereotypical trait. For example, consider Katie, who believes that Muslims are 
violent, a belief which regularly guides her speech acts and interactions with 
people that she takes to be Muslim. Katie is systematically biased, in that she has 
formed a belief about a class of people on the basis of a very small group of 
individuals, a group of people that many Muslims argue are not representative of 
Muslims more generally at all. In fact, being systematically biased in this way is 
                                                
 
32 This is the sort of argument we saw Levy (2014a) make in Chapter 2. In Levy’s terminology, 
Ben is not conscious of the facts that make his attitude morally significant, and so this attitude is 
not integrated with his evaluative stance, and should not be considered an agential attitude.  
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often a central characteristic of prejudice—that’s just what prejudice is, a belief 
which isn’t borne out by the evidence. But crucially, it does not seem necessary 
for Katie to acknowledge herself as biased in order for her to qualify as 
sufficiently introspectively aware of her prejudiced attitude for that attitude to be 
considered agential—as an attitude that it is correct to attribute to Katie, the agent. 
So, if explicitly prejudiced people do not have to recognise that they are 
systematically biased in order to count as sufficiently introspectively aware of 
their explicit prejudices for such prejudices to be agential, then even if Ben does 
not recognise that he is systematically biased, this does not undermine his having 
sufficient awareness of his general class preference for it to be considered 
agential. 
 
Objection 3: Discerning Extent 
One might argue that even if Ben observed his class preference, and became 
aware both that he thinks that women are not that smart, and that he is biased in 
doing so, still he would not know the extent to which this preference influences 
his evaluation of any one woman. My opponent might maintain that this is not the 
case for everyday observable class preferences, where we are introspectively 
aware of the extent to which the preferential class attitude affects our evaluations. 
So, it might be argued, Ben may be able to observe his class preference, but, 
unlike agents with everyday class preferences, he cannot discern the extent to 
which it influences his decisions and actions, and this undermines the extent to 
which the attitude, and the decisions that it influences, are agential. 
However, it is not the case that all agents with everyday observable class 
preferences are able to discern the extent to which their preference affects their 
evaluations either. Imagine that Sara, the agent who has a general aesthetic 
preference for trees, visits an art installation by an artist who paints a lot of trees. 
Sara finds one of this artist’s paintings particularly aesthetically pleasing. She 
recognises that she generally finds the fractal shape of the trees aesthetically 
pleasing, but she also likes the distinctively artistic features of the painting, such 
as the colours, the materials used and the composition. In this case, it is not clear 
that Sara is able to discern the extent to which her positive aesthetic judgement is 
influenced by her general preference for trees, vs. the extent to which it is 
influenced by the specific artistic properties of the painting. So, because at least 
some agents with everyday observable class preferences are not able to discern the 
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extent to which they influence decisions and actions, that Ben cannot do this is no 
basis for a substantial distinction.  
 
SUMMARY  
In the forgoing, I argued that there is no significant distinction between (i) implicit 
biases, and the actions that they influence; and (ii) agential attitudes such as 
beliefs, and the actions that they guide, on the basis of the kind of awareness that 
we have of each. I argued that we have the same kind of awareness of at least 
some of our implicit biases and their influence on our actions, as that which we 
have of at least some of our beliefs, and their guidance of our actions.  
Specifically, I investigated whether any substantial distinction may be 
upheld on the basis of each of the three notions of awareness (inferential, 
observational and introspective) that Holroyd (2015) demonstrates are at issue in 
the literature on implicit bias. I argued that, at least sometimes, we can have the 
same kind of inferential, observational and introspective awareness of at least 
some of our implicit biases, and the actions that they influence, as that which we 
have of at least some of our agential attitudes, and the actions that they guide. I 
then gave a positive account of the awareness that we have of our implicit biases, 
arguing that at least some implicit biases are observable class preferences. I 
argued that, insofar as awareness qualifies an attitude as agential, these implicit 
biases, and their manifestation in action, ought to be considered at least as agential 
as many of our everyday observable class preferences, and their manifestation in 
action.  
This result undercuts SDR arguments (SD arguments regarding moral 
responsibility) which rely on the claim that we do not have the kind of awareness 
of our implicit biases, and their influence on action, that renders such attitudes and 
actions as agential: I showed arguments for this claim fail. In light of this, 
consider the following claim, which formed an implicit premise of Saul’s (2013) 
argument: 
 
JS4:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is introspectively aware of m/that m influences action. 
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To the extent that I argued that we are introspectively aware of at least some of 
our implicit biases and their influence on action, S4 is consistent with our having 
moral responsibility for at least some implicit biases/at least some actions 
influenced by implicit bias. That it is consistent of course does not yet show that 
we are morally responsible for harbouring any implicit biases, or for any 
implicitly biased actions—just that this isn’t ruled out.   
Now consider Levy’s (2014a) SDR claim: 
 
NL1:  …only when we are conscious of the facts that give our actions 
their moral significance are those actions expressive of our 
identities as practical agents and do we possess the kind of control 
that is plausibly required for moral responsibility, (2014a: 1). 
 
In §3.2.3, I argued that it is not necessary for our attitudes to be consciousPA 
(according to Levy’s (2014a) particular account of consciousness as personal 
availability) in order for them to qualify as agential, and in order for them to guide 
agential action. For Levy, to be aware of the facts that give an action its moral 
significance is to be aware of the morally relevant contents of the attitudes which 
guide that action (2014a: 102). Recall from Chapter 2 that for Levy, implicit 
biases “express nothing more than facts like: there is a statistical association 
between being male and being a police chief” (2014: 102) and so they have no 
morally relevant attitudinal content of which to be aware. So, one way to spell out 
the claim in NL1 is that, because there is no morally relevant attitudinal content of 
which to be aware in the case of actions guided by implicit bias, we are not 
morally responsible for implicitly biased actions. 
But I think that this SD argument cannot be maintained, on two accounts. 
Firstly, I think that consciousnessPA of the morally relevant facts will turn out to 
be an overly demanding condition for agents to meet in order to be morally 
responsible, and a condition according to which a lot of intuitively responsible 
agents will turn out not to be responsible. For instance, recall my example above 
of Katie, a person who harbours explicit prejudices against Muslims. Katie fails to 
acknowledge that she is biased in thinking that all Muslims are violent, and in 
doing so, fails to be consciousPA of the facts that give her actions (such as her 
harmful speech acts during her interactions with Muslims) their moral 
significance. It is probable that many explicitly prejudiced agents are like this. 
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Explicit prejudice seems like the sort of thing for which we could and often are 
morally responsible. It seems appropriate for others to often have particular 
negative reactive attitudes to, for instance, explicitly prejudiced people who make 
harmful speech acts, even though these people may fail to acknowledge their 
biases.  
Secondly, I think that there are at least some circumstances in which 
implicitly biased agents are aware of the content of an implicit bias as biased, as 
well as how this attitude may influence action. As I argued above, it is possible 
for our implicitly biased hirer Ben, as well as for Borgoni’s ‘Emilia’ (2015), to be 
aware of their implicit biases as biased, and to catch themselves in an act 
mediated by such attitudes. Insofar as Ben and Emilia are (occurrently, 
introspectively) aware that their attitudes are biased, they are consciousPA of the 
morally relevant facts when those attitudes guide behaviour. So, once again, 
whilst this does not show that Ben or Emilia are, in fact, morally responsible for 
acting on their implicit biases, it does show that if they are excused, then it is not 
on the basis of their awareness of implicit bias and its influence on behaviour.  
So, if it turns out that we do lack moral responsibility for all of our implicit 
biases, and their influence on our actions, then it will not be because we lack 
awareness of them, but because of some other distinguishing feature. I now turn to 
SD(R) claims for another such candidate set of distinguishing features: that of the 
structure of implicit biases and the way in which they are processed.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESPONDING TO SUBSTANTIAL 
DISTINCTION CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESSING 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that a fundamental distinction in kind between (i) 
implicit biases, and the actions that they guide; and (ii) agential attitudes such as 
beliefs, and the actions that they guide, could not be upheld on the basis of the 
kind of awareness that we have of each. This chapter examines arguments for the 
substantial distinction account of implicit bias on the basis of how the attitudes in 
question are structured and processed: and in particular whether they encode or 
respond to propositional information. 
SD theorists such as Gendler and Levy suggest that implicit attitudes 
(implicit biases being among them) are to be distinguished from beliefs because 
only the latter are structured and processed propositionally. Contra Gendler and 
Levy, I argue that at least some of our implicit biases are propositional in 
structure, and feature in evidence-sensitive inferential transitions in the same way 
that many beliefs do. The conclusion of the chapter is that there is no substantial 
distinction between (i) the structure of implicit biases, and the way in which they 
are processed; and (ii) the structure of beliefs, as an example of agential attitudes, 
and the way in which they are processed.  
In §4.1 I outline the psychological theory (dual process theory) which 
supposedly supports the claim that implicit biases are structured and processed 
associatively. According to dual process theory, there are two kinds of mental 
states, which are processed in fundamentally different ways: Propositional mental 
states encode relational information that holds between their constituent concepts, 
and are processed in accordance with their semantic content. Associative mental 
states encode nothing more than the frequency with which a person has 
experienced their constituent concepts together, where the activation of one 
concept primes the activation of an associated concept. According to dual process 
theory, this can happen regardless of the proposition implied by the activation, or 
of any propositional attitudes which the person has towards the constituent 
components. Some philosophers, such as Gendler in two papers published in 
2008, have used this apparent distinction to argue that there is a fundamental 
difference in kind between beliefs and implicit biases. 
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 I show that these philosophical claims generate two testable hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 is that implicit biases are necessarily associative. HYPOTHESIS 2 is 
that beliefs change in response to changes in evidence. HYPOTHESIS 1 may be 
disproven by finding at least a few implicit biases which update in accordance 
with propositional information. I summarise findings from both de Houwer (2014) 
and Mandelbaum (forthcoming) to this effect in §4.2. I argue that whilst these 
findings survey relatively few implicit biases, even if just a few implicit biases are 
shown to be propositional, then this is sufficient motivation for rejecting the 
predictions of the dual process theory, that as yet untested implicit biases will be 
associative.  
 I discuss HYPOTHESIS 2, that beliefs change in response to changes in 
evidence, in §4.3. I argue that HYPOTHESIS 2 may also be shown to be false, 
because, as I demonstrate in §4.3.1, there are a number of examples of beliefs 
which fail to update in accordance with new evidence. However, I acknowledge 
that there is an ambiguity in the SD theorist’s claims which generate HYPOTHESIS 
2, and that these claims may have been intended to be interpreted normatively, 
rather than descriptively. I argue in §4.3.2, however, that the normative 
interpretation also fails to distinguish between implicit biases and beliefs, by 
showing that implicit attitudes may be governed by the same epistemic norms as 
beliefs. 
 Levy (2015) has recently accepted the falsity of HYPOTHESIS 1: he agrees 
that implicit biases may be propositionally structured. However, as I will 
demonstrate in §4.4, he has also provided a reinterpretation of HYPOTHESIS 2, 
which is supposed to reinstate the substantial distinction between implicit 
attitudes and beliefs. In particular, whilst he accepts that some implicit attitudes 
may be sensitive to propositional information, and so able to feature in inferential 
transitions, he argues that only beliefs are ‘inferentially promiscuous’, featuring in 
a much broader range of inferential transitions. I present this account in §4.4.1. In 
§4.4.2, I argue that if Levy’s distinction between the inferential promiscuity of 
beliefs and the inferential sensitivity of at least some implicit attitudes is supposed 
to be a distinction in kind, then it will be at best an arbitrary one. If there is such a 
distinction in kind, then it must be the case that the most evidence sensitive 
implicit attitude is still evidence sensitive to a lesser degree than the least 
evidence sensitive belief. I demonstrate that, to the contrary, there are in fact some 
beliefs (in particular, explicit prejudices) which are evidence sensitive to a lower 
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degree than the most evidence sensitive implicit attitudes, and conclude that 
Levy’s reinterpretation of HYPOTHESIS 2 does not support a substantial distinction 
between beliefs and implicit biases on the basis of their relation to evidence.  
 In light of the argument above, I then consider the SDR claim that the 
structure and processing of implicit biases rules out moral responsibility for 
implicitly biased attitudes and the actions that they influence. As in the conclusion 
to the previous chapter, I argue that this argument does not work: if it turns out 
that we do lack moral responsibility for our implicit biases, and their influence on 
our actions, it will not be because of their structure and the way in which they are 
processed. 
 
4.1. THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND TO THE NOTION OF ASSOCIATIONS 
In the following, I will present a brief overview of a position in cognitive science 
known as ‘dual process theory’, and demonstrate how the SD arguments on the 
basis of structure and processing rely on claims made by dual process theorists.  
 
4.1.1. Dual process theory and single-process theory 
The notion that implicit bias implicates associative processes originates in 
cognitive science. Some psychologists, such as Sloman (1996) posit that the mind 
is comprised of an ‘Associative System’ and a ‘Rule Based System’ which 
process mental entities in two distinct ways: the rule based system processes 
mental entities in virtue of their propositional contents, whereas the associative 
system processes mental entities just in virtue of how closely they are associated 
with each other—in a sense that I will explore in more depth shortly. This ‘dual 
processes’ interpretation of a range of findings in cognitive science is also 
favoured by Strack and Deutsche (2004) as well as Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
(2006, 2011, 2014).  
 Three things are important to note as regards the dual process 
interpretation, and my argument to follow. Firstly, the dual process interpretation 
is not incontrovertibly implied by the psychological evidence. Rather, proponents 
argue that the dual process interpretation best explains the findings, and best 
predicts how people will perform in experimental conditions, (for example see 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014).  
 Secondly, there is no consensus across the empirical community that the 
dual process interpretation is correct. A competing hypothesis, the ‘single-
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process’ interpretation, is favoured by other cognitive scientists such as Fazio 
(1990), Olson & Fazio (2008), Petty & Briñol (2006), and Petty et al. (2007). For 
single-process theorists, there is no distinction between associative processes and 
rule-based processes. Instead, the mind is comprised of just one system which 
processes all mental entities in fundamentally the same way.  
 Thirdly, it is beyond my remit in this thesis to provide an argument for 
whether the single-process model or the dual process model is, in general, the 
correct interpretation of mental processing. But such a verdict is not necessary for 
my purposes because my argument will be that implicit biases are not necessarily 
associatively structured states, and that at least some implicit biases implicate 
rule-based processes, rather than associative processes. It is consistent with the 
data and argument presented in this chapter that the dual process model could still 
hold in general, in that some set of mental entities (other than implicit social 
attitudes) may be processed by an associative system, which is distinct from a 
rule-based system. So, my argument against the SD theorist that there is not a 
substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of 
structure, content or processing is independent of the debate over whether the dual 
process or single-process model is the correct interpretation of mental processing 
in general.33 
 Let us now turn to the supposed distinction that dual process theorists 
maintain exists between the rule-based and the associative system, before 
assessing whether implicit biases are in fact associatively structured and 
associatively processed states. Let’s look first at the rule-based system. Many 
mental states, such as beliefs or desires, for instance, contain constituent concepts. 
For example, the belief that ‘trees are green’, call it B1, contains the concept of 
TREES and the concept of the colour GREEN; and the belief, B2, that ‘Dan loves 
George’ contains the constituent concepts DAN and GEORGE. Further, at least 
some mental entities specify the particular way in which their constituent concepts 
                                                
 
33 Whilst my argument against the SD theorist about implicit biases is independent of the general 
dual process vs. single-process debate, the reverse may not be true, because dual process theorists 
often appeal to at least some of the data on implicit bias to justify why they think that the dual 
process interpretation is correct, (for example, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 450). If 
appeal to this data on implicit bias plays a necessary role in the argument for why dual process 
theory is (supposedly) a superior interpretation to single-process theory, then the arguments in this 
chapter that at least some implicit biases are not associatively structured or associatively processed 
might well put some pressure on at least some arguments for the dual process theory. But as I 
explained in the main text, I do not have the scope to pursue this further in the thesis. 
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are related—the kind of relation that holds between them. This is the case for both 
B1 and B2. In B1 the colour green is a property that is had by trees, and in B2 Dan 
and George are related through Dan’s love of George.  
 Philosophers term these sorts of mental states ‘propositional attitudes,’ and 
because these attitudes represent propositions, they have a semantic content which 
is truth evaluable. The specification of how the constituents of the proposition are 
related at least in part determines the semantic content of the attitude in question. 
For example, ‘Dan loves George’ has a different semantic content to ‘George 
loves Dan’, even though both propositions have the same constituents: Dan, 
George, and the relation of ‘love’. Attitudes with semantic content may enter into 
what Levy calls ‘inferential transitions’ in accordance with the semantic content 
in question (2015). That’s to say that they may imply or be implied by other 
propositions according to the semantic content specified by the constituent 
concepts and the relation that holds between them. For instance, a person who 
believes B1 as above, and who is told that ‘there is a tree outside’, may infer that 
‘the tree outside is green’; whilst someone who believes B2 as above, and who is 
told that ‘Dan has bought a lovely birthday present for the only person he loves’, 
may infer that ‘Dan has bought a lovely birthday present for George’.  
 We can see that in order for a mental system to process propositional 
attitudes and produce the kind of inferentially valid transitions discussed above, 
that system must be sensitive to the semantic contents of a propositional 
attitude—to the particular way in which the constituent concepts of the 
propositional attitude are related. So, at least some of the time, it seems that we 
process mental states in virtue of a system that is sensitive to semantic relations, 
and which can produce valid inferential transitions. For dual process theorists, this 
kind of inferential, rule-based processing is the preserve of the rule-based system.  
 In setting up the case for the existence of a second, distinct system, dual 
process theorists rely on evidence which shows that the activation of one concept 
primes a set of other concepts which are then apt to feature in processing or to 
affect behaviour. The set which gets primed are those concepts, examples of 
which the person in question has previously experienced as “spatiotemporally 
contiguous” with the first concept in their environment (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2014: 453)—or, in other words, entities that the person in question 
has previously encountered alongside an entity instantiating the first concept. 
Recall from Chapter 1, for instance, Meyer and Schvaneveldt’s (1971) finding 
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that participants are quicker to recognise ‘butter’ as an English word when first 
presented with the word ‘bread’, compared to when they were first presented with 
a word that is unrelated to ‘butter’ (such as ‘window’ or ‘doctor’). The dual 
process interpretation of these results is that bread and butter are experienced as 
‘spatiotemporally contiguous’, or seen together, more often than butter and 
windows are seen together, and so subjects develop a strong associative link 
concerning those concepts. So, when one concept is activated, concepts which 
have a strong associative link with the first concept become primed for activation, 
making them more easily accessible to mental processing, and apt to affect 
behaviour, than concepts which are less closely associated with the first concept. 
 Dual process theorists hold that the priming of closely associated concepts 
can occur even if the person in question has propositional attitudes which imply 
that the associated concepts are in fact inappropriate to the particular context in 
question, (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 450).34 For example, for someone 
who is asked “What is your favourite colour?” it may be the case that the word 
‘colour’ activates the concepts of RED, ORANGE, GREEN, etc., even when the 
person in question rejects at least some of the activated concepts as aesthetically 
pleasing colours.  
 It should be noted that it is not the case, for dual process theorists, that 
when the activated concept A primes the associated concepts B, C and D, that B, C 
and D will inevitably feature in subsequent mental processing or action guidance. 
Dual process theorists hold that, at least sometimes, it is possible for rule-based 
processing to override the influence of concepts which are primed by the 
associative system. Instead, the commitments of dual process theory are that (i) 
after A becomes activated, B, C and D are more likely to affect behaviour than 
concepts E, F and G where E, F and G are less closely associated with A than B, C 
and D; and (ii) that after A becomes activated, B, C and D will be more easily 
accessible, and so they will affect behaviour more quickly than E, F and G in 
                                                
 
34 Gawronski and Bodenhausen argue that “mentally associated concepts can be activated 
regardless of whether the relation implied by the activated link is considered valid or invalid,” 
(2014: 450). They support this by appealing to findings of implicit bias, saying “For example, 
encountering a Muslim-looking man may activate the concept terrorism even if a person rejects 
the implied connection between Muslims and terrorism,” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 450). 
As per the previous footnote, this is just one example of where dual process theorists rely on 
implicit biases as paradigm examples of entities which are associatively processed. I’m avoiding 
giving an example based on implicit bias in the exposition of the notion of the associative system, 
because whether or not implicit bias really is associative in this way is exactly what is at issue in 
this chapter. 
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circumstances where the rule-based system cannot operate, such as when 
responding as quickly as possible to an experimental sorting task like the IAT. 
According to dual process theorists, the rule based system requires more time to 
process concepts than the associative system requires to prime them for use in 
further processing and behaviour, and so when people must act quickly, such as 
when they are pressed to respond to various experimental tasks, the rule-based 
system does not have time to override the operation of the associative system. 
 A brief clarification: Up until this chapter, the thesis has been mainly 
concerned with implicit biases conceived of as mental states, and their propensity 
to influence actions. This section introduces the notion of the systems which 
process these mental states. This might appear to open up the conceptual 
possibility that an associative mental state could be processed by the rule based 
system, whilst a propositional mental state could be processed by the associative 
system. But this is not what dual process theorists think is the case. In fact, as we 
can see from the passage below, associative processes and associative states are 
somewhat inter-defined, and likewise for propositional processes and 
propositional states:  
 
A central assumption of [the main dual process model]…is that implicit 
evaluations reflect the behavioral outcome of associative processes, whereas 
explicit evaluations are the behavioral outcome of propositional processes. 
Associative processes are defined as the activation of mental associations in 
memory, which we assume to be driven by the principles of feature matching 
and spatiotemporal contiguity. Propositional processes are defined as the 
validation of the information implied by activated associations, which we 
assume to be guided by the principles of cognitive consistency. (Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2014: 449) 
 
So, according to dual process theorists, associative processes are those which 
process associations on the basis of their spatiotemporal contiguities, and 
propositional processes are those which assess the semantic content of activated 
mental states, accepting such content if it is considered to be consistent with other 
propositional attitudes, or rejecting it if it is considered to be inconsistent. 
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4.1.2. Conditions of acquisition, modulation and extinction 
For dual process theorists, there is a fundamental distinction between the way in 
which associations are originally encoded and the way in which propositions may 
be encoded. According to dual process theory, associations may only be formed 
“gradually as the result of many experiences” (De Houwer 2014: 343). In order 
for the associative system to produce an association between concept A and 
concept B, a person must witness the co-occurrence of examples of concept A 
alongside examples of concept B many times over. Dual process theorists 
Gawronski and Bodenhausen hold that: 
 
The central assumption underlying this definition [of associative processes] 
is that observed co-occurrences between objects and events result in a co-
activation of their corresponding mental concepts, which in turn creates an 
associative link between the two. Repeatedly observing the same co-
occurrences strengthens this link, which facilitates the spread of activation 
from one concept to the other upon encountering one of the two associated 
stimuli. (2014: 453) 
 
Propositions, on the other hand, can be formed “as the result of a single 
instruction or inference” (De Houwer 2014: 344). For dual process theorists, this 
process is supposed to be distinctive to the formation of propositions alone. For 
instance, the proposition TREES ARE GREEN might be formed simply by being 
informed by a reliable person that “trees are green.” Gawronski and Bodenhausen 
suggest that when people are presented with new propositional information, they 
perform a “validity assessment” of that information, wherein it “may be regarded 
as either true or false depending on its consistency with other momentarily 
considered propositions,” (2014: 453), and they form a new proposition 
accordingly.  
 Both de Houwer (2014: 344) and Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2014: 
453) agree that the dual process theory allows that propositions may also be 
formed as a result of seeing the co-occurrence of two objects multiple times. 
However, Gawronski and Bodenhausen claim that in order to form a new 
proposition in this manner, the considered information must still “pass a process 
of propositional validation” which “involves the acquisition of self-generated 
propositional information,” (by which I think they mean that a person infers a new 
proposition from their previous experiences of the co-occurrence of two 
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concepts). For instance, a person might see multiple instances of trees with green 
leaves, and infer, on the basis of these experiences, the proposition TREES ARE 
GREEN. According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen, this process of inference does 
not happen in the case of the formation of an association, and so for them, even if 
not necessarily for de Houwer, the process of proposition formation is importantly 
distinct from association formation. 
 Alongside the claim about how associations are formed, dual process 
theorists are committed to a symmetrical hypothesis about how associations are 
modified. According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen, “repeated co-occurrences in 
the environment may create new associative links between concepts in memory,” 
(2014: 454). For them, the only way to alter an already encoded association 
between concepts A and B is through a process of ‘extinction’ or ‘counter-
conditioning’: Either A is presented many times over with ¬B, (extinction), or, if B 
is not the kind of thing that can be negated, then with an alternative concept C 
(counter-conditioning). Even then, this does not guarantee that an existing 
association will be changed, or extinguished (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 
454). 
 Importantly, for dual process theorists, a single propositional instruction or 
inference should not modify an association. Indeed, according to Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen, focusing on propositional information that negates the implied 
content of an association “leaves the activation of associations unaffected” or 
even “produce[s] ironic effects”, whereby the association is activated to affect 
behaviour more significantly than if the person in question had not focused on the 
negating propositional information, (2014: 455). The claim that a single 
propositional instruction or inference should not modify an association will be 
important when it comes to testing the SD theorist’s claims, as I outline in the 
next subsection. 
 So, to summarise, dual process theorists hold that the mind is comprised of 
two systems which process information in two distinct ways. The rule-based 
system processes propositional mental entities (such as beliefs) in accordance 
with their semantic content and inferential relations. The associative system 
primes concepts for use in further processing and behaviour in virtue of how 
closely they are associated to one another in memory (which is determined by 
how often the person has witnessed their co-occurrence), regardless of whether 
the person in question endorses the implied content of an association or not. 
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4.1.3. Substantial Distinction views, and some testable hypotheses 
In light of the above, we’re now in a position to appreciate the empirical 
background to the SD claims introduced in Chapter 2, in which implicit bias is 
said to implicate associative mental states and processes: 
 
NL5:  Implicit biases are associative, not propositional, in structure.35 
TG1:  Implicit biases are aliefs: sui generis tripartite mental states with a 
representational component, an affective component, and a 
behavioural component, which are ‘associatively linked’. 
TG3:  Implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, are not sensitive to the 
propositional information encoded in mental states such as beliefs: 
Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease having an 
implicit bias with the apparent content that P. 
 
Indeed, Levy’s claim summarised in NL5 comes from a book in which he gives a 
substantial exposition to the above kinds of empirical considerations, in much 
more depth than I am able to here.36 Gendler’s claims about the associative nature 
of implicit biases apply insofar as she thinks that implicit biases are examples of 
aliefs, a sui generis class of mental state. Importantly for her, the representational, 
affective and behavioural components of an implicit bias are not linked in virtue 
of a relation which bears semantic content, but in virtue of associations between 
the representational component, the affective response, and the behavioural 
output. These components tend to be co-activated, and are not sensitive to the 
propositional content of more familiar attitudes such as beliefs (Gendler, 2008a: 
651). 
 The general claim, common to both Gendler’s and Levy’s substantial 
distinction positions that implicit biases are structured and processed 
associatively, delivers a testable hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: implicit biases are necessarily associative 
 
                                                
 
35 This view is from Levy’s 2014a book, and it is a view that he rejects in his 2015 paper, as I will 
discuss in §4.4.  
36 See chapter 3 of Levy’s 2014a. 
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This hypothesis may be shown to be false if at least one implicit bias which 
updates in accordance with propositional information can be found: as we just 
saw, according to the psychological theory on which these claims are based, if 
implicit biases are associative, then they should not update in accordance with 
propositional information, (this point is also emphasised by de Houwer, 2012 and 
Mandelbaum, forthcoming).  
 In addition to Gendler’s characterisation of aliefs (the class to which she 
says implicit biases belong) she makes some further claims regarding the 
characteristics which are particular to beliefs, though as noted in Chapter 2, it was 
unclear whether these claims were to be understood as descriptive or normative 
claims.  
Here, the claims look descriptive:   
 
If I believe that P, and subsequently learn that not-P, I will revise my 
belief... Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease alieving that P... 
alief just is not reality-sensitive in the way belief is. Its content does not 
track (one’s considered impression of) the world. (2008a: 651)37 
 
Beliefs change in response to changes in evidence; aliefs change in response 
to changes in habit. If new evidence won't cause you to change your 
behaviour in response to an apparent stimulus, then your reaction is due to 
alief rather than belief. (Gendler, 2008b: 566)38 
 
On a descriptive interpretation, the claim is that beliefs always update in 
accordance with the proposition implied by new evidence. This can be seen in the 
latter sentence of Gendler’s second quote above, which implies that it is a 
necessary condition of any belief that both it, and the behaviours it brings about, 
update in accordance with new evidence.39 If the claim about this particular 
characteristic of beliefs is descriptive, then it is also testable in the following way: 
 
                                                
 
37 Note that this is the basis of what I called claim TG3. 
38 Note that this is the basis of what I called claim TG4. 
39 I take it that, on the descriptive interpretation, Gendler needs it to be the case that beliefs 
necessarily update in light of evidence, rather than something weaker, such as that beliefs only 
typically update in light of evidence, in order to support her (SD) claim that aliefs are a 
fundamentally different kind of mental state to beliefs. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Beliefs necessarily change in response to changes in 
evidence. If I believe that P, and subsequently learn that not-P, I will 
revise my belief that P to a belief that not-P. 
 
To show that HYPOTHESIS 2 is false, we need to find at least one belief that not-P 
which fails to be revised in response to learning that not-P.  
Elsewhere, however, Gendler seems to make a normative claim when she argues 
that beliefs update in accordance with evidence, saying: 
 
belief aims to ‘track truth’ in the sense that belief is subject to immediate 
revision in the face of changes in our all-things-considered evidence. When 
we gain new all-things-considered evidence—either as the result of a change 
in our evidential relation to the world, or as a result of a change in the 
(wider) world itself—the norms of belief require that our beliefs change 
accordingly. (Gendler, 2008b: 565) 
 
The talk of ‘aims’ and the notion of being ‘subject to’ immediate revision, as 
opposed to necessarily being immediately revised in the face of new evidence 
suggests that beliefs are distinguished from implicit biases (insofar as they are 
supposed to be aliefs) because the former are governed by some set of norms 
which require, but do not guarantee, that they will update in accordance with new 
evidence. If the normative interpretation of the claim is correct, then it may not be 
refuted simply by finding examples of beliefs which do not in fact update in 
accordance with evidence. This result is still consistent with the normative 
interpretation, as long as the beliefs in question are governed by the relevant 
evidence update norms. Refuting the normative interpretation, then, is a matter of 
either (a) rejecting that there is such a thing as an evidence norm, or (b) arguing 
that whatever the evidence-sensitivity norm turns out to be, it could also govern 
implicit attitudes. (I will argue for (b).) 
 My intention over the next two sections is to show that both HYPOTHESIS 1 
and HYPOTHESIS 2 are false. I address HYPOTHESIS 1 in §4.2, where I give several 
examples of implicit biases and other implicit social attitudes which do update in 
accordance with evidence. Following this, HYPOTHESIS 1 is false, and any 
substantial distinction claims which rely on the notion that implicit biases are 
necessarily associative in structure, and in the manner in which they are 
processed, will fail. In §4.3 I consider Gendler’s evidence update claims as 
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regards beliefs. I address the descriptive version (HYPOTHESIS 2) in §4.3.1. There, 
I give several examples of beliefs which fail to change in response to changes in 
the agent’s evidence, thus showing HYPOTHESIS 2 to be false. I then turn to the 
normative interpretation of Gendler’s evidence update claim in §4.3.2, where I 
argue that evidence-sensitivity norms may also govern implicit attitudes, and 
hence, implicit biases. So, on both the descriptive interpretation, and the 
normative interpretation of Gendler’s claims, the substantial distinction argument 
fails: there is no substantial distinction between beliefs and implicit biases on the 
basis that the former either do, or should, update in light of evidence whilst the 
latter do not. 
 
4.2. HYPOTHESIS 1 FAILS:  IMPLICIT BIASES ARE NOT NECESSARILY 
ASSOCIATIVE 
As we saw above, according to dual process theorists, implicit attitudes are 
paradigm associative states (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 449). Recall also 
that, for dual process theorists, the only way to alter an association between 
concepts A and B is through a process of ‘extinction’ or ‘counter-conditioning’: 
Either A is presented many times over with ¬B, (extinction), or, if B is not the 
kind of thing that can be negated, then with an alternative concept C (counter-
conditioning), (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014: 454-5). 
So dual process theorists are committed to the claim that if a mental state can be 
altered through processes other than extinction or counter-conditioning, then the 
mental state in question is not an associative one, (Mandelbaum, forthcoming: 
17). SD theorists who rely on dual process theory to maintain that implicit biases 
are fundamentally distinct from beliefs because the former are associative states 
whilst the latter are propositional states, are thereby committed to the claim that 
no implicit biases may be altered through processes other than extinction or 
counter-conditioning. 
 Problematically for these SD theorists, there is evidence to show that a 
number of implicit social attitudes, including the subset that we’re interested in, 
implicit biases, may be modulated by processes other than extinction or counter-
conditioning. Both de Houwer (2014) and Mandelbaum (forthcoming) discuss a 
number of relevant findings, which I outline below.  
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Implicit biases are modulated by strength of argument 
Strength of argument can affect the strength of an implicit bias. Briñol et al. 
(2008, cited in Mandelbaum, forthcoming) demonstrate that subjects who are 
presented with a strong argument for hiring an African American professor (citing 
their academic merits) exhibit less bias on a subsequent IAT than that exhibited 
by those presented with a weak argument (citing the benefit to the image of the 
institution). According to the dual process interpretation on which implicit biases 
are associative, just the mention of the term ‘African American’ should activate 
negative implicit associations which could then be observed on a subsequent IAT. 
Both the strong and the weak argument contained the same number of mentions of 
the term ‘African American professors’. So if associations mediate action on the 
IAT, then we would expect there to be no significant difference between the 
performance of the two groups. But this was not what was observed—those who 
read a strong argument for hiring African American professors exhibited less anti-
African American bias on the IAT. All else being controlled for, Briñol et al. 
(2008) conclude that strength of argument is the variable that accounts for the 
resulting difference in the level of implicit bias across conditions.40 
 
Implicit social preferences are modulated by relational information 
‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’ goes the old adage. This saying 
exemplifies the basic semantic content of ‘enemy’ and ‘friend’ as logically 
complimentary relations, and is predictive of explicit preferences, (for example, 
see Heider, 1958; Aronson & Cope, 1968; as referenced in Mandelbaum, 
forthcoming). According to dual process theory, associative processes are blind to 
the propositional notion of double-negation elimination: a negated negative 
valence is processed as a negative valence. So, if implicit like/dislike preferences 
are associative, then we would expect an enemy’s enemy to inherit a negative 
valence, on account of being associated with two negative items. 
 However, implicit preferences which are sensitive to semantic content of 
enemy-friend relationships have been observed. Gawronski et al. (2005, cited in 
Mandelbaum, forthcoming) presented subjects with a series of photos of 
unfamiliar people (the ‘CS1s’) which were coupled consistently with either 
                                                
 
40 Note that this result refutes Levy’s claim in NL7: We can influence our implicit attitudes only 
indirectly, by attempting to form new associations. 
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positively or negatively valenced concepts. Experimenters then presented subjects 
with a second series of photos of different people (the ‘CS2s’), as well as 
information on whether the CS2s were liked or disliked by the CS1s. As 
Mandelbaum points out, the associative theory predicts that: 
 
…you should have enhanced negative reactions toward the CS2 because you 
a) are encountering the CS2 as yoked to negative CS1 and b) are activating 
another negative valence because you are told that the CS1 dislikes the CS2. 
(forthcoming, 11) 
 
However, the results showed quite the opposite. Participants exhibited implicit 
preferences for the CS2s who were disliked by negatively valenced CS1s. That is, 
participants exhibited implicit preferences for the enemies of their enemies. These 
results imply that implicit preferences are sensitive to the logical notion that the 
negation of a negative property is equivalent to a positive property—sensitive to 
propositional information. Such results cannot be explained by a theory on which 
implicit like/dislike preferences are associative, (Mandelbaum, forthcoming: 11). 
 Peters and Gawronski (2011) conducted a later study in a similar 
paradigm, (in DeHouwer, 2014). They presented participants with pictures or four 
unknown people alongside a series of personality traits. Persons A and B were 
mostly presented alongside positive traits, whilst persons C and D were most often 
presented alongside negative traits. Participants were informed that persons A and 
C were paired with words which truly described them, whilst B and D were paired 
with words that are the opposite of their actual traits. Participants’ evaluations of 
the four people were then tested, testing which including an IAT test of the 
implicit attitudes participants held towards A, B, C and D. If these attitudes were 
formed associatively, purely on the basis of seeing the people presented in 
spatiotemporal contiguity with the relevant traits, then we would expect that 
persons A and B (who were mostly shown alongside positive traits) would be 
evaluated more positively than C and D (shown alongside negative traits). Even 
though person A was evaluated more positively than person C (which is predicted 
on the associative hypothesis), it turned out that person B was evaluated less 
positively than person D. It appears that the propositional content of the relational 
information supplied at the start, that persons B and D had the opposing traits to 
those they would be shown alongside, had a modulating effect on the participants’ 
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implicit evaluations. This difference in evaluation cannot be explained by the 
associative hypothesis: An associative hypothesis predicts learning that B and D 
were shown alongside opposing traits to those which they in fact had will have no 
difference on implicit evaluations.  
 The results from Gawronski et al. (2005, in Mandelbaum, forthcoming) 
and Peters and Gawronski (2011, in DeHouwer, 2014) reveal that at least some 
implicit social preferences and evaluations are modulated by propositional 
information, leaving the associative theory of implicit evaluations unable to 
explain these results.  
 
Implicit attitudes about (fictional) social groups are modulated by propositional 
instruction  
New implicit attitudes, which are formed as the result of an abstract propositional 
instruction, can be as virulent as new implicit attitudes formed as the result of 
extensive associative conditioning. Perhaps even more surprisingly, further 
propositional information modulates these implicit attitudes to a greater extent 
than further associative conditioning. 
 In a study by Gregg et al. (2006; in Mandelbaum, forthcoming), half of the 
subjects read a single sentence about which of two (fictitious) tribes are peaceful 
and civilised, and which are savage and barbaric. The other half underwent 240 
trials to associatively condition one tribe with the notions of peace and 
civilisation, and the other with savagery and barbarism. (The same tribes were 
matched with the same notions across conditions). Both groups were then given 
an IAT test. Those in the propositional instruction condition showed implicit 
attitudes coupling tribes with concepts which were as virulent as those in the 
associative learning condition. In other words, 240 trials of associative 
conditioning resulted in the association of two terms no more significantly than 
attitudes formed as the result of a single propositional instruction. Being presented 
with an abstract proposition in which a social group are predicated with a 
valenced concept produced as efficacious a behavioural response on the IAT as 
extensive associative conditioning. This is problematic for dual process theorists, 
who hold that the strength of an association (as revealed on the IAT) correlates 
with how often concepts appear in spatiotemporal contiguity, (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2014). That a group who have seen two concepts in spatiotemporal 
contiguity once have as strong an implicit attitude as those who have seen the 
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concepts in spatiotemporal contiguity 240 times is not explainable on the 
associative hypothesis (Mandelbaum, forthcoming: 16).  
 A later study in the Gregg et al. (2006) is perhaps even more problematic 
for the associative hypothesis. Participants in the propositional instruction 
condition were instructed to read a sentence which contradicted the contents of the 
first sentence, i.e. a sentence in which the adjectives which originally described 
the first tribe now describe the second, and vice versa. Those in the associative 
conditioning trial underwent extensive counter-conditioning trials in which the 
adjectives which were originally presented alongside the first tribe were now 
presented alongside the second, and vice versa. This counter-conditioning failed 
to have any effect on subjects’ attitudes. An IAT in the counter-conditions group 
revealed attitudes in accordance with the originally conditioned valences which 
were as efficacious as before the counter-conditioning. However, an IAT of those 
in the propositional instruction condition revealed that their implicit attitudes had 
in part adjusted in line with the new information: exhibiting implicit attitudes 
which were less extreme than their attitudes on the first test, and less extreme than 
those in the associative condition. Their implicit attitude did not reverse 
completely as the result of a single propositional instruction. However, as 
compared with those in the associative conditioning group, propositional 
instruction was revealed to be more effective at modulating implicit attitudes than 
associative counter-conditioning. The associative hypothesis cannot make sense 
of this, as Gregg et al. acknowledge in the following: 
 
Our first two experiments therefore empirically contradict what dual process 
models can plausibly be taken as implying, namely, that automatic attitudes 
are relatively immune to sophisticated symbolic cognition (2006: 9; quoted 
in Mandelbaum, forthcoming).  
 
DeHouwer (2006) shows that the modulation of implicit attitudes by propositional 
information also occurs in non-social attitudes. Study participants were given 
some instructions which inform them that that they will be presented with a series 
of pleasant and unpleasant pictures, where the pleasant pictures will always be 
preceded by the brief presentation of two neutral words, and the unpleasant 
pictures preceded by two different neutral words. Before the presentation of 
pictures began, subjects underwent an IAT which revealed that they were 
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significantly faster at pairing the neutral words that they were told were going to 
accompany the pleasant pictures with pleasant evaluative concepts, and to pair the 
neutral words that they were told were going to accompany the unpleasant 
pictures with unpleasant evaluative concepts than the other way around (i.e. 
pairing neutral words in a manner incongruent with the instructions). DeHouwer 
suggests that “a single instruction about the relation between the meaningless 
words and positive or negative pictures was sufficient to influence the implicit 
evaluation of the words” (2014: 347). 
 
In light of the above evidence, it appears that implicit bias, as well as implicit 
evaluation more generally, may be modulated by the strength of an argument, by a 
single propositional instruction, and by relational information. None of these 
results are explainable on an associative hypothesis, but they are both explainable 
and predicted by a hypothesis on which the implicit attitudes in question both 
encode propositional information, and are sensitive to its content. These findings 
undermine SD views according to which there is supposed to be a fundamental 
distinction between all implicit biases and all beliefs on the basis that the former 
are associative in structure, whilst the latter are propositional in structure. Recall 
Levy’s (2014a) claim, as summarised in NL5, and Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) 
claim, as summarised in TG1 and TG3: 
 
NL5:  Implicit biases are associative, not propositional, in structure. 
TG1:  Implicit biases are aliefs: sui generis tripartite mental states with a 
representational component, an affective component, and a 
behavioural component, which are ‘associatively linked’. 
TG3:  Implicit biases, insofar as they are aliefs, are not sensitive to the 
propositional information encoded in mental states such as beliefs: 
Learning that not-P may well not cause me to cease having an 
implicit bias with the apparent content that P. 
 
Importantly, for both Levy and Gendler, implicit biases are characterised by their 
being associatively structured, and not responsive to propositional information. 
This generated HYPOTHESIS 1, that implicit biases are necessarily associative in 
structure, and so necessarily processed associatively. So, even if just one result 
shows that implicit biases may be modulated by propositional information, then 
the hypothesis that implicit biases are fundamentally distinct from beliefs because 
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they are structured and processed associatively, whilst the latter are structured 
propositionally, and processed in accordance with propositional information, fails.  
 It might be pointed out that whilst these examples show that at least some 
implicit social attitudes are processed in accordance with propositional 
information, and so are structured propositionally, it doesn’t show that all implicit 
social attitudes are so structured and processed. It might then be argued that, for 
all that we have shown above, the majority of as yet untested implicit social 
attitudes are not propositional, but associative.  
 I don’t think that this is quite right. Recall from §4.1 that the dual process 
theory, the idea that there is an associative system which processes associations in 
a distinct manner to that of the propositional system, is a theoretical model. It is 
not incontrovertibly implied by the psychological findings. Rather, it is upheld 
insofar as it serves to both explain and to predict the findings (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2014). The findings above are neither explainable, nor predictable 
on a dual process hypothesis, according to which implicit attitudes, by their very 
nature, are associative.41 The dual-systems model only has theoretical utility, with 
respect to implicit social attitudes at least, if all implicit social attitudes are 
associative. If some implicit social attitudes are in fact propositional, then, 
alongside the dual-systems model, we need to commit to another model to 
account for those attitudes which the dual systems model cannot explain. But if 
we have to commit to another model, then we lose the motivation for positing the 
dual systems model in the first place. So, even though we haven’t yet empirically 
verified that all implicit biases are indeed propositional, we have lost a 
considerable theoretical reason to think that they might be otherwise. It may well 
be that the dual process model has theoretical utility independently of the debate 
regarding implicit social attitudes, over territory where the competing single 
systems models cannot account for the data, and so I do not take this to be an 
outright refutation of the duals systems model in general. However, given that the 
dual process model cannot explain the propositional structure of at least some 
implicit social attitudes, we have little reason to place faith in its predictions of the 
structure of as yet untested implicit social attitudes.  
                                                
 
41 It is not an option for the dual processes theorist to deal with the evidence presented in this 
section by saying that that those implicit attitudes that exhibit propositional features turn out to be 
explicit attitudes after all. These implicit attitudes have other features which, according to dual 
process theorists, propositional processes should lack. For instance, they are non-effortful; they 
operate automatically; and do not require guidance from attentional resources. 
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4.3. HYPOTHESIS 2 FAILS ON BOTH A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE  
INTERPRETATION 
HYPOTHESIS 2 is the claim that beliefs necessarily change in response to changes in 
evidence. On a descriptive interpretation of this claim, finding just one belief 
which fails to change in response to changes in the agent’s evidence is sufficient 
to show that it is false. On a normative interpretation, the claim fails if both 
beliefs and implicit attitudes are governed by evidence sensitivity norms. In what 
follows, I will show that both the descriptive interpretation and the normative 
interpretation of the evidence claim fail to uphold a substantial distinction 
between implicit biases and beliefs. I start with the descriptive interpretation. 
 
4.3.1. The descriptive interpretation fails 
The descriptive reading of Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) claims that beliefs update in 
light of evidence, which I summarised as key claims G3 and G4, generates 
HYPOTHESIS 2, as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: If I believe that P, and subsequently learn that not-P, I 
will revise my belief that P to a belief that not-P. 
 
To show that HYPOTHESIS 2 is false, we must find at least one belief that P which 
fails to be revised in response to learning that (which Gendler uses 
interchangeably with having evidence for) not-P.  
One might think that any false belief is a belief which has not updated in 
light of the evidence. If this were how Gendler (2008a, 2008b) intended the claim 
to be interpreted, then her substantial distinction argument would fail for quite 
trivial reasons—plenty of beliefs are false. In light of this, I take Gendler to mean 
that an agent will update their belief in light of evidence which they recognise and 
interpret as relevant to that belief. So, the claim is not that all beliefs update in 
light of evidence, but that if an agent encounters evidence which they see as 
justification for the formation of a new (or alteration of an existing) belief, then 
they should form a new belief accordingly.   
 However, such a claim is just too strong for many ordinary cases that we 
still might want to countenance as cases of belief. Imagine that I believe (falsely) 
that you live on College Road, a belief I have held for a long time on the basis of 
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misunderstanding something you said in conversation years ago. Let’s imagine 
that this comes up in conversation between us later on, whereupon you correct 
me—in that conversation from years ago you were in fact talking about helping 
your brother move in to College Road, rather than moving in yourself. You in fact 
live on Station Road. You’re a generally reliable person, who rarely intends to 
deceive and so I see your testimony as justification for the formation of a new 
belief, that you in fact live on Station Road. Nevertheless, a few weeks later, when 
someone asks me where you live, I say “College Road”, fully believing myself to 
have stated something true—our recent conversation about where you in fact live 
having slipped my mind. In this case, I’ve retained an old belief, in spite of having 
learned evidence to the contrary. So, cases of memory lapse are problematic for 
the notion that agents always update their beliefs in accordance with evidence 
which they see as justification for the formation of a new belief. 
 It might be objected that if I’ve forgotten that you told me you live on 
Station Road, then it’s not true to say that my belief is unresponsive to the 
evidence that you live on Station Road, and so it is not a problem for the 
descriptive interpretation of Gendler’s view. It might then be that beliefs only 
have to update in accordance with evidence that the subject, in the moment that 
the belief is tokened, sees as evidence. What is important, then, is that if a subject 
sees some evidence E as evidence for the proposition P, then in that moment, she 
will adopt the belief that P accordingly. But then, consider the following cases: 
 
Self-doubt 
Ada sees the fact that she consistently gets As and A*s on her maths tests as 
evidence that she is good at maths, and yet she does not believe that she is 
good at maths because she has crippling self-doubt about her own abilities.  
 
Grief 
Hakeem goes to identify the body of his brother, who died after being hit by 
a car. The doctor who tried to save his brother’s life recounts what happened. 
From the doctor’s account, it is evident that his brother was conscious, 
confused, and in much pain as the ambulance arrived, and he was attended to 
by paramedics. However, even in the face of this evidence, Hakeem cannot 




Explicit prejudice  
Mike is a neuroscience student who believes that female brains lack some of 
the processing capacities of male brains, and that this shows that women are 
cognitively inferior to men. He sincerely assents to this belief, asserts it 
frequently, and utilises it in judgements. Mike reads Joel et al.’s (2015) study 
which shows that human brains are not distinguishable on the basis of sex. 
He has sufficient training to understand the methodology and the 
conclusions. However, he fails to update his belief that women are inferior to 
men on the basis of the neurological evidence, and goes on believing that 
neuroscience shows that women are academically inferior to men. 
 
Here, we have three agents who see the evidence that P as evidence that P, and 
yet fail to adopt the belief that P.  
 Let’s take one of these agents, and look more closely at what is going on 
in their psychological economy. Let’s take Ada. For the duration of Ada’s 
presentation on trigonometry, Luke and Steven sit at the back of the class, 
snickering. For the next couple of weeks, Luke and Steven tease Ada in each 
maths class. Ada interprets this behaviour as evidence that she is bad at maths, 
and, because of this, forms the belief that she is bad at maths. Of course, Luke and 
Steven’s actions aren’t really evidence (or, at least, they are bad evidence) for the 
proposition that Ada is bad at maths. So Ada has formed a false belief. So far, this 
is consistent with Gendler’s claims. Ada has ended up with a false belief, but only 
because she took herself to have evidence for the belief in question, and, for 
Gendler, taking oneself to have evidence that P is sufficient for believing that P.  
 Some time later, Ada receives her class report, which details all of the 
marks that she got in recent tests and exercises. The class average wavers around 
60%, but Ada consistently achieves over 70%, with some scores in the 90s. Ada 
understands that this is good evidence that she is good at maths—and certainly 
better than the majority of her peers. However, her self-doubt is such that she 
cannot bring herself to believe that she is good at maths. She cannot assent to the 
proposition that she is good at maths. When she thinks about the subjects that she 
needs to work on most for the upcoming exams, she concludes that it is the 
numerate subjects that she is worst at. She thinks about possible future careers and 
resolves not to pursue any positions which require numeracy. She dreads the 
upcoming maths exam more than any of the others. In terms of her 
phenomenology, her reasoning and her actions, the proposition “I am bad at 
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maths” is playing a somewhat prolific role. The proposition “I am good at maths” 
plays no such role. On any account of belief, it looks as if Ada has not acquired 
the belief that she is good at maths. And yet she has been presented with 
something that she recognises as evidence for that belief. 
 I can imagine the following objection: If Ada does not end up with the 
belief that she is good at maths, then perhaps she does not really fully accept that 
she has evidence for this proposition in the first place. If that’s the case, then the 
example is simply wrongly described. Ada recognises that she has some good 
marks, but she doesn’t really accept this as decisive evidence for her being good 
at maths. The trouble with this line of argument, however, is that it is not clear 
what taking something to be evidence amounts to, if Ada doesn’t do this with 
respect to her test scores. What entitles us to say that an agent has not really 
accepted the evidence that entails P as evidence that entails P? It had better not be 
an appeal to the fact that they have failed to adopt the entailed belief: If the 
argument that Ada has failed to fully appreciate the evidence amounts to nothing 
more than drawing attention to the fact that she has failed to form the appropriate 
belief, then we have a problem of triviality. The claim from HYPOTHESIS 2 that 
needs to be defended is that: 
 
If S recognises that there is evidence that not-P, then they will revise their 
belief that P (to a belief that not-P). 
 
If the means of defending this claim against Self-doubt, Grief, and Explicit 
prejudice is to say that: 
 
S only recognises evidence that not-P as evidence that not-P if they form the 
belief that not-P. 
 
then the conditions on evidence recognition and belief update are trivial. The 
agent’s recognition of their evidence is analysed just in terms of their acquisition 
of the appropriate state, whilst their acquisition of the appropriate state is analysed 
just in terms of their recognition of the evidence. But this much is true of implicit 
bias too. For instance, we can just say that those agents who successfully modified 
their implicit biases in virtue of reading a single propositional instruction (Gregg 
et al., 2006) or a strong argument (Briñol et al., 2008) recognised the evidence 
119 
that favoured the attitude change. Those who fail to update their biases fail to 
recognise the evidence. So, if we interpret Gendler’s evidence update claim as 
descriptive, rather than normative, then we lose the distinction between beliefs 
and implicit biases. 
 So, if the SD theorist wishes to maintain that there is a substantial 
distinction between beliefs and implicit biases on the basis that for the former, but 
not for the latter, recognition of evidence is sufficient for attitude update, then the 
onus is on them to (1) come up with a non-trivial account of evidence recognition 
that is independent of the notion of appropriate belief acquisition; (2) explain why 
the agents in Self-doubt, Grief, and Explicit prejudice fail to count as recognising 
evidence; and (3) explain why participants in experiments where implicit biases 
are modulated in virtue of propositional instruction do not count as updating their 
attitudes in light of the evidence.  
 I anticipate that at this stage in the dialectic, we will naturally progress to 
discussing the agent’s control of their attitudes, and so we move somewhat 
beyond the focus of this chapter. I discuss the extent to which we control our 
beliefs and our explicit biases in the following chapter, where I will pick up again 
on this debate. 
 
4.3.2. The normative interpretation fails 
On the normative interpretation, Gendler’s claim is that beliefs are governed by 
some set of norms which require, but do not guarantee, that they will update in 
accordance with new evidence, whilst implicit biases are governed by no such 
norm. I am not convinced, however, that whatever the belief norms turn out to be, 
they will not also apply to implicit attitudes.  
To see this, consider arguments that it is just part of the nature of what 
beliefs are that they aim at truth (for instance, see Williams, 1973; Velleman, 
2000). Even when beliefs end up being false, their aim is to represent the world 
accurately, in accordance with the evidence. On this position, being governed by 
an evidence-update norm just requires that the mental state in question aims to 
represent the world accurately. On this ‘constitutivist’ interpretation of Gendler’s 
claim, the fundamental distinction between beliefs and implicit biases is that only 
the former constitutively aim at representing the world accurately.  
While it may well be true that there is a sense in which beliefs 
constitutively aim at representing the world accurately, it is not clear why we 
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should accept this as a substantial distinction claim. Although implicit attitudes 
might occasionally end up misrepresenting the world (for example, in the case of 
implicit biases, and Gendler’s other examples of alief states), on the whole, 
implicit attitudes may nevertheless still aim at representing the external world 
accurately, just as beliefs do. Whilst implicit biases have received much 
philosophical attention, implicit attitudes more generally are implicated in a range 
of everyday information processing, with some arguing that much daily cognition 
is implicit, insofar as it occurs and guides behaviour automatically (Bargh & 
Morsella, 2008). A number of theorists tell an evolutionary story about why we 
have such automatic processes in the first place, arguing that the evolution of an 
automatic behavioural guidance system, which represents the world broadly 
accurately, is, in the context of selective environmental forces, predictable a priori 
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008: 75, see also Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1991 & 1995): A 
creature whose mental states consistently misrepresent their environment, and 
then figure in behavioural guidance is unlikely to be favoured by selective forces. 
So, if implicit attitudes evolved with the function of accurately representing the 
environment, then they too constitutively aim at truth—even if a subset of implicit 
attitudes (implicit biases) fail to represent truthfully. It is not clear why implicit 
attitudes wouldn’t then be governed by evidence-update norms, just as beliefs are. 
Not all implicit attitudes in fact comply with the norm, because some implicit 
attitudes end up representing the world inaccurately. However, an attitude’s being 
false does not necessarily imply that it is not governed by a truth norm—
constitutivists hold that false beliefs are nonetheless still governed by the relevant 
norm. 
 An opponent might argue that aiming at truth is a necessarily conscious, 
necessarily intentional activity. But this need not be the case. Consider Velleman 
in the following passage: 
 
A person can also aim cognitions at the truth without necessarily framing 
intentions about them. Suppose that one part of the person—call it a 
cognitive system—regulates some of his cognitions in ways designed to 
ensure that they are true, by forming, revising, and extinguishing them in 
response to evidence and argument. Regulating these cognitions for truth 
may be a function for which the system was designed by natural selection, or 
by education and training, or by a combination of the two. In any case, the 
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system carries out this function more or less automatically, without relying 
on the subject’s intentions for initiative or guidance. (Velleman, 2000: 253) 
 
Consider also the three agents from the ‘Lights’, ‘Flat warming’ and 
‘Mushrooms’ examples in Chapter 3 who formed beliefs which accurately 
represented the environment without consciously intending to do so. Presumably, 
these beliefs were still norm-governed. So, claiming that attitudes may only aim at 
truth in virtue of conscious and intentional input from the agents in question isn’t 
a commitment of all constitutivists, and will end up ruling out a number of beliefs 
as norm-governed. 
 So, implicit biases (since they are implicit attitudes) may constitutively 
aim at truth, and so be governed by evidence-update norms in the same way that 
beliefs are. Accordingly, the normative interpretation of Gendler’s distinction 
between beliefs and implicit biases fails.  
 
4.4. IMPLICIT BIASES AS ‘PATCHY ENDORSEMENTS’, (LEVY, 2015) 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Levy revised the position that he took in his 2014a 
book, that implicit biases are necessarily associative, in response to 
Mandelbaum’s (forthcoming) argument in a more recent 2015 paper. There, Levy 
acknowledges the evidence that I summarised in §4.2—that some implicit biases, 
and implicit social attitudes more generally, have been shown to feature in 
inferential transitions, which they could only do if they encoded, and were 
sensitive to, propositional information. He also acknowledges that this refutes 
arguments that he has made in earlier work which rely on the claim that all 
implicit biases are associatively structured and processed, (2015: 817).  
 However, Levy (2015) proposes that there is still a distinction between 
implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of how each are processed, arguing that 
beliefs are ‘inferentially promiscuous’ and responsive to evidence: 
 
Beliefs are inferentially promiscuous and beliefs are responsive to evidence. 
Beliefs are inferentially promiscuous inasmuch as the belief that p can 
interact (appropriately) with any other propositional attitude… For instance, 
my belief that it is raining will interact appropriately with my desire to stay 
dry, as well as my belief that roads can be dangerous when wet, and any 
other of my attitudes concerning water and wetness. Whereas inferential 
promiscuity is a matter of how beliefs cause behavior and update other 
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mental states, responsiveness to evidence is a matter of how the belief itself 
can be expected to update, given appropriate evidence. Inferential 
promiscuity and responsiveness to evidence are two sides of the same coin: 
beliefs are inferentially promiscuous, causing the update of other beliefs, 
because beliefs are responsive to evidence. (Levy, 2015: 805)  
 
Here Levy accepts that the experiments which I summarised in §4.2 show that 
some implicit attitudes are sensitive to some propositional information. However, 
he argues that it is significant that many implicit attitudes are insensitive to a lot 
of other propositional information. For example, he mentions findings which 
show that implicit attitudes predict job candidate preferences, where subjects do 
not acknowledge biased preferences in the justification of their choices.42 He 
argues that 
  
…any inference from a proposition like “a white (male) candidate is 
superior” to “the kinds of qualifications possessed by the white (male) 
candidate are the ones relevant to the job” is an inference—if indeed it can 
be called that at all—that ignores too many other representations which we 
can justifiably attribute to the person. (Levy, 2015: 814)  
 
The claim here is that although implicit attitudes may update in accordance with 
some propositional information, they fail to update in light of many other 
propositions. Notably, they fail to update in accordance with the propositional 
information encoded in the subject’s explicit egalitarian attitudes as regards fair 
hiring practices, for instance. So, whilst implicit biases may be inferentially 
sensitive, they are not inferentially promiscuous, as beliefs are. 
 Levy proposes that implicit attitudes are a kind of sui generis state, that he 
calls ‘patchy endorsements’: 
 
Implicit attitudes are not beliefs. They do not feature often enough and 
broadly enough in the kinds of normatively respectable inferential transitions 
that characterize beliefs. Nor, though, are they just associations. They do not 
activate contents solely associatively: they exhibit some of the kind of 
                                                
 
42 For example, in Chapter 1 we saw that Swedish recruiters with high IAT race bias are 
significantly less likely to offer a job interview to an applicant with a name that they perceive to 
belong to a Muslim, as compared compared to applicants with a Swedish name (Rooth, 2007). 
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inference aptness that characterize beliefs. They do so in a patchy and 
fragmented manner, which indicates they have propositional structure. They 
are patchy endorsements. (2015: 816) 
 
So, whilst Levy acknowledges that at least some implicit attitudes are 
propositional in structure, he maintains that this is insufficient evidence for 
something like a continuum thesis of implicit attitudes, where implicit attitudes 
are not fundamentally different to beliefs. He thereby rejects the line of argument 
that I presented in §4.2. 
 Levy suggests that there are moral upshots to the notion that implicit 
attitudes are patchy endorsements (that is, neither purely associative, but also 
neither fully doxastic) in the following: 
 
We should hesitate before we blame, or feel shame, or guilt. Equally, 
though, given that they do not seem to be just associations, there may be 
room to develop analogues of our existing moral concepts that can apply to 
agents who harbor them. Right now, neither blame nor excuse (insofar as 
excuse rests on the claim that they are just associations (Levy 2014a)), seem 
justified. (2015: 816-7) 
 
In the next subsection I will respond to this conception of implicit biases as 
patchy endorsements. I will also consider the upshot for moral responsibility, 
should it be the case that implicit biases are patchy endorsements, when I consider 
moral responsibility more generally at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.4.2. Inferential promiscuity designates a difference in degree, not kind  
I will argue that Levy’s distinction between the inferential promiscuity of beliefs 
and the inferential sensitivity of at least some implicit attitudes is one of degree, 
not kind, and so supports a continuum thesis, rather than a substantial distinction 
thesis. I will further show that, in fact, there are some beliefs which are evidence 
sensitive to a lower degree than the most evidence sensitive implicit attitudes. The 
conclusion will be that Levy’s notion of implicit attitudes as ‘patchy 
endorsements’ does not uphold a substantial distinction between beliefs and 
implicit biases.  
 In the previous subsection, we saw Levy concede that implicit attitudes are 
structured propositionally. However, he argued that only beliefs are inferentially 
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promiscuous in that “the belief that p can interact (appropriately) with any other 
propositional attitude” (Levy, 2015: 805). Levy intends the distinction between 
the mere inferential sensitivity of implicit attitudes and the full blown inferential 
promiscuity of beliefs to designate a substantial distinction in kind. His comments 
in the abstract, about implicit biases being a sui generis mental state, make this 
clear: 
 
In this paper I argue that while implicit attitudes have propositional 
structure, their sensitivity and responsiveness to other mental representations 
is too patchy and fragmented for them to properly be considered beliefs. 
Instead, they are a sui generis kind of mental state, a state I dub patchy 
endorsements. (2015: 800). 
 
Later claims support this too: 
 
Any state which is inferentially promiscuous and appropriately responsive to 
evidence is a belief; accordingly, I will follow Brownstein and Madva 
(2012) in taking this kind of responsiveness to be the mark of a bona fide 
belief. (Levy, 2015: 805) 
 
Levy (2015) doesn’t explicitly say what constitutes the different kinds of ways to 
update in light of evidence, or the different kinds of ways to be inferentially 
sensitive, if indeed he holds that such differences exist. Instead, it seems that 
inferential promiscuity is just frequent inferentially sensitivity. But this would 
make the distinction one of degree, not kind. 
Later on in the paper, the argument seems to be that the relevant difference in kind 
will be constituted by a large enough difference in degree. This is evident in the 
following passage (where I have underlined words and phrases which I think 
indicate a difference in degree): 
 
Both sides would surely agree, however, that excessive evidence 
insensitivity and encapsulation blocks the ascription of a correlative belief to 
an agent. … Though it may be ineliminably vague just how much 
responsiveness to evidence is required for a representational state to count as 
a belief, sufficient departure from the kind of sensitivity to evidence and 
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aptness for normatively respectable inference we associate with a bona fide 
belief will settle the question. (Levy, 2015: 806, underline emphasis mine)43 
 
So, according to the above passage, the idea seems to be that, at some point, a 
distinction in degree becomes a distinction in kind, even if the precise extent to 
which an attitude must be responsive to evidence in order to count as a belief, 
rather than implicit, is “ineliminably vague”.  
 I think that this commits the patchy endorsement theorist to the following 
claims:  
 
PE1:  Each and every state in the set of beliefs, b1, b2, b3…bn, is 
responsive to evidence more frequently than each and every state 
in the set of implicit attitudes ia1, ia2, ia3…ian.  
 
PE2:  There is a sufficient gap between the least evidence-responsive 
belief, bL, and the most evidence-responsive implicit attitude, iaM 
such that bL is a different kind of state to iaM.  
 
Patchy endorsement theorists are committed to PE1 insofar as they hold that both 
beliefs and implicit attitudes are propositional, and so some particular belief b23 
does not respond to some piece of evidence e1 in a different kind of way to the 
way in which some particular implicit attitude ia67 responds to evidence e1. 
Instead, the distinction lies in the frequency with which b23 responds to evidence: 
for example b23 responds to evidence e1, e2, e3, e4, and e5, whilst ia67: only 
responds to e1 and e2. In other words, whilst ia67 may be inferentially sensitive, b23 
is inferentially promiscuous. PE1 is the minimum commitment for the patchy 
endorsement theorist to be able to say that all beliefs are inferentially promiscuous 
whilst all implicit biases are only inferentially sensitive—whatever these 
properties turn out to be—in that it orders implicit attitudes and beliefs on a 
continuum of inferential sensitivity, but does not determine the distance between 
the most evidence-responsive implicit attitude, and the least evidence-responsive 
belief. PE2 is the stronger commitment which delivers the desired difference in 
                                                
 
43 Although we’ve switched from ‘inferential promiscuity’ to ‘responsiveness to evidence’, recall 
that Levy thinks that “Inferential promiscuity and responsiveness to evidence are two sides of the 
same coin: beliefs are inferentially promiscuous, causing the update of other beliefs, because 
beliefs are responsive to evidence” (2015: 805). 
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kind, even though, as we saw Levy admit above, this distinction will fall at an 
arbitrary point on the continuum of inferential sensitivity to inferential 
promiscuity. 
 PE2 requires, as a minimum, that PE1 is true. So, if PE1 is false, this 
entails that PE2 is false. Given this, we can test the patchy endorsement claim that 
implicit attitudes are a sui generis class, distinct from beliefs: If we can find even 
one belief that is less frequently responsive to evidence than the most frequently 
evidence-responsive implicit attitude, then PE1 fails. If PE1 fails, then PE2 fails, 
and consequently, the patchy endorsements argument, that there is a substantial 
distinction between implicit attitudes and beliefs on the basis of the frequency of 
responsiveness to evidence, fails. In the following, I argue that PE1 fails, and PE2 
fails also. 
 Firstly, it is unclear what motivates PE1. Admittedly, there is evidence 
that some implicit attitudes, at least sometimes, do not update in response to 
evidence, or that they update, but not in the right way (Levy, 2015). But there are 
also cases where some beliefs, at least sometimes, do not update in response to 
evidence, or that they update, but not in the right way (such as in the examples of 
Self-doubt, Grief, and Explicit prejudice, from §4.2.2). Recall that nothing in the 
nature of implicit attitudes suggests that they will consistently misrepresent the 
environment, or else creatures with cognitive systems which utilise implicit 
attitudes are unlikely to be favoured by selective forces. 
 To the further detriment of PE1, I think that there is a whole class of 
beliefs which are at least as frequently unresponsive to evidence as the most 
responsive of implicit attitudes: that is the class of explicit prejudices. In fact, 
explicit prejudices which have been held for a long period of time persist 
precisely because they are frequently unresponsive to evidence. To see this, 
consider Liz, who believes that “black people are unintelligent.” Liz is 
introspectively aware of the content of her belief: She feels assent to it, taking it to 
describe a truth when she recalls the content. She is disposed to assert it—not in 
all circumstances, for example, not in front of her boss—but she’s happy to bring 
the content of her belief up with friends, when in the pub, and in conversation 
with her boyfriend. It guides her actions in appropriate ways, leading her to utter 
racist slurs, and to assert “Too thick to learn English” when a black footballer 
makes a grammatical mistake in a post-match interview. However, when Liz 
encounters evidence which counts against her belief, she fails to update her belief 
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appropriately in light of this evidence. She fails to update her belief when she 
reads about a black oncologist developing a new drug which significantly 
enhances the effectiveness of leukemia treatment. She fails to update her belief 
when a black colleague fixes a bug in the software her team is designing. She fails 
to update her belief when a black friend of a friend beats her at chess three times 
in a row. Liz has plenty of evidence, and plenty of opportunity to update her 
prejudiced belief about black people. And yet, she fails to: her belief not only fails 
to be inferentially promiscuous in light of this evidence, but it fails to be even 
moderately inferentially sensitive. 
 Resistance to evidence seems to be an important part of how we 
characterise at least some prejudice. Consider Arpaly’s example of Soloman. 
Soloman comes from an isolated village in which he is not exposed to any women 
who are also abstract thinkers, and so forms the belief that women are incapable 
of abstract thought. But then: 
 
Imagine…that Solomon gains a scholarship and finds himself a student in an 
excellent academic institution, where he proceeds to study his favorite 
abstract topic. In college, Solomon sits shoulder to shoulder with brilliant 
female students and is taught by brilliant female professors. At the end of his 
first year as a college student, if Solomon were rational, he would have 
changed his mind about the aptitude of women for abstract thinking. If at the 
school year's end Solomon still believed that all women are bad abstract 
thinkers, his belief would now be not only false but also irrational. He would 
no longer be simply mistaken, but prejudiced. (Arpaly, 2003: 104) 
 
Resistance to a year’s worth of evidence that women clearly are capable of 
abstract thought, and yet failing to update his belief in light of all of this evidence 
is the very fact that renders Solomon’s belief a prejudice. In fact, it would seem 
that we can only explain why explicit prejudices persist by characterising them as 
regularly inferentially insensitive.  
 So, the least evidence-responsive belief has set the bar of responsiveness 
to evidence—a bar which, for the patchy endorsements theorist, must not be 
exceeded by any implicit attitude—rather low indeed. It seems entirely possible 
that a person could remain prejudiced for a lifetime, in which case, this would be 
an example of a belief which is almost entirely insensitive to evidence. It seems 
highly unlikely that the most evidence sensitive implicit attitude is still less 
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evidence sensitive than this. We considered in §4.3.2 that a creature whose 
implicit attitudes consistently misrepresent their environment is unlikely to be 
favoured by selective forces (Bargh, 2008: 75). A creature whose implicit 
attitudes are all less evidence sensitive than Liz’s explicit prejudice seems very 
unlikely to be favoured in the face of selective evolutionary forces. Further, we’ve 
already seen a number of empirical findings which show that at least some 
implicit attitudes do update appropriately in response to evidence. 
So, PE1, the claim that every belief is responsive to evidence more frequently 
than every state in the set of implicit attitudes, fails. If PE1 fails, then PE2, the 
claim that there is a sufficient gap between the least evidence-responsive belief, 
and the most evidence-responsive implicit attitude to constitute a difference in 
kind between beliefs and implicit attitudes, also fails. At best, the patchy 
endorsements theory is a theory about the difference in the degree of evidence 
sensitivity of some implicit attitudes as compared with that of some beliefs. If so, 
that would make it a continuum thesis. It is no basis for a substantial distinction 
between all beliefs and all implicit attitudes.  
  
SUMMARY 
In the forgoing, I argued that there is no significant distinction between (i) the 
structure of implicit biases and the way in which they are processed; and (ii) the 
structure of beliefs and the way in which they are processed. I argued that at least 
some of our implicit biases are propositional in structure, and feature in evidence-
sensitive inferential transitions in the same way that many beliefs do. I 
demonstrated that SD claims on the basis of structure and processing generate two 
testable hypotheses. I showed that HYPOTHESIS 1 (that implicit biases are 
necessarily associative) is false, by summarising findings from both de Houwer 
(2014) and Mandelbaum (forthcoming) in which some implicit biases are shown 
to be sensitive to propositional information. I then argued that this finding 
demotivates the expectation that implicit biases are generally associative. 
Following this, I argued that HYPOTHESIS 2 (the descriptive interpretation of the 
claim that beliefs change in response to changes in evidence) is false, by 
providing a number of examples of beliefs which fail to update in accordance with 
new evidence. I then argued that even if the claim from HYPOTHESIS 2 is 
interpreted normatively, it will fail to distinguish between implicit biases and 
beliefs, because implicit attitudes may be governed by the same kind of epistemic 
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norms as beliefs. Finally, I considered Levy’s (2015) reinterpretation of 
HYPOTHESIS 2, on which implicit biases are propositionally structured ‘patchy 
endorsements’, but which, unlike beliefs, fail to be inferentially promiscuous. I 
argued that this account fails to reinstate the substantial distinction between 
implicit attitudes and beliefs on the basis of a difference in processing, 
demonstrating that there are at least some beliefs that are evidence sensitive to a 
lower degree than the most evidence sensitive implicit attitudes. 
 The argument made in this chapter undercuts SDR arguments which 
proceed on the assumption that there is substantial distinction between the 
structure of implicit biases, and the way in which they are processed, and the 
structure of beliefs, and the way in which they are processed. In light of this, 
consider the following claims of SD theorist Gendler (2008a, 2008b) summarised 
in TG1, and SDR theorist Levy (in his 2014a book) summarised in NL5 and NL8. 
 
TG1:  Implicit biases are aliefs: sui generis tripartite mental states with a 
representational component, an affective component, and a 
behavioural component, which are ‘associatively linked’.  
NL5:  Implicit biases are associative, not propositional, in structure. 
NL8:  The fact that I associate X and Y, nonconsciously, is no basis for 
holding me morally responsible. 
 
Whether or not NL8 is correct, since NL5 and TG1 were shown, empirically, to 
be false, (a result that Levy himself later acknowledges in his patchy 
endorsements paper, 2015: 817), NL8 tells us nothing about implicit biases. In 
fact, NL8 is consistent with moral responsibility for at least some implicit biases 
and the actions that they influence. Consistency of course does not show that we 
are morally responsible for harbouring any implicit biases, or for any implicitly 
biased actions—just that this isn’t ruled out on the basis of the attitudes’ structure.  
 In light of the arguments made in his 2015 paper on patchy endorsements, 
Levy makes a slightly different suggestion as regards moral responsibility for 
implicit attitudes and the actions that they influence at the end of this paper, to 
that which he argued for in the 2014a book. Even though the main argument in 
the 2015 paper is that implicit biases are a sui generis class, distinct from 
beliefs—an SD argument, Levy does not follow this up with an SDR argument to 
the effect that we are therefore not in any way morally responsible for harbouring 
implicit biases, or for actions influenced by them. He appears to concede that such 
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an SDR argument is not going to follow straightforwardly from the notion that 
implicit biases are patchy endorsements, acknowledging that “[w]e should hesitate 
before we blame, or feel shame, or guilt for habouring implicit biases, or for their 
influence on action” (Levy, 2015: 816-7. Note that this is a much weaker claim 
than the SDR claim of the 2014a book).  
It is not an argument that Levy (2015) makes in any detail, but let me 
anyway anticipate a possible SDR argument on the basis that implicit biases are 
not inferentially promiscuous, and offer a continuum response. This would be an 
argument along the lines that there is some level of inferential promiscuity that it 
is necessary for an attitude to have in order for us to be morally responsible for 
that attitude and the actions that it guides. The SDR theorist would hold that 
beliefs exceed this level of inferential promiscuity, whilst implicit biases fall 
below it. I think that this argument will fail. Firstly, because there are at least 
some beliefs that are evidence sensitive to a lower degree than the most evidence 
sensitive implicit attitudes, we cannot draw a line on the implicit bias-belief 
evidence sensitivity continuum, such that we are morally responsible for all 
beliefs, and the actions that they guide, and for no implicit biases, and the actions 
that they influence. We will either end up excluding at least some beliefs and 
belief guided actions as possible targets of moral condemnation, or including at 
least some implicit biases and implicitly biased actions.   
 Secondly, the degree of evidence sensitivity of an attitude is not obviously 
related to moral responsibility, at least in the case of agents with a recalcitrant 
explicit prejudice, such as Liz. Recall that Liz’s explicit prejudice not only failed 
to be inferentially promiscuous in light of this evidence, but failed to be even 
moderately inferentially sensitive. But nonetheless, Liz seems to be a target for 
moral condemnation precisely because she has failed so frequently to update her 
racial prejudices in light of counter-evidence. The very trait which, according to 
Levy (2014a) exempted implicit biases, and their manifestation in action, from 
moral condemnation seems to be the very trait that is morally repugnant about 
Liz. We might think that the moral condemnation that we feel towards Liz is not 
wholly a function of the fact that she has failed to update her prejudiced attitudes, 
but it is also a function of her awareness of the situation. That seems reasonable. 
But it is not a way to save the particular SDR theory at hand which says that 
inferential promiscuity is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. 
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 So, if it turns out that we do lack moral responsibility for all of our 
implicit biases, and their influence on our actions, then it will not be because of 
their structure, and the way in which they are processed, but because of some 
other distinguishing feature. In §4.3.2, I reached a stage in the dialectic where the 
natural progression was to discuss agential control. SD(R) claims on the basis of 
control will be my focus in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESPONDING TO SUBSTANTIAL  
DISTINCTION CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF CONTROL 
 
In the previous two chapters, we saw that a fundamental distinction in kind 
between implicit biases and beliefs (and their associated actions), could not be 
upheld on the basis of the kind of awareness that we have of each (Chapter 3) or 
on the basis of the structure and processing of each (Chapter 4). This chapter 
examines the final set of arguments for the substantial distinction account of 
implicit bias: arguments on the basis of control. I argue that there are a number of 
strategies that we can utilise to control implicit biases and implicitly biased 
actions—strategies which, as I will demonstrate, are also necessary for controlling 
belief acquisition, and at least some of our everyday agential actions. The 
conclusion will be that there is no substantial distinction between implicit biases 
and agential attitudes on the basis of the kind of control that we exert over each 
and their associated actions.  
 I start by providing an overview of some of the notions of control that will 
be relevant to the discussion (§5.1). I briefly introduce the notion of control in the 
psychological literature (§5.1.1), which will in part inform how we are to 
understand SD claims on the basis of psychological findings. I then introduce 
some of the main accounts of agential control in the philosophical literature: (i) 
voluntary control; (ii) reasons responsiveness; and (iii) deep self accounts. I also 
define a number of important distinctions: (a) direct vs. indirect control; (b) 
initiation vs. intervention control; and (c) deliberative vs. non-deliberative control 
(§5.1.2) which will be relevant to the demonstration that we do exert several kinds 
of control over implicitly biased actions. Following this, I outline the substantial 
distinction claims on the basis of control that were presented in Chapter 2 
(§5.1.3). Accordingly, the relevant SD claims require that there is no kind of 
control that we have over at least some of our implicit biases, and their guidance 
of action, that it is necessary for us to utilise in order to control our beliefs, and 
their guidance of action. 
In §5.2, I consider SD claims as they relate to the acquisition and 
maintenance of implicitly biased attitudes vs. that of beliefs. §5.2.1 explores a 
strategy apparently open to continuum theorists, who may be tempted to utilise 
Bernard Williams’ (1973) claims that we do not exert control over the acquisition 
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of beliefs to argue against any substantial distinction between them and implicit 
biases. I argue that this strategy is unsuccessful, and shows only that we lack 
direct voluntary control of beliefs. An SD argument may be advanced instead on 
the basis that we have indirect voluntary control of belief but lack such control of 
implicit bias. I show, however, that the SD argument on the basis of indirect 
voluntary control fails, by presenting evidence to the effect that we also have 
indirect control over the acquisition and maintenance of at least some of our 
implicit biases (§5.2.2).  
I then consider another response to Williams (1973): that of Pamela 
Hieronymi in her (2008) notion of ‘answerability’, according to which we to exert 
a kind of direct control over our beliefs because they embody our take on the 
world (§5.2.3). One might think that this account reinstates the substantial 
distinction. I demonstrate, however, that it does not. SD theorists may try to 
advance an argument on the basis of answerability, with the effect of showing that 
we lack direct control of the acquisition of our implicit biases. But they will be 
unable to avoid also showing that we lack direct control of the acquisition of at 
least some of our beliefs. So, the argument that there is a substantial distinction 
between beliefs and implicit bias, in terms of the control that we exert over their 
acquisition, fails. 
 There are other ways in which one may attempt to advance the substantial 
distinction theory on the basis of control: for instance, in terms of control over 
actions guided by beliefs vs those guided by implicit biases. This is the focus of 
§5.3. I show that we in fact have indirect, intervention control of many of our 
implicitly biased actions (§5.3.1), and, further, that indirect, intervention control is 
the only kind of control we may exert over many uncontroversially agential 
actions. But indirect control is not the only kind of control that we have over 
implicitly biased action: agents may exercise two kinds of direct, intervention 
control over the manifestation of implicit bias in action, as I will demonstrate in 
§5.3.2. In particular, agents have (i) a form of deliberative, direct, intervention 
control; and (ii) a form of non-deliberative, direct, intervention control. I 
demonstrate that we rely on both (i) and (ii) in everyday agential action. As 
regards (i) I argue that we can—and are often expected to—directly and 
deliberately intervene on the manifestation of a number of more familiar 
preferences in daily life to render our agential outputs more effective, expressive 
or fair and, therefore, this method of control is indispensable to the guidance of 
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some of our everyday agential actions. As regards (ii) I outline some research 
which suggests the neural basis for a more general faculty for non-deliberative, 
direct, intervention control that may well operate to enable us to control our 
actions in accordance with our motivations in a number of everyday activities.  
I thus demonstrate, in §5.3, that there are three different control strategies 
which are effective over our implicitly biased actions, which are also necessary 
for controlling at least some of our everyday agential actions. This result is 
inconsistent with the SD theorist’s claim that there is a kind of control that we 
have over all of our belief-guided actions which we do not have over any of our 
implicitly biased actions. As such, SD arguments as regards control of actions, 
fail. 
 We will then be in a position to consider the SD claim that the (apparent) 
fundamental distinction in control over implicit biases and agential attitudes (and 
the actions that they guide), rules out moral responsibility for implicit biases and 
implicitly biased actions. At this point, I will also consider how awareness 
interacts with the control that we exert over implicitly biased attitudes and actions, 
should the (apparent) lack of awareness and the (apparent) lack of control be 
jointly sufficient support for the SDR claim that we lack moral responsibility for 
implicit biases and the actions that they guide. I argue that, if it turns out that we 
do lack moral responsibility for our implicit biases, and their influence on our 
actions, then it will not be because we lack awareness of, or control over them. 
This result will pave the way for a more positive statement of the continuum 
thesis in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1. CONTROL: PSYCHOLOGICAL & PHILOSOPHICAL NOTIONS 
Philosophers and psychologists do not necessarily always understand ‘control’ to 
mean the same thing, and so arguments sometimes may be at cross-purposes. In 
order to understand exactly what claims are being made by substantial distinction 
theorists who utilise psychological results, we need to identify which account of 
control they rely on. In the following subsections, I give an overview of some 
psychological notions of control and their relevance to research on implicit bias 
(§5.1.1); some philosophical accounts of control, and distinctions which will be 
relevant to the discussion to come (§5.1.2); and a recap of the substantial 




5.1.1. Psychological notions of control 
Recall from §1.3 of Chapter 1, the notion that there exist ‘automatic’ processes 
which contrast with ‘controlled’ processes was proposed in the psychology 
literature by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), who contributed to research into 
attention and mental processing from which the paradigms to test for implicit bias 
eventually evolved. Schneider and Shiffrin define an automatic process as that 
which is activated “without the necessity for active control or attention by the 
subject” (1977: 2). Later psychologists contrast automatic or uncontrolled 
processes with those processes which involve the subject’s intending to fulfil a 
task or to achieve a goal (Moors et al., 2010: 20). In particular, according to 
Moors et al., it is characteristic of an automatic process that it can result in 
particular effects when the subject in question did not have the goal of achieving 
such an effect (2010: 20).  
 A number of psychologists make use of the distinction originally proposed 
by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) to analyse implicit biases, suggesting that 
implicit biases mediate actions via automatic, as opposed to controlled, processes: 
Dasgupta and Greenwald, in discussion of their 2001 experiment on what they 
term ‘automatic prejudice’, write that ‘activation of automatic beliefs has been 
described as an inescapable habit that occurs despite attempts to bypass or ignore 
it,’ (2001: 800. Dasgupta & Greenwald attribute this thought, in particular, to 
Bargh, 1999, and Devine, 1989). In Chapter 1, I already mentioned evidence that 
participants are unable to respond more quickly on stereotype incongruent trials 
just because they are instructed to do so, (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001); as well 
as evidence that participants who are asked to form a goal to not stereotype are 
not able to reduce the extent to which their responses are stereotyped on an IAT 
(Lowery et al. (2001). Another argument for the notion that implicitly biased 
actions are not controlled is the idea that we take it that people act consistently 
with the values which they take themselves to have, or at least, values which they 
profess to have on self-report measures (Nosek et al., 2007). 
For others, controlled processes are those which involve the rule-based 
processing of propositions, whilst uncontrolled processes are those which involve 
the processing of associations, (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). I presented 
evidence and arguments against this sort of dual process model—insofar as it 
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applies to implicit bias—in the last chapter, and so will not discuss accounts of 
control on the basis of rule-based processing further here. 
Let us now turn to philosophical accounts of control, where we see a 
proliferation of notions, to which the psychological notions described above map 
neither obviously nor neatly. 
 
5.1.2. Philosophical accounts of control 
The philosophical literature on agential control—what it is for an agent to be in 
control of an attitude or an action—is vast. But we need to have at least a basic 
understanding of this literature to make sense of the relevant SD claims: to assess 
whether or not they are supported by the psychological evidence, and to 
investigate whether they really do deliver a substantial distinction. Some 
philosophers have suggested that an agent is in control of some act if they are able 
to act voluntarily. Others have suggested that an agent is in control when they are 
able to respond to reasons. Yet others still have suggested that agents are in 
control when their action expresses their ‘deep self’ in a sense that I will define 
shortly. That said, I do not have space to offer anything more than a brief outline 
of these philosophical accounts of control. There are further distinctions which cut 
across these accounts just mentioned, which will be relevant to the discussion in 
this chapter. They are: direct vs. indirect control; initiation vs. intervention 
control; and deliberative vs. non-deliberative control. I will give a brief outline of 
each of these distinctions in the following. 
 So, we turn to the first philosophical account of agential control. 
 
Voluntary control 
A number of philosophers maintain that agential control is to be understood in 
terms of the operation of the agent’s will. For instance, an agent has voluntary 
control over some ɸ-ing when when her ɸ-ing is the outcome of her will. Famous 
proponents include Descartes (1694/1984) and Mill (1843/2002). There is a large 
literature on what the will amounts to (for discussion, see O’Connor, 2005; 
Hyman, 2015: Chapter 1). For many voluntary control theorists, “conscious 
choosing” is the paradigm output of the will (Hyman, 2015: 2). For others, to will 
is to exercise a capacity wherein it is possible for an agent not to do as they do 
(Kenny: 1963: 237). Yet others theorists who espouse voluntary control theories 
identify willing with fulfilling one’s intentions (Mele, 1992; Mele and Moser, 
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1994). The notion of voluntary control will be relevant to the discussion to come. 
However, I will not adopt any particular account. Instead, my purpose will be to 
show that whatever kind of voluntary control we are supposed to have over our 
agential attitudes and actions, we also have it over at least some of our implicit 
attitudes and actions, and so substantial distinction arguments on the basis of 
voluntary control do not work. 
 
Reasons responsiveness 
Another tradition is to characterise some ɸ-ing as controlled and agential only if 
in so ɸ-ing the agent was able to respond to (practical) reasons for ɸ-ing. Notable 
proponents in this tradition are Wolf (1990) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998). 
These accounts hold that in at least some circumstances, as well as acting for 
reasons they see there to be for acting, agents must also be able to recognise and 
to respond to reasons for not acting as they do in at least some circumstances.44 
Reasons may be considerations that justify acting from the agent’s perspective, or 
they may be features which explain an agent’s actions. Justificatory and 
explanatory reasons do not necessarily always converge (Dancy, 2000). Some 
philosophers argue that reasons are facts about the agent’s situation, whilst others 
argue that reasons are internal mental states (see Alvarez, 2009), but my 
discussion in this chapter will be neutral on this issue. As was the case with 
voluntary control, my purpose is not to adopt any particular account of reasons-
responsiveness, but to show that, however SD theorists understand a capacity to 
respond to reasons, it will not support a substantial distinction between beliefs and 
implicit biases (and actions guided by each). 
 
Deep self 
Others think that agents control just those ɸ-ings which manifest their 
fundamental evaluations the world—their ‘deep self’ (see Watson 1996; Smith 
2005, 2008, 2012, manuscript; Sher, 2006; Hieronymi, 2008; Sripada, 
forthcoming). In particular, deep self theories can provide an account of why 
agents are implicated in cases of omission (which are often neither voluntary, nor 
                                                
 
44 Fischer and Ravizza (1998) argue that agents need to be able to do this for all controlled 
instances of action, whilst Wolf (1990) maintains that agents only need to be able to recognise and 
to respond to reasons for not acting in circumstances where they do something ‘unreasonable’: she 
relies on an objective sense of reason to delineate what is reasonable and unreasonable.  
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done for reasons), maintaining that omissions nevertheless reflect the things that 
the agent really cares about—or fails to care about (for example see Smith, 2005; 
Sher, 2006). Not all proponents of deep-self accounts consider them to be theories 
of control per se, some understanding the term ‘control’ to implicate a voluntary 
faculty. However, for deep-self theorists, agents play an active role in ɸ-ings 
which manifest their evaluative stance, whether or not they also ɸ voluntarily, and 
so on a neutral notion of what control amounts to, deep-self accounts are worthy 
of inclusion. As above, I do not intend to adopt any particular deep self account in 
what follows, but to demonstrate that however substantial distinction theorists cast 
the deep-self, it will not enable them to maintain the fundamental distinction that 
they require. 
 
Variation and interdependence across accounts 
There is great variation within each of these broad traditions, but also, it is worth 
noting that some accounts within one tradition appeal to notions from another to 
analyse agential control. For instance, some have analysed voluntariness as 
responsiveness to reasons (such as, for instance, Bennett, 1990: 90). Further, 
Hieronymi (2008) presents a deep self account of doxastic control, arguing that 
our beliefs manifest our evaluative stance, but her analysis of what this amounts 
to appeals to the notion that it is appropriate to ask the agent to give reasons for 
her beliefs. I will consider Hieronymi’s (2008) account in more detail in §5.2.2.  
 There are a number of other distinctions which cut across all three 
accounts presented above, and each other, that are relevant to the argument in this 
chapter. I think that previous philosophers in this literature have conflated some 
distinctions, that I will now tease apart. Later, in §5.3, we will see how these 
particular distinctions enable the continuum theorist to outline three distinct kinds 
of control that we have over our implicitly biased actions, which are also the only 
kinds of control that we have over at least some of our belief-guided actions, 
which is bad news for the SD theorist. 
 
Direct vs indirect control  
Many have distinguished between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ notions of control 
(Williams, 1973; Bennett, 1990; Feldman, 2001; Strawson, 2003; Hieronymi, 
2008). Accordingly, an agent has direct control of some ɸ-ing if it is within their 
power to ɸ, without any intermediary steps. This is to say that the agent’s bringing 
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about her ɸ-ing is itself the act of agential control. It would seem that many bodily 
movements are under this type of control. For example, an agent has direct control 
over raising her arm, if it is within her power to raise her arm without any 
intermediary steps. Pollard captures this idea in the following (although, shortly, I 
will argue that there are at least three different distinctions in kinds of control to 
draw out of Pollard’s (2003) account). 
 
When we deliberate we exert a kind of direct control over what we do: we 
think about what to do, and then do it. (Pollard, 2003: 415) 
 
In the case of direct control, the action that we seek to bring about, (and will to do, 
or intend to do, or see there to be reason to do, and so on—depending on your 
chosen account of control) is an action that it is within our power to perform 
without having to take preparatory steps. 
 In the case of indirect control, the act which the agent themselves performs 
is a distinct event from that which she seeks to bring about. Suppose that the agent 
wants to bring about ɸ. She can bring about ɸ in an act of indirect control if she 
can bring about ψ (through an exercise of direct control, as above), and from the 
occurrence of ψ, the occurrence of ɸ follows. The cases of indirect control that I 
am interested in are those where ɸ is a change in the agent’s attitudes or actions.45 
For instance, it may be argued that it is not within my direct control to make 
myself feel happy, just like that. However, I do have direct control over seeking 
out and looking at a photo of an enjoyable holiday, or recalling a memory of time 
spent with a loved one, and as a result of presenting myself with these happy 
memories, I feel happy. The recall of a joyful occasion is appropriately linked up 
in my psychological economy to the occurrent experience of happiness such that I 
may experience the latter as a result of recalling the former. So, even if I cannot 
simply bring it about that I am happy in the same way that I can raise my arm, I 
can look at a photo, or recall a joyful experience, and as a result of so doing, 
indirectly bring it about that I am happy. 
 The relevance of this distinction to the case of implicit bias is that whilst 
one might think that we lack direct control over our implicitly biased actions (for 
                                                
 
45 One might have indirect control over all sorts of external objects, in virtue of being able to, 
through an exercise of direct control, bring about a change in them. But let us set these sorts of 
cases aside, and focus on cases where ɸ is a change in the agent’s attitudes or actions. 
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instance) it may be that we are able to control them in virtue of doing something 
else which itself has the effect of preventing the manifestation of a biased action. 
For example, anonymising C.V.s prevents the manifestation of bias against 
applicants that might arise as the result of viewing gendered or racialised names. 
Here, the act of anonymising is distinct from the act in which we seek to eliminate 
bias (that is, the evaluation of the applications) but elimination of bias in 
evaluation is the result of the earlier anonymising. It is also worth flagging up that 
I think that there are at least two kinds of direct control that we have over 
implicitly biased actions, as I will discuss more fully in §5.3.2. 
 
Initiation vs intervention control 
The quotation from Pollard in the previous section comes from a 2003 essay on 
automatic actions, in which he outlines a slightly different notion of indirect 
control to that which I outline above. He maintains that we have such control over 
at least some of our automatic behaviours. He calls this notion ‘intervention’ 
control. He suggests 
 
direct control is absent when our behaviour is automatic…we have the 
capacity to intervene on such behaviours. This is particularly the case for 
those automatic behaviours which we have learned. Since there was a time 
when we didn’t do such things, it will normally still be possible for us still to 
refrain from doing them… We intervene by doing something else, or nothing 
at all, either during the behaviour, or by anticipating before we begin it. 
(Pollard, 2003: 415) 
 
For instance, I may notice myself performing one of my automatic habitual 
actions—nail-biting—and intervene on my behaviour by doing something else, 
namely by ceasing to bite my nails. Snow (2006) suggests that the appropriate 
complement of Pollard’s intervention control is to be termed ‘initiation’ control: 
 
As I understand Pollard, direct control could also be called “initiation 
control,” since it is the kind of control we exert when we initiate an action or 
action sequence. (2006: 549) 
 
Accordingly, I do not generally initiate sequences of nail-biting behaviour, even if 
I can intervene on them. I think that this notion of initiation control is distinct 
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from the notion of direct control that I outlined above. In fact, I think that, 
precisely because it is to do with sequences of behaviour that have become 
automatised vs. non-automatic behaviour, the Pollard-Snow initiation/intervention 
distinction is independent of the direct/indirect distinction as I outlined it above. 
To see this, recall my example of indirect control in the previous section, where 
an agent thinks of a happy memory to engender an occurrent feeling of happiness 
in herself. She is not intervening on a process already in motion, but initiating a 
new one. However, her control of her emotion is not direct, because she has to 
perform an act which is itself distinct from feeling happy in order to bring about a 
feeling of happiness. So, these distinctions are independent and combine to give 
us four possible types of control:  
 
(1) I have direct, initiation control over the raising of my hand;  
(2) I have direct, intervention control over the ceasing of my nail 
biting;  
(3) I have indirect, initiation control over bringing on an occurrence of 
joyousness, by looking at photo of an enjoyable time; and  
(4) I have indirect, intervention control when I get the (almost 
uncontrollable) giggles in the library, and I call to mind a sad event in 
my life, which has the effect of curtailing my giggling.  
 
Case (4) is somewhat like case (3), but my intention is to intervene on some 
emotion-driven behaviour which is already in motion. In short, we can employ 
direct control to either (1) initiate or (2) intervene on a sequence of behaviour, and 
we can employ indirect control to bring about some occurrence which itself either 
(3) initiates or (4) intervenes on a sequence of behaviour.  
The initiation/intervention distinction has been recently employed in the 
implicit bias literature by Holroyd and Kelly (2016). They develop an account on 
which agents have a form of indirect, intervention control that is effective over a 
great many implicitly biased actions. I will present Holroyd and Kelly’s account 
of indirect, intervention control in more detail in §5.3.1 (although, in §5.3.2, I 




Deliberative vs non-deliberative control 
The examples in (1)-(4) above are all examples where the agent has deliberated 
about what to do, and has then done it. By deliberation, I mean something akin to 
Pollard’s ‘we think about what to do’ (2003: 415) prior to acting, where the action 
performed is that which is specified in the outcome of our thinking about what to 
do.46 Such deliberation does not necessarily need to be prolonged or carefully 
thought through for subsequent actions to qualify as deliberatively controlled. As 
long as they were thought about at all, then they may be deliberatively controlled. 
Contra Pollard, however, I think that at least sometimes, agents may employ 
at least some of the kinds of control detailed in the previous two subsections 
without prior deliberation, as I will argue in §5.3.2. Pollard maintains that 
intervention control is typically deliberative. In particular,  
  
Of course when we intervene, this will typically require thought, and the 
behaviour will on that account cease to be habitual. (2003: 41) 
 
I do not think there are many (or perhaps any) instances of non-deliberative, 
indirect, intervention control. But, contra Pollard, I do think that we sometimes 
have deliberative, direct, intervention control, of both agential actions and 
implicitly biased actions, as I will argue in §5.3.2. I also think that we sometimes 
have non-deliberative, direct, intervention control, of both agential actions and 
implicitly biased actions, as I will argue in that same section. 
 
To recap these three distinctions, then: The direct/indirect distinction refers to 
whether the ɸ-ing which the agent performs is the occurrence which she seeks to 
bring about or whether it leads to the occurrence that she seeks to bring about. The 
initiation/intervention distinction refers to whether the agent initiates a new 
sequence of ɸ-ing, or whether she intervenes on some ɸ-ing already underway. 
The deliberative/non-deliberative distinction refers to whether the ɸ-ing is the 
outcome of deliberation, or not.  
 
                                                
 
46 Holroyd and Kelly make a similar distinction, differentiating ‘taking’ from ‘exercising’ control, 
where the former is the outcome of a deliberative process, but the latter is not, (2016: 121). For 
consistency, I will stick to the terms ‘deliberative’ and ‘non-deliberative’. 
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5.1.3. Substantial distinction arguments on the basis of control 
In Chapter 2, I summarised the main substantial distinction claims which utilise 
the notion of control. We saw claims about our apparent lack of control over the 
acquisition of implicitly biased attitudes: 
 
K&R5:  Implicit biases are acquired rapidly, automatically, and 
uncontrollably 
JS2:  We are not able to exert control over the acquisition of our implicit 
biases, in virtue of the fact that they result solely from our living in 
a bigoted culture. 
JS3:  Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is 
not sufficient for control over implicit biases (interpreted as 
implicit biases qua attitudes)  
 
We also saw claims about our apparent lack of control over the effects of 
implicitly biased attitudes on actions: 
 
K&R4:  Implicit biases influence action automatically. 
TG2:  Activation of the representational content of an implicit bias 
renders it more likely that an implicitly biased behavioural routine 
will actually be performed. 
JS3:  Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is 
not sufficient for control over implicit biases (interpreted as 
implicitly biased actions) 
 
As noted in §5.1.2, there are multiple possible notions of control according to 
which we may interpret the above claims. Clearly, I will not have space to 
systematically consider whether each of the above claims delivers a substantial 
distinction on the basis of each and every possible kind of control. However, I aim 
to examine most possibilities. Further, if it is the case that there is a kind of 
control that we can exert over at least some implicit biases/implicitly biased 
actions, which is also the only kind of control that we exert over at least some 
agential attitudes/agential actions, then we have a result that is inconsistent with 
the SD theory. I will show that this result in fact obtains. 
I will distinguish arguments on the basis of the control that we exert over 
the acquisition of implicit biases, compared with acquisition of agential attitudes 
144 
(§5.2), from arguments on the basis of the control that we exert over implicitly 
biased actions, compared with agential actions (§5.3). In §5.2, I will present SD 
arguments (and continuum responses) on the basis of indirect voluntary control 
(in §5.2.2) and direct deep-self control (in §5.2.3). In §5.3, I will present SD 
arguments (and continuum responses) on the basis of indirect, intervention control 
(in §5.3.1), and two possible accounts of direct, intervention control: (i) 
deliberative, direct, intervention control; and (ii) non-deliberative, direct, 
intervention control (in §5.3.2).  
 
5.2. CONTROL OF IMPLICITLY BIASED ATTITUDES 
In the last chapter, I looked at a number of claims from SD theorists that beliefs 
update in light of propositional information, whilst implicit biases are unable to, 
because they do not have the appropriate structure—that is, they are not 
propositional. I refuted these arguments with evidence that at least some implicit 
biases are propositional, and do update in light of new propositional information. I 
also argued that if at least some implicit biases are propositional in structure, then 
we lose the motivation to expect that other implicit biases will be associative. I 
then demonstrated that at least some beliefs fail to update in light of new 
propositional information, even when the agent recognises the new propositional 
information as evidence relevant to their belief. I argued that this shows that there 
is no substantial distinction between implicit biases and beliefs on the basis of 
their structure and processing. I acknowledged at the end of §4.2 that some SD 
theorists may reply to these arguments by suggesting that, even though implicit 
biases might have the right structure to be updated in light of propositional 
information, we have a kind of control over the acquisition of our beliefs that we 
do not have over our implicit biases. I now turn to discussion of this claim. 
 SD theorists who argue that there is a substantial distinction between 
implicit bias acquisition and belief acquisition need it to be the case that there is a 
kind of control that we have over the acquisition and maintenance of our beliefs 
(call this ‘doxastic control’) which we do not have over the acquisition and 
maintenance of our implicit biases. In what follows, I first consider an argument 
from Williams (1973) that we lack voluntary doxastic control, and acknowledge 
that this may appear to represent a victory for the continuum theorist (§5.2.1). 
This victory is premature, however, because Williams (1973) only shows that we 
lack direct voluntary doxastic control, and his account is quite compatible with 
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our having indirect voluntary doxastic control, which may reinstate a substantial 
distinction between implicit biases and beliefs (§5.2.2). However, I respond to the 
threat of a substantial distinction here, by showing that we also have indirect 
control over the acquisition and maintenance of at least some of our implicit 
biases. I then survey a response to Williams (1973) put forward by Hieronymi in 
her (2008) account of answerability, and consider whether Hieronymi’s account 
reinstates the substantial distinction (§5.2.3). I suggest that in fact Hieronymi’s 
account favours the continuum theory. I argue that if Hieronymi’s account was to 
succeed in showing that we lack direct control of the acquisition and maintenance 
of our implicit biases, it would thereby also show that we lack direct control of the 
of the acquisition and maintenance of at least some of our beliefs. Because of this, 
the argument that there is a substantial distinction between the kind of control that 
we exert over the acquisition of our beliefs as compared with the kind of control 
that we exert over the acquisition of our implicit biases, fails. 
 
5.2.1. A provisional victory for the continuum thesis? 
If one’s chosen theory of control is that of voluntary control, then it would seem 
that we lack this with respect to the acquisition of our beliefs, as many have 
argued (Williams, 1973; Bennett, 1990; Feldman, 2001; Strawson, 2003; 
Hieronymi, 2008). Williams (1973) maintains that we cannot simply believe at 
will, that is, believe whatever we want, for the very reason that we take our beliefs 
to represent reality. He argues 
 
If I could acquire a belief at will, I could acquire it whether it was true or 
not. If in full consciousness I could will to acquire a ‘belief’ irrespective of 
its truth, it is unclear that before the event I could seriously think of it as a 
belief, i.e. as something purporting to represent reality. (Williams, 1970: 
148) 
 
For instance, I cannot believe at will that my living room walls—which, as I look 
at them now, appear to me to be white—are, in fact, orange. I can imagine that my 
living room walls have turned orange, and I can wish that someone would come in 
and decorate the room, painting them orange. However, if Williams is correct, 
then as long as I have no evidence that my walls are orange, it is not within my 
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direct control to bring myself to believe that they are just by wanting to believe 
it.47 
 Others (Strawson, 2003; Levy, 2005) appeal to the phenomenology of 
acquiring a belief to demonstrate that belief acquisition is not voluntary. Strawson 
maintains that: 
 
…the role of genuine action in thought is at best indirect. It is entirely 
prefatory, it is essentially—merely—catalytic. For what actually happens, 
when one wants to think about some issue or work something out? If the 
issue is a difficult one, then there may well be a distinct, and distinctive, 
phenomenon of setting one's mind at the problem.... No doubt there are other 
such preparatory, ground-setting, tuning, retuning, shepherding, active 
moves or intention initiations. The rest is waiting, seeing if anything 
happens, waiting for content to come to mind.... There is I believe no action 
at all in reasoning and judging considered independently of the preparatory, 
catalytic phenomena just mentioned, considered in respect of their being a 
matter of specific content-production or of inferential moves between 
particular contents. (Strawson, 2003: 231-3; quoted in Boyle, 2009: 133) 
 
The idea is that whilst agents may well bring particular thoughts to mind which 
have a bearing on the issue of whether to accept a new belief that p, when it 
comes to actually forming the belief, the agent must simply wait and see which 
new beliefs happen to bubble up in the mind. If one is convinced by Williams 
                                                
 
47 One might recall the examples of Self-doubt, Grief, and Explicit Prejudice from the previous 
chapter, in which agents fail to form beliefs on the basis of the evidence which they take 
themselves to have. It might be thought that these agents are doing something voluntary in failing 
to believe in line with their evidence, and that, therefore, these agents violate Williams’ (1973) 
contention that belief acquisition is involuntary. But this is not the case. For whilst the agents in 
Self-doubt, Grief, and Explicit Prejudice violate Gendler’s (2008a, 2008b) claim that recognition 
of evidence that P is sufficient for belief that P, they do not violate Williams’ claim that 
recognition of evidence that P is necessary for belief that P. All these agents have (what they take 
to be) evidence for the beliefs which they fail to update in light of further evidence. For example, 
recall that: 
 
Ada (mistakenly) recognises Luke and Steven’s laughter at her presentation as evidence that she 
is bad at maths. 
Ada forms the belief that she is bad at maths. 
Ada recognises her high test scores as evidence that she is good at maths. 
Ada fails to acquire the belief that she is good at maths. 
  
It’s not the case that Ada (thinks she) has no evidence that she is bad at maths—she interprets 
Luke and Steven’s laughter as evidence that she is bad at maths. As she does not believe that she is 
bad at maths on the basis of having no evidence, she does not count as believing at will.  
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(1973) and Strawson (2003) and the rest quoted above, then one may advance the 
following continuum claim: whilst implicit biases are not acquired in an exercise 
of voluntary control, neither may beliefs be acquired in this manner, and so that 
we lack voluntary control over our implicit biases does not distinguish them from 
beliefs.  
 
5.2.2. SD argument from indirect doxastic control 
The above continuum claim is premature, however, because all that the particular 
argument from Williams (1973) shows is that we lack direct voluntary doxastic 
control. This result is compatible with us exercising indirect voluntary doxastic 
control. We said that one has indirect control of one’s ɸ-ing, if one can directly ψ, 
and thus bring it about that one thereby ɸ-s. Indeed, we do seem to have this sort 
of control over our beliefs. I can generate new beliefs, or update my current 
beliefs, by influencing my environment so as to make it the case that I have 
evidence for these new beliefs. In the oft used example, I can acquire the belief 
that the lights are on in an exercise of indirect voluntary control: step 1, I get up 
and turn on the lights; step 2, I look, and acquire the belief that the lights are on. 
We regularly exercise indirect voluntary control over our beliefs in less mundane 
ways than this. For instance, a person might want to regularly acquire new beliefs 
about recent current affairs, and so, in an exercise of indirect voluntary control, 
expose herself to news sources each morning.48 Or, imagine a person who, when 
in conversation with his friends, realises that he has an inaccurate understanding 
of a particular topic in history. In an exercise of indirect voluntary control, he 
reads some library books on the topic in question, in order to update his erroneous 
beliefs with factually correct ones.49 So, even if we cannot acquire beliefs in acts 
of direct voluntary control, we regularly exercise indirect voluntary control in 
order to acquire particular beliefs. That is, we can perform an act over which we 
have direct voluntary control (such as reading a newspaper or a library book) in 
                                                
 
48 To be precise, this is an example of deliberative, indirect, initiation control. That is, one’s 
reading the news is the outcome of a deliberative process in which one decides to find out what is 
going on in the world. I think this is an example of initiation control, rather than intervention 
control, because the agent is acquiring a new mental state. 
49 I think that this agent is exercising both deliberative, indirect, intervention control (with respect 
to terminating some of his false beliefs) and deliberative, indirect initiation control, with respect to 
acquiring new beliefs.  
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which we expose ourselves to evidence, and as a result of doing so we can acquire 
new beliefs, or update existing beliefs.  
 If it is the case that we do not have this sort of indirect voluntary control 
over our implicit biases, then there is grounds for a substantial distinction claim 
on the basis of this lack of indirect voluntary control. As many have suggested 
(Holroyd, 2012; Levy, 2014a; Holroyd and Kelly, 2016; Mandelbaum, 
forthcoming), however, we do have indirect control over at least some of our 
implicit biases. Consider the following findings.  
 
(i) Exposure to counter-stereotypical exemplars 
Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) demonstrate that participants who are 
exposed to counter-stereotypical exemplars (in particular, exposed to 
pictures of admired black celebrities, and well known, but disliked white 
individuals) manifest less race bias. This effect was shown not just shortly 
after exposure, but was also present 24 hours later.  
 
(ii) Imagining counter-stereotypical exemplars 
Blair, Ma and Lenton (2001) reveal that entertaining counter-stereotypical 
mental imagery reduced the manifestation of implicit bias on a number of 
psychological measures. Participants who spent a few minutes imagining 
“what a strong woman is like, why she is considered strong, what she is 
capable of doing, and what kind of hobbies and activities she enjoys” 
manifested less implicit bias than those in the control condition, whilst in a 
further experiment, those who imagined a stereotypically ‘weak’ woman 
manifested more implicit bias than the control group, (2001: 830). As 
researchers tested participants on a number of measures, they were able to 
determine that, in particular, imagining a strong woman allowed participants 
to control (or suppress) their implicit stereotypes of women specifically 
(2001: 837).50 
 
(iii) Reading a strong argument 
Subjects of Briñol et al. (2008; cited in Mandelbaum, forthcoming) who are 
presented with a strong argument for hiring an African American professor 
                                                
 
50 Recall from Chapter 1 that if we see a reduction in stereotypic responses on the IAT, we are not 
able to determine whether this is mediated by an endorsement of ‘women’ + ‘strong’, or an 
endorsement of not-‘men’ + ‘strong’. However, the Go/No Go Association Test (GNAT), one of 
the measures employed by Blair et al. (2001) does allow us to determine which attitude mediates 
the change. 
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exhibit less bias than that exhibited by those presented with a weak argument 
(as already noted in Chapter 4, §4.2). 
 
We said that one has indirect control of one’s ɸ-ing, if one can directly ψ, and thus 
bring it about that one thereby ɸ-s. In each of the above cases, agents have direct 
control over ψ-ing, where ψ-ing in each case is (i) exposing oneself to counter-
stereotypical exemplars; (ii) imagining counter-stereotypical exemplars; or (iii) 
reading a strong argument. The effect that agents bring about with their ψ-ing is a 
modulation of their implicit biases. So, insofar as agents are able to bring about 
the above changes in their implicit attitudes, they have indirect control of the 
maintenance of implicit biases (and the acquisition of new implicit attitudes).  
I now consider two possible objections to the claim that we have indirect control 
over the modulation of implicit biases, and the acquisition of new implicit 
attitudes: (i) the epistemic conditions objection; (ii) the state change vs. bypass 
objection. 
 
(i) Epistemic conditions objection 
SD theorists might point out that the epistemic conditions for this sort of indirect, 
intervention control are relatively demanding, and require inferential awareness of 
at least some of the empirical findings on implicit bias. To act because of the 
recommendations of an empirical study, one has to be familiar with the empirical 
study in question. I think that continuum theorists can accept that one must meet 
these epistemic conditions in order to employ the control strategies as they are 
recommended by the empirical studies above, and be successful in reducing their 
biases. This alone refutes Saul’s claim in JS3.51 
 I think that at least sometimes, people employ similar strategies to those 
above with the intention of forming or updating their attitudes, even when they 
are unaware of implicit biases and the research on indirect control strategies. For 
instance, a person may decide to stop reading a politically motivated newspaper 
which both publishes a lot of material on successful white men and seeks out 
stories on crime perpetrated by black people, and decide to do so because the 
paper’s editorial motive, and its likely effects on her attitudes, makes her uneasy. 
                                                
 
51 JS3: Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is not sufficient for control 
over implicit biases (interpreted as implicit biases qua attitudes) 
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She might instead seek to get her news from a more balanced publication which 
runs stories on famous people of colour, as well as taking a critical stance towards 
the misdeeds of white public figures. Effectively, this agent is exposing 
themselves to counter-stereotypical examples, with the intention of updating their 
attitudes. 
 In light of this discussion, it is interesting to consider Saul’s (2013) claim 
that the acquisition of implicit biases result solely from our culture.52 Presumably 
by ‘culture’, she means cultural stereotypes in an agent’s environment. Arguably, 
our explicit social attitudes result from our culture, but to the extent that we are 
able to exert control over at least some of the media to which we expose 
ourselves, we are able to exert (indirect) control over our cultural attitudes. As I 
have already mentioned, one can choose which news outlets to expose oneself to, 
which literature to read, and so on. This is even easier with the advent of 
technology where one can set things up such that the media that one receives is 
automatically filtered (consider a tailoring a Twitter feed, or the inputs on a 
personalised news homepage), and so it is quite possible to exert direct control 
over a great deal of content to which one is exposed by choosing to only browse 
content from reputable platforms which do not (actively) utilise harmful 
stereotypes. So this claim does not cut a sharp distinction between our implicit 
and our explicit cultural attitudes. Both originate in our culture, and we are able to 
exert indirect control over both, at least to some extent. So, just as we can exert 
indirect control over belief acquisition and adjustment, so too can we exert 
indirect control over at least some of our implicit biases. 
 
(ii) State change vs. bypass objection 
SD theorists may question how we know that these techniques bring about a 
genuine change in the implicitly biased attitude itself, rather than simply enabling 
agents to bypass the original attitude, restricting it from manifesting on attitude 
measures. We can reply by pointing out that in at least some contexts, the attitude 
change remains stable over an extended period—it was observed 24 hours later in 
the case of Dasgupta and Greenwald’s participants (2001). But I think there is a 
more powerful reply to the SD theorist if we consider the bypass question when it 
                                                
 
52 This is the claim that I summarised in JS2, accordingly “We are not able to exert control over 
the acquisition of our implicit biases, in virtue of the fact that they result solely from our living in 
a bigoted culture.” 
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comes to beliefs. When a subject first acquires a new belief that contradicts the 
content of another belief that they have long held, do they determinately eradicate 
that old belief, or do they merely ‘bypass it’? I think that there are at least some 
cases of belief update where the bypass hypothesis is in fact the only hypothesis 
that explains the data.  
 Consider the example from the previous chapter in which a person learns 
that her belief that her friend lives on College Road is in fact false, and that her 
friend actually lives on Station Road. This person meets many of the criteria for 
having acquired a new belief: she assents to the proposition that her friend lives 
on Station Road, she informs others that this is the case, and this proposition 
figures in her reasoning as regards how to get to her friend’s house on a number 
of occasions. Nevertheless, a few weeks later, she tells another friend that her first 
friend lives on College Road, fully believing herself to have stated something 
true. That her first friend informed her that they in fact live on Station Road has 
simply slipped her mind. Now, it would seem that the only way that she would be 
able to retrieve the information that her friend lives on College Road, even after 
learning that her friend in fact lives on Station Road, would be if she retained the 
old belief that her friend lives on College Road after all, and was simply 
bypassing it in previous contexts. So, in reply to the SD theorist, it is not clear that 
when we acquire a new belief that not-P after having previously believed P, we 
determinately overwrite P with not-P, rather than simply bypassing P when we 
utilise not-P in appropriate circumstances. So, the bypass objection is not 
problematic for the continuum theorist: even if we bypass old implicit attitudes 
rather than update them, we also do this, at least sometimes, in the case of beliefs. 
 So, there is no substantial distinction between the relevant attitudes on the 
basis of indirect voluntary control. We may have this kind of control over the 
acquisition and maintenance of both (i) agential attitudes such as beliefs, and (ii) 
implicit biases. 
 
5.2.3. SD arguments from direct doxastic control 
Other philosophers disagree with Williams (1973), Strawson (2003), and the rest 
who argue that control of belief is at best indirect, and maintain that there is a 
sense in which belief is directly controllable, even if the control is not necessarily 
voluntary. I will now briefly outline a prominent account of direct doxastic 
control: that of ‘answerability’ from Pamela Hieronymi (2008). I argue that in 
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order to show that we are answerable for all of our beliefs, the SD theorist must 
also accept that we will sometimes be answerable for our implicit biases. 
Therefore, the SD claim on the basis of direct doxastic control, alike the SD claim 
on the basis of indirect doxastic control before it, fails.  
Like Williams (1973), Hieronymi (2008) maintains that beliefs are not 
under our direct voluntary control. She argues that we do, nonetheless, exercise a 
kind of direct control over them. To set up the argument, she compares beliefs to 
Anscombe’s (1957) account of actions. Here, Anscombe holds that we are 
‘answerable’ for our agential actions in the sense that it is appropriate to ask us to 
answer the question why we acted with a specific kind of reason: Such a question 
invites the person to give an account of the factors which they saw to favour 
acting. That is, it seeks to discover an agent’s reasons for acting. Hieronymi 
(2008) holds that we may ask similar questions of believing agents—we may ask 
them to justify why they believe that P. Accordingly, she says: 
 
…whenever one believes that p…one can rightly be asked, “Why do you 
believe p?” where that question looks, not for an explanation of how it came 
about that one believes, but rather for considerations that one takes to bear 
positively on whether p (that is, roughly, one’s reasons for believing). 
(Hieronymi, 2008: 359) 
 
Compare this to the phenomena that Strawson was concerned with. Whilst 
Strawson’s account of “…waiting, seeing if anything happens, waiting for content 
to come to mind” (Strawson, 2003: 232) may say something accurate about “how 
it came about that one believes [that P]”, it is not an appropriate answer to the 
question of “Why do you believe that P?” However, it is entirely appropriate to 
ask Strawsonian and Williamsian believers to provide an answer to the second 
kind of question. The reason for which I believe that the living room walls are 
white, for instance, is that they appear to me to be white. The same is true for our 
evaluative attitudes. Whether or not I exercise voluntary control over my 
evaluation of Beethoven’s piano sonatas as richer, more complex and more 
moving than Mozart’s piano sonatas, it is appropriate to ask me to justify my 
evaluation by providing the reasons for which I made it.  
 Hieronymi argues that even though we do not have direct voluntary 
control over what we believe, we are not thereby passive with respect to our 
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beliefs (2008: 338). Rather, we are vested in our beliefs in virtue of the reasons 
for which we take them to be true. I am vested in my evaluation of Beethoven—
and in all of my evaluations, whether they are aesthetic, prudential, political, 
moral, and so on. Hieronymi thus suggests that beliefs are “commitment-
constituted attitudes” and argues that we have a distinctive form of (direct) control 
over them: 
 
Because these attitudes embody our take on the world, on what is or is not 
true or important or worthwhile in it, we control them by thinking about the 
world, about what is or is not true or important or worthwhile in it. Because 
our minds change as our take on the world changes…we can be said to be 
“in control” of our commitment-constituted attitudes. (Hieronymi, 2008: 
370-1) 
 
As I mentioned in §5.1.2, I take Hieronymi to be arguing here for a deep self 
account of doxastic control, because, in believing what is good and what is 
valuable, for instance, the agent expresses her fundamental evaluations of the 
world. (Although, as I also mentioned in §5.1.2, the analysis of what a 
fundamental evaluation turns out to be relies on the notion that it is appropriate to 
ask the agent to give reasons for believing. So this is a deep self account that 
analyses our fundamental evaluative stance in terms of our capacities as 
reasoners). By Hieronymi’s own admission, this is also a theory of direct control 
(2008: 357). Believing is the agential act—the agent does not have to perform any 
prior ψ-ing in order to believe such that she is answerable for doing so. 
 If it can be shown that implicit biases do not embody our take on the 
world, and that we are not answerable for them, then there might be grounds for a 
substantial distinction between the former and beliefs. The SD theorist may argue 
that because implicitly biased agents do not consciously endorse any particular 
considerations as reasons for harbouring their implicit biases, therefore they are 
not able to answer “Why do you think that P?” (where P is the contents of their 
implicit bias) and hence they are not answerable for it. Because of this, it might be 
argued that implicit biases do not embody an implicitly biased agent’s take on the 
world.  
I don’t think that this is quite right, however. Recall that Hieronymi’s 
(2008) condition is not that agents can in fact answer such a question, but, given 
that they are somewhat vested in an attitude as it guides speech acts and other 
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behaviours, it is appropriate to ask them for their reasons. I think that there is a 
sense in which implicitly biased agents are answerable for particular utterances 
which reveal their implicit biases, even though they do not consciously affirm the 
considerations on which they acquired their implicit biases as reasons for doing 
so. Consider the following case: 
 
Courier 
A courier delivers a letter addressed to Dr Dewan, and when a woman 
answers the door, he asks if her husband is available to sign for his letter. His 
belief that the woman at the door is not Dr Dewan is a manifestation of an 
implicit bias which couples men and academic achievement, and women and 
homemaking. In fact, the woman at the door is Dr Dewan. She has won a 
prestigious research grant as is at home researching for her next book. 
 
The courier has a belief which manifests a coupling of men and academia (or 
perhaps, women and being at home) even if only by implication. The courier does 
not act autonomically when he asks if the woman’s husband is available. His 
action is guided by an occurrently tokened belief that the woman at the door is not 
Dr Dewan. The belief that the woman at the door is not Dr Dewan embodies his 
take on the world, as Hieronymi would say. So, even though he may well not 
affirm the coupling of men and academic achievement as a reason to assume that 
the woman at the door is not Dr Dewan if he was so asked, he nevertheless does 
believe that the woman at the door is not Dr Dewan. It seems entirely appropriate 
in this situation for Dr Dewan herself to ask the courier why he believes that she 
is not Dr Dewan. So, even if the courier cannot provide the reason “I have an 
implicit bias against women in academia” for example, as a reason for his belief, 
his belief does embody his take on Dr Dewan, and for this he seems fully 
answerable in Hieronymi’s (2008) sense of the word. 
 Consciously affirming some considerations as reasons for holding an 
attitude is not the only way to endorse an attitude such that it embodies one’s take 
on the world. By committing to the claim that one must consciously affirm the 
considerations for which one acquired an attitude as reasons for doing so, in order 
to be answerable for a particular attitude, the SD theorist will end up excluding at 
least some agential attitudes from the set of attitudes for which we are 
answerable. Attitudes may be formed without introspective awareness, on the 
basis of considerations which the agent in question does not consciously affirm as 
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reasons at the time the attitude is acquired. Nevertheless, these attitudes may go 
on to guide what looks very much like agential behaviour. Recall the three cases 
from Chapter 3, §3.2.3, where agents form and act on beliefs without occurrent 
introspective awareness: Muhammed acts on a belief about where the torch is 
kept, even though he is not occurrently introspectively aware of forming, or acting 
on, this belief; Laura acts on a belief about where Aisha’s flat is, even though she 
is not occurrently introspectively aware of forming, or of acting on, this belief (at 
least in the instance of utterance, though of course having spoken as she does, 
Laura brings her belief to introspective awareness); and Naveen acts on a belief 
about the colour of the mushroom punnet, even though he is not occurrently 
introspectively aware of forming, or acting on, this belief in the moment of 
utterance. As such, neither Muhammed, Laura nor Naveen consciously affirm any 
considerations as reasons for forming their attitudes. And yet, these attitudes seem 
to have been formed in response to features of the situation which make them 
reasonable. For instance, Muhammed’s unconscious attitude has the following 
sort of content “the cupboard door handle is such-and-such a distance in such-and-
such a direction from my body”—content which is reasonable in light of the 
relative position of the cupboard to him. Further, there is a sense in which these 
agents’ attitudes embody their take on the world. Muhammed takes it that the 
world is such that the cupboard door is at this angle, relative to his body; Laura 
takes it that the world is such that Aisha lives on the second floor, and Naveen 
takes it that the world is such that the mushrooms in the fridge are in a black 
punnet.  
 There are other cases where agents acquire attitudes without consciously 
affirming any considerations as reasons for their acquisition, but which 
nevertheless appear to make some forms of agential behaviour possible. Angela 
Smith (manuscript: 17-18) appeals to the notion of ‘flow’, a psychological state 
observed by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) and Gladwell (2005) in which agents fully 
immersed in an activity do not have introspective awareness of the mental states 
guiding their actions. For instance, a skilled jazz musician may improvise novel 
sequences without effort or awareness of the processes which guide her actions. 
All the time she is responding to cues from her fellow musicians, thus she is 
forming representational mental states which guide action. As Smith suggests 
“Her musical reactions are clearly reasons-responsive—she is exquisitely attuned 
and responsive to the playing of her fellow musicians—but this reasons-
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responsiveness operates below the level of conscious awareness” (manuscript: 17-
18). The musician is also unaware of these representational states as they are 
acquired, and so does not consciously affirm the considerations on which she 
acquired these states as reasons for doing so. The musician cannot answer the 
question of “Why do you think that P?” where P is any of the representational 
states that inform her playing, in a sentence. Nevertheless, because such states 
inform her playing, there is a sense in which she endorses them, in their guidance 
of her responses. As they inform her musical responses, they embody her take on 
the improvisation session.  
 If the attitudes which count as “embody[ing] our take on the world, on 
what is or is not true or important or worthwhile in it” (Hieronymi, 2008: 370) 
must be consciously affirmed, and if the reasons for which an agent holds an 
attitude must also be consciously affirmed, then Muhammed, Laura, Naveen, and 
agents experiencing flow, end up as not answerable for their attitudes, even 
though, as I have argued previously, these attitudes are rightly considered as 
agential. In order to account for the cases of Muhammed, Laura, Naveen, and 
flow as agential, I think that we have to reject a substantial distinction account on 
which conscious affirmation of the considerations for which one holds an attitude 
as reasons for doing so is a necessary condition for answerability. If that is so, the 
implicitly biased agents such as the courier do count as answerable for their 
attitudes. So, if Hieronymi’s (2008) account of answerability shows that agents 
directly control all of their beliefs, then is also shows that agents directly control 
at least some implicit biases, and the substantial distinction argument fails.  
 
Let us take stock. If the foregoing is correct, then it would seem to be that there is 
no substantial distinction between the control that we exert over the acquisition of 
agential attitudes, such as beliefs, and that which we exert over the acquisition of 
implicit biases. I showed this to be the case both for accounts of indirect voluntary 
control, as well as for direct doxastic control. If control over the acquisition of 
implicitly biased attitudes doesn’t distinguish them from beliefs, perhaps control 
of associated actions does. It is to this question that I now turn.  
 
5.3. CONTROL OF IMPLICITLY BIASED ACTIONS 
Implicit biases typically affect behaviour automatically. That is, they become 
primed and ready to manifest in behaviour, or in fact do manifest in behaviour, 
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without our explicit intentions that this be so. This means that control efforts will 
often have to be focused on intervening on this process of automatic activation 
and manifestation. However, this does not mean that we do not exert direct 
control over such behaviour in at least some instances—as I argued in §5.1.2, the 
direct/indirect distinction cuts across the initiation/intervention distinction. 
Accordingly, an agent has direct control of ɸ-ing if it is within their power to ɸ, 
without any intermediary steps. An agent has indirect control of ɸ-ing if it is 
within their power to ψ (through an exercise of direct control, as above), and from 
the occurrence of ψ, the occurrence of ɸ follows. Agents have initiation control 
when they initiate an action sequence, and intervention control when they 
terminate or re-direct an action sequence that is already in progress. 
 In this section, I demonstrate that there are three different control 
strategies which are effective over at least some implicitly biased actions, which 
are also necessary for controlling at least some of our everyday agential actions. 
This undermines the SD theorist’s claim that there is a kind of control that we 
have over all of our belief-guided actions which we do not have over our 
implicitly biased actions. I start by presenting a kind of indirect, intervention 
control that we have over many of our implicitly biased actions (§5.3.1). This 
indirect, intervention control is the only kind of control available to us to guide 
and hone many of our uncontroversially agential actions. I then argue (in §5.3.2) 
that agents may exercise two kinds of direct, intervention control over the 
manifestation of implicit bias in action: (i) a form of deliberative, direct, 
intervention control, and (ii) a form of non-deliberative, direct, intervention 
control. I demonstrate that we rely on both (i) and (ii) in everyday agential action.  
 Of course, SD theorists about control need it to be the case that there is a 
kind of control that we exert over all of our agential actions which we do not exert 
over any of our implicitly biased actions. In showing that there are many agential 
actions which are only controllable via strategies which we can also use to control 
implicitly biased actions, it follows that the SD theory as regards control of action 
is false.  
  
5.3.1. Indirect, intervention control of implicitly biased action 
In §5.1.2 we saw that there are some automatic actions on which we can directly 
intervene. For instance, an individual can directly intervene on actions such as 
nail-biting by directly ceasing to bite their nails. According to Holroyd and Kelly 
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(2016) agents cannot directly intervene on the manifestation of implicit bias in 
action: 
 
Recall Snow’s idea …[of] intervention control—the ability to exert influence 
on autonomously running processes by stopping them or redirecting how 
they shape action. According to this understanding of intervention control, 
individuals lack it in relation to implicit biases—it is very difficult to prevent 
behavioural manifestation of implicit bias via direct reflective control. The 
job interview panellist cannot effectively intervene on the operation of 
implicit biases as they influence cognition, simply by thinking: ‘Oops, there 
it goes; better get my cognitive processes back on track and stop that biased 
evaluation.’ (Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 127) 
 
However, Holroyd and Kelly develop an account on which agents can control the 
manifestation of bias in their actions by indirectly intervening on these processes. 
With this notion of indirect, intervention control in play, they maintain that 
 
An agent can intervene in some automatic process [that would otherwise 
manifest implicit bias] not by bringing it under direct reflective control at the 
moment of its activation, but by diverting its activation by means of some 
environmental or cognitive prop put in place to derail unwanted cognitive or 
behavioural patterns. (Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 127) 
 
On Holroyd and Kelly’s account, agents cannot simply ɸ, and in ɸ-ing, effectively 
intervene on the manifestation of implicit bias in action. However, they can 
(directly) manipulate either features of their environment, or features of their own 
cognitive processes, where these manipulations have the effect of intervening on 
the manifestation of implicit bias in action. As such, Holroyd and Kelly present an 
account of indirect, intervention control of implicit bias.53   
                                                
 
53 Holroyd and Kelly (2016) present three ways of deploying this indirect, intervention control: (i) 
by way of environmental props consciously employed for guiding cognitive processes; (ii) with 
cognitive props consciously employed for guiding cognitive processes; and (iii) through automatic 
processes as props unconsciously employed for guiding cognitive processes. I talk about (i) and 
(ii) in this section, but I disagree that the example that Holroyd and Kelly employ to demonstrate 
(iii) really is an example of indirect, intervention control, and instead suggest that it is better 
characterised as direct, intervention control, albeit of a non-deliberative kind. For this reason, I 
will postpone the discussion of (iii) until §5.3.2, where I discuss direct, intervention control. 
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 Holroyd and Kelly present some of the environmental change strategies 
that I considered in §5.2.1, in which it was shown that people are able to update or 
reduce the strength of their implicitly biased attitudes (Dasgupta and Greenwald, 
2001; Blair, Ma and Lenton, 2001). One of the effects of acting to alter our 
implicitly biased attitudes is a reduction of their manifestation in our behaviour, 
thus ‘nipping’ the origins of implicitly biased action ‘in the bud’. Holroyd and 
Kelly maintain that 
 
…a person might rein in the expression of her own implicit racial biases by 
putting up pictures of admired black celebrities around her office, thus 
taking indirect, ecological control over those biases so that her judgements 
and actions more fluidly express her character and values. (2016: 122) 
 
Holroyd and Kelly also consider what they call ‘cognitive props’ which can 
be employed by the agent to exert indirect, intervention control over the 
manifestation of an implicit bias, (2016: 122). Research shows that people have 
indirect control over the manifestation of their implicit biases in behaviour, by 
deploying ‘implementation intentions’ (Webb, Sheeran and Pepper, 2012). 
Implementation intentions are intentions with a conditional structure in which the 
subject plans to think about something, or to carry out an action, when they 
encounter a target concept (Stewart and Payne, 2008; Webb and Sheeran, 2008; 
Mendoza, 2010). In the case of experiments which seek to determine the effects of 
implementation intentions on implicit bias, such intentions tend to take the 
following form: “If I encounter [target person x] then I will think [social attribute 
y]” where x and y constitute a counter-stereotypical pairing. To measure the 
effects of such intentions, typically subjects first undertake tasks which serve as 
measures of their base rate level of implicit bias (an IAT or other implicit 
measure). Then subjects are instructed to form the relevant implementation 
intention, before they undergo another IAT test. For an example of how this 
instruction is given, subjects in Webb, Sheeran and Pepper’s (2012) study saw the 
following onscreen message:  
 
Most people associate females with liberal arts and males with science 
subjects. Your goal in the following experiment is NOT to stereotype 
women. (Webb, Sheeran and Pepper, 2012: 17-18) 
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and were then asked to form the following implementation intention:  
 
If female and science are paired at the top of the screen, then I will respond 
especially fast to both science and female words! (Webb, Sheeran and 
Pepper, 2012: 18) 
 
It turned out that participants who formed this implementation intention 
responded more quickly on stereotype-incongruent trials than those who did not 
form such intentions, revealing that such a strategy can enable participants to 
modify the extent to which their implicit biases manifested in behaviour (Webb, 
Sheeran and Pepper, 2012).54 Employing implementation intentions in this way, 
subjects have indirect, intervention control over their implicitly biased 
behavioural responses. In an act of direct control, they call to mind a non-
stereotypical concept, and this has the effect of mediating the implicitly biased 
response. This is a form of indirect intervention control, because the act of calling 
to mind a non-stereotypical concept intervenes on the activation of the implicit 
attitude which would otherwise produce a (more) biased behavioural response.  
 SD theorists might point out that employing implementation intentions to 
control our behaviour is a relatively demanding method of action control, and is 
quite unlike the control that we exert over our belief guided actions. Holroyd and 
Kelly (2016) disagree, arguing that implementation intentions are very much a 
part of our everyday agential control. They maintain that agents utilise strategies 
similar to implementation intentions to hone and refine various everyday skills 
(2016: 122). In their discussion of implementation intentions as a strategy for 
taking indirect, intervention control over the manifestation of implicit bias, they 
draw an analogy to a sports player who  
                                                
 
54 You may recall that whilst the IAT measures stereotype matching behaviour, it is usually taken 
to reveal one’s underlying (implicit) attitudes, because it requires fast responses which may not be 
altered by general conscious intentions to respond non-stereotypically. However, this does not rule 
out that IAT performance may be altered by something other than these general conscious 
intentions—in which case, modulated scores on the IAT may not necessarily indicate altered 
underlying attitudes, if one has reason for thinking that another variable may account for 
modulated responses. Webb and colleagues’ claim that the present study does not reveal a change 
in the underlying attitudes, but rather a change in the control that one exerts over the manifestion 
of attitudes in behavior (2012: 16) relies on previous findings which show that implementation 
intentions do not necessarily change underlying attitudes, but rather enable the agent to control the 
extent to which these affect behaviour, using a number of different paradigms to the IAT (for 




…practises, calibrating the operation of sub-personal subsystems to bring 
them in line with intentions, and thus developing a certain kind of fluid and 
unthinking control. (2016, 122) 
 
Indeed, it would seem that utilising implementation intentions is a necessary part 
of the process of enhancing fine motor control.  
 This sort of control seems uncontroversially agential. As Arpaly has 
argued, even though sports players employ various indirect control strategies to 
hone their techniques, it would seem incorrect to claim that therefore they do not 
act agentially when performing actions honed in this manner (2003: 52). 
Furthermore, I think that implementations intentions (or something very similar to 
them) are useful for enhancing more than just fine motor control, and are likely to 
be utilised by all sorts of people, in all sorts of agential pursuits. For instance, an 
actor might employ implementation intentions to develop a particular expression 
(reflecting on a sad episode in his life to enhance his expression of emotion). A 
trainee accident and emergency doctor, anticipating the arrival of some car crash 
victims, might use implementation intentions to steel herself to maintain a sense 
of calm and professionalism in the face of appalling trauma. In particular, the 
doctor utilises indirect, intervention control, intervening on the manifestation of 
anxiety in her behaviour, and either suppressing anxious behaviour that is already 
in process, or preventing such behaviour from manifesting in the first place. It 
would seem inappropriate to claim that the actor’s expression and the doctor’s 
professionalism are not agential simply because they were enabled by 
implementation intentions. As Holroyd and Kelly point out, this type of control is 
in fact rather mundane, and “underlies a vast swathe of human behaviour and 
problem-solving” Holroyd and Kelly (2016: 123). So, because there are at least 
some agential actions, the performance of which would seem to require indirect 
control strategies, there is no grounds for a substantial distinction between all 
agential actions and all implicitly biased actions on the basis of the kind of control 
that we have of each. 
 I think that we are now in a position to refute the following two SD 
claims: 
 
K&R4:  Implicit biases influence action automatically. 
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JS3:  Inferential awareness that we are likely to be implicitly biased is 
not sufficient for control over implicit biases (interpreted as 
implicitly biased actions) 
 
Regarding K&R4, whilst it may be the case that implicit biases influence action 
automatically, this does not rule our being able to intervene on their operation. 
Similarly, the trainee doctor’s anxiety may influence her action automatically, but 
this does not mean that she cannot take steps to prevent it from manifesting. So, it 
does not follow from K&R4 that we have any less control over the manifestation 
of implicit bias in action than we do over a number of agential actions. Regarding 
JS3, inferential awareness of implementation intention studies, for instance, is, at 
least sometimes, sufficient for (indirect, intervention) control over the 
manifestation of bias in action. So this claim will not uphold a substantial 
distinction either. 
 The SD theorist might raise an objection about the epistemic conditions 
for utilising these indirect, intervention strategies to control the manifestation of 
implicit bias in behaviour, similar to that discussed in §5.2.1. The objection goes 
like this: such strategies would seem to require knowing about findings from 
cognitive science, and so, it might seem that agents can only utilise these indirect, 
intervention control strategies if they are aware of the relevant findings. Further, 
the SD theorist can point out that we don’t have to know about empirical findings 
to utilise indirect, intervention control in everyday cases of behaviour (such as 
those of the actor and the doctor). So, there would seem to be grounds for a 
distinction between control over implicitly biased actions and control over 
agential actions, with respect to the relevant epistemic requirements.  
 I resisted this claim with respect to attitude control in §5.2.2, and I resist it 
again here, with respect to action control. One does not need to have inferential 
awareness of implicit bias and the relevant findings in order to expose oneself to 
counter-stereotypical exemplars with the purpose of updating one’s attitudes, and 
since a result of changing a biased attitude is that the attitude will no longer be 
available to guide behaviour, I think that the same can be said here: agents do not 
need to have inferential awareness of implicit bias in order to expose themselves 
to counter-stereotypical exemplars with the purpose of updating attitudes which 
might otherwise manifest in behaviour. 
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 As for implementation intentions, I don’t think that it is impossible that an 
agent with no inferential awareness of implicit bias might nevertheless still 
employ something similar to an implementation intention to control the 
manifestation of implicit bias in behaviour. Recall Borgoni’s (2015) example of 
Emilia, who catches herself thinking implicitly biased thoughts about women in 
politics. Disturbed by such thoughts, Emilia might use something like an 
implementation intention to prevent such thoughts from entering any further into 
her deliberations. She might make the following sort of plan: “if I catch myself 
thinking that women are naturally less able in the field of politics than men, then I 
shall stop myself short and think instead of able political women that I know.” 
This is to say that agents like Emilia, who are disturbed by their inegalitarian 
thoughts, are capable of making plans to try to prevent them from influencing 
deliberation any further, some of which might have the structure of 
implementation intentions. Whether or not such strategies in fact are successful at 
reducing biases in action is an empirical question. Until there is further research 
on such strategies, continuum theorists must concede that it remains the case that 
utilising the specific implementation intentions which are shown to be effective in 
current empirical studies requires inferential awareness of the studies in question. 
 But even if we make this concession, I think that the SD theorist still does 
not have sufficient grounds for a substantial distinction between the indirect, 
intervention control that we have over our implicitly biased actions and that which 
we have over agential actions, on the basis of the relevant epistemic 
preconditions. As I argued above, agents do not require inferential awareness of 
the studies on counter-stereotypical exemplars in order to expose themselves to 
inclusive media, with the effect of reducing the manifestation of bias in action.  
Another point that is relevant to this discussion is that some agential 
activities, such as honing a particular skill in sport, might not be possible until one 
acquires inferential knowledge of particular developments in sport science. For 
instance, knowing the precise arc of motion, and the angle at which the arm 
delivers the most power, might be necessary for developing one’s serve. And yet, 
a game-winningly powerful serve, even if it is developed and honed on the basis 
of learning about findings in musculoskeletal biomechanics seems to be an 
agential action nonetheless. We don’t deprive athletes of titles on the basis that the 
development of their skills depends on their knowing particular findings in sport 
science.  
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So, to summarise my response to the epistemic conditions objection: in 
utilising the indirect, intervention control strategies mentioned above, agents 
sometimes require inferential awareness of the relevant scientific findings, and 
sometimes they don’t—and this is true of both implicitly biased actions and of 
agential actions. 
 
5.3.2. Direct, intervention control of implicitly biased action 
Recall that an agent has direct control of some ɸ-ing if it is within their power to 
ɸ, without any intermediary steps. This is to say that the agent’s bringing about of 
her ɸ-ing is itself the act of agential control. Recall also Holroyd and Kelly’s 
contention from the last subsection, that it is very difficult to prevent the 
manifestation of implicit bias via direct control and that people “cannot 
effectively intervene on the operation of implicit biases as they influence 
cognition, simply by thinking: ‘…better get my cognitive processes back on track 
and stop that biased evaluation’” (Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 127). Their claim is 
not that it is impossible to have any form of direct control over the manifestation 
of implicit bias, but that it is, at least, “very difficult”.  
In what follows, I outline some cases in which agents have what I think is 
properly characterised as direct, intervention control over the manifestation of 
implicit bias in action. Contra Holroyd and Kelly’s claim, this is also control 
which does not come at a great effort. I argue that there are cases in which agents 
may ɸ, where ɸ-ing is both within their direct control, and where the ɸ-ing itself 
constitutes an intervention on the manifestation of an implicit bias in action. I 
argue that, at least sometimes, agents have direct intervention control over the 
manifestation of implicit bias in action. I first discuss a kind of (i) deliberative, 
direct, intervention control, and then a kind of (ii) non-deliberative, direct, 
intervention control. 
 
(i) Deliberative, direct, intervention control of implicitly biased action 
Sometimes, when an implicit bias manifests in action, the agent would seem to act 
in a way that they would not have done, had the implicit bias not been present, 
and had the action instead been guided wholly by the values and intentions that 
the agent professes to have. For instance, Henry’s implicit bias against black 
people manifests in his blinking more, when in conversation with a black 
colleague than he otherwise would have, had he not had this bias. We can call this 
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a ‘manifestation case’. Other times, an implicit bias would seem to block an 
action from being performed in a particular way, and instead, the agent will 
perform that action in a restricted or limited way—a limitation that would not 
have been there had the implicit bias not manifested. For instance, Franz’s 
implicit bias against women manifests in his failing to invite women professionals 
to speak on the business development panels that he organises. In this case, Franz 
is performing an action (the selection of speakers) in a restricted manner, in that, 
whilst his intention is to select speakers from all areas on the basis of their 
expertise, he ends up primarily selecting questions from male business experts, 
and so he is performing this selection action in a manner that is restricted, relative 
to his intentions. Call this a ‘restriction case’. 
 It may be that some restriction cases can be re-described as manifestation 
cases, and vice versa. For instance, consider Olivia’s implicit bias against 
Muslims, which manifests in her crossing the street to avoid a Muslim man. We 
could describe Olivia as (1) “walking in a manner which decreases proximity with 
a Muslim”. Because this description picks out the way in which the implicit bias 
manifests in the current action, it would seem to be a manifestation case. But 
equally, we might want to describe Olivia as (2) “failing to perform an act of 
tolerance”. Because this description picks out a failure of action performance, it 
would seem to be a restriction case. That some restriction cases may be re-
described as manifestation cases, and vice versa, isn’t a problem for what I want 
to say. For my upcoming argument to work, I only require that there are at least 
some cases of implicit bias where it is possible for the agent to realise that they 
are performing an action in a way that is restricted relative to the way that they 
intended to perform that action, as well as to realise that it is possible for them to 
perform less restricted actions from then on. As such I am interested in 
manifestation vs. restriction as an epistemological distinction, whether or not there 
is a robust metaphysical basis to the distinction. 
I propose that, in restriction cases, if the agent can (i) realise that a biased 
preference has blocked them from performing an action in such-and-such a way, 
and (ii) it is possible for them to deliberately and directly perform the action in 
that way from then on, then they may directly intervene on the manifestation of 
implicit bias in action. By ‘directly’ performing the intervention action, I mean 
that the agent ɸs, where their ɸ-ing either cuts off a current manifestation of 
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implicit bias in action, or prevents its continued manifestation. Call this 
‘unrestricting’.  
 Restriction cases, I contend, are relatively common. Further, they are 
common both for implicitly biased agents and for agents whose agential 
preferences manifest in action without their (initially) realising it. Both sorts of 
agents may directly intervene on the manifestation of the bias/preference in action 
in a number of these cases, thus ‘unrestricting’ non-biased/non-preferential 
actions which may be performed from then on. Let’s look first at some 
unrestriction cases featuring implicitly biased actions. 
 
Seminar: A seminar chair’s implicit bias manifests in his predominantly 
selecting questions from white men in the discussion session. He both can, 
and, in this instance (i) does notice that he predominantly selects questions 
from men, and (ii) takes direct control of the manifestation of his implicit 
bias, by intervening and actively looking for women and people of colour 
who have raised their hands.55 
 
Author: The implicit bias of a highly successful and well read author of 
fiction manifests in a number of novels where white, male characters 
dominate the dialogue and the plot. She both can, and, on this occasion (i) 
does notice that the majority of her main characters are white men, and (ii) 
takes direct control of the manifestation of her implicit bias, by intervening 
and deliberately writing in a more inclusive set of characters in her next 
novel. 
 
Panel show producer: A panel show producer’s implicit bias manifests in 
the selection of participants who are almost always white men. He both can, 
and, in this instance (i) does notice this fact, and (ii) takes direct control of 
the manifestation of his implicit bias, by intervening and actively seeking out 
participants from more diverse backgrounds. 
 
In each of the cases, participants gain awareness of the manifestation of implicit 
bias in action. This seems quite possible. All of these cases are cases in which 
                                                
 
55 I owe thanks to Jenny Saul for suggesting this particular example of an unrestriction case, 
during the Q&A of my presentation on control of implicit bias at the Leeds Minorities and 
Philosophy Conference on Implicit Bias, October, 2015. 
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participants have observable class preferences (Chapter 3). As I argued in Chapter 
3, I think it is possible that, at least sometimes, people may discover some of their 
implicit biases through introspection on their particular preferences as regards 
social groups. However, observational awareness of the manifestation of a biased 
preference in behaviour is quite sufficient in the above cases for people to be able 
to directly perform the relevant intervention behaviours, whether or not they also 
have introspective awareness of their biased preferences.  
 Note that it is not necessary to have any inferential awareness of implicit 
bias and the relevant empirical findings to be able to make the sorts of 
observations necessary for redirecting action as above. Once people notice that a 
particular behaviour is shaped by a biased preference, they can deliberately 
redirect their action, thus ‘unrestricting’ the action they would have performed 
had their biased preference not manifested. The unrestricted action constitutes a 
direct intervention on the manifestation of implicit bias. So, unrestriction cases 
show that agents can, at least sometimes, have direct, intervention control over the 
manifestation of implicit bias in action, and, further, contra Holroyd and Kelly 
(2016: 127) this is relatively easy for the agents in question to do. 
 One might think that it is somewhat demanding to expect implicitly biased 
agents to notice biased behaviour, and to exert this sort of control. I am not 
convinced that it is. Many of our everyday preferences frequently guide behaviour 
without our express intention that they do so. A politics graduate may have an 
everyday preference for the left-wing of politics, for instance, which she endorses 
explicitly, and which she frequently employs in introspective practical reasoning 
to determine her actions (such as how to vote, for instance). However, this 
preference may also guide her behaviour without her express intention in many 
other contexts. For instance, she reads news articles which endorse the protection 
of state-funded institutions more frequently than those which support shrinking 
the state and placing public institutions in private hands, even though she doesn’t 
expressly intend to do this. In many of the contexts in which her left-wing 
preference guides her actions automatically, were she to become aware (either 
introspectively or observationally) that this is the case, she would endorse its 
being so—as would be the case in the example of her news reading preferences. 
However, in other contexts, were she to become aware that her left-wing 
preference automatically guides action, she would not endorse its manifestation in 
that particular action. I will give examples of this shortly. I think there are plenty 
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of cases in which agents both can, and are in fact expected to both (i) notice that 
their preferences automatically guide their actions in a fashion inconsistent with 
their present aims, and (ii) to redirect their future behaviour in line with a non-
preferential course of action. Consider the following everyday unblocking cases: 
 
Student council: The student council chair’s left-wing preference manifests 
in the selection of questions from known left-wingers at a much higher rate 
than questions from known right-wingers during a council meeting, without 
her initially realising it. Given that her role requires that she ensures that 
people on either side of the political spectrum have an opportunity to have 
their say, she is both expected to, and, in this instance, does (i) eventually 
notice the manifestation of a left-wing preference in question selection, and 
(ii) takes direct control over this, by intervening and actively looking for 
questions from those she knows to be right-wing. 
 
Reports: A researcher repeatedly favours particular adjectives throughout his 
reports, without his initially realising this. Given that his role requires that he 
communicates concepts in an articulate and effective manner, he is both 
expected to, and, in this instance, does (i) eventually notice the manifestation 
of his linguistic preferences and (ii) takes direct control over them, by 
deliberately selecting a close synonym the next time he finds himself 
considering using one of his overused adjectives. 
 
Debate: A TV executive’s advocacy of climate skepticism manifests in the 
programming of excessive airtime for climate skeptics on her debate show, 
without her initially realising this. As an executive for a publicly funded 
channel, she is both expected to, and, in this instance, does (i) eventually 
notice the manifestation of her preference for skepticism, and (ii) takes direct 
control over it, by actively inviting contributions from climate scientists. 
 
For each agent in the above three examples, a preference which they may endorse 
in some contexts manifests automatically in a context in which, when they 
become either introspectively or observationally aware of it, they do not endorse 
its guidance of action. It seems quite possible for the agents above to become at 
least observationally, if not introspectively (or perhaps retrospectively) aware of 
how their preferences guide their actions. Furthermore, I think that, given the role 
that each of these agents is performing, they are expected to notice the 
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manifestation of preferential treatment in their behaviour, and to do something 
about it: the student council officer ought to make sure that she is facilitating a 
fair debate; the report writer ought to make sure that he is describing complex 
concepts in the most articulate and meaningful language; the TV executive for a 
publicly funded channel ought to be producing an unbiased show. So, even 
though action may often be guided by the automatic manifestation of preferences, 
it is possible for agents to become aware that this is the case, and to intervene on 
the manifestation of the preference, thus unrestricting an action that they would 
endorse in the context at hand. These agents have a deliberative form of direct, 
intervention control over the manifestation of their preferences in action, in that, 
on recognising the preference, they ɸ, where ɸ is actively looking for questions 
from right-wingers; deliberately selecting a close synonym; or actively inviting 
contributions from climate scientists, and where ɸ-ing constitutes a direct 
intervention on the manifestation of the preference in action. 
 So, there are at least some cases where everyday preferences affect action 
automatically, in a way that the agent in question would not endorse, but over 
which they have direct intervention control. When these everyday preferences 
manifest automatically, they aren’t subject to initiation control, and so there will 
be times when the utilisation of intervention control is the only way that agents 
may control these actions (although they can deploy this intervention control 
directly). Not only is their doing so a belief-guided, agential action, it is also 
expected of them. So, we have another kind of control (direct, intervention 
control), in addition to that presented in the previous subsection (indirect, 
intervention control) that (i) is necessary for controlling at least some instances of 
everyday, belief-guided actions, and (ii) is also available to agents in the case of at 
least some implicitly biased actions (the unrestriction cases). As such, the SD 
claim that there is no strategy by which we may control at least some of our 
implicitly biased actions that it is also necessary to use to control at least some of 
our belief-guided actions, fails yet again.  
 What of Holroyd and Kelly’s claim that a job interview panellist cannot 
directly intervene on the operation of their implicit biases, simply by thinking 
“Oops, there it goes; better get my cognitive processes back on track and stop that 
biased evaluation” (Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 127)? When it comes to exerting 
control over an evaluation, in which the agent takes into account a candidate’s 
various skills and experience, and in which they may also (unintentionally) take 
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into account the candidate’s race and gender, I agree with Holroyd and Kelly 
(2016: 127) that it is not clear what an agent can do to “get her cognitive 
processes back on track”. It isn’t immediately obvious to the agent what she can 
do to intervene on the operation of the implicit bias, since it isn’t obvious how the 
bias restricts her thinking. At least, it is not as obvious as the unrestriction cases 
that I discussed earlier, where there is a clear course of action that the 
manifestation of bias previously blocked the agent from taking, but which they 
can take from then on.  
 However, not knowing exactly how an implicit bias manifests in 
evaluation is not, I think, wholly a function of the implicit aspect of the attitude in 
question: It is also, in part, a function of the biased aspect of the attitude. The 
same problem arises when an explicit personal preference interacts with the 
evaluation of some objective criteria. For instance, I have an explicit preference 
for my friend’s character and demeanour. Were I to be a on the panel for a job to 
which he applied, and were I to have to evaluate his suitability for the position 
compared with a number of other applicants, it is likely that my explicit 
preference for his character and demeanour would guide my evaluation, even if I 
did not intend for this to be the case. It is not clear that I would have any more 
insight into how my explicit preference for my friend guides my evaluation of his 
credentials than the insight that I have into how, for instance, my implicit race 
bias guides my evaluation of his credentials.  
 To prevent favouring my friend on the basis of my explicit preference, I 
could collate all of the objective information (exam results, relevant 
qualifications, and so on) that I can attain from the applicants’ C.V.s 
anonymously, and resolve to select the candidate who is objectively best on paper 
for the job. Doing this would prevent the manifestation of my preference for my 
friend. However, as Holroyd and Kelly acknowledge (2016, 122), this option is 
open to us in the case of implicit bias as well—we can anonymise C.V.s (thus 
preventing gendered and racialised names from activating our implicit biases) and 
evaluate candidates purely on the basis of objective criteria.  
 Even here, though, it is not clear that I could block the manifestation of 
personal preferences completely. For instance, if I happen to prefer qualifications 
from institution A to qualifications from institution B, (and, suppose that I am 
unwarranted in doing so) then it might be that simply removing the name from a 
C.V.˙ is not sufficient to prevent the manifestation of my personal preferences in 
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my evaluation. I might say to myself “I won’t let my preference for a qualification 
from A when this person only has a qualification from B, affect my overall 
evaluation of their suitability for the position.” Whether I’ll be successful in 
directly suppressing the manifestation of my preference for qualifications from 
institution A in my overall evaluation of a candidate is about as unclear as whether 
I’ll be successful in directly suppressing the manifestation of a preference for, say, 
a white candidate, with an equivalent internal utterance of not letting race affect 
my overall evaluation. 
 So, when we’re faced with with the task of evaluating candidates, we may 
not be able to exert direct, intervention control over the manifestation of our 
implicit biases. To take control, we may instead have to commit ourselves to the 
long-term, indirect intervention control strategies discussed by Holroyd and Kelly 
(2016), and which I discussed in the previous subsection. However, we are also 
unable to exert direct, intervention control over the manifestation of our explicit 
personal preferences when evaluating candidates. (This doesn’t necessarily mean 
that we aren’t doing something agential when either explicit or implicit 
preferences guide our evaluations—one might still think that these evaluations 
still “embody our take on the world” for instance. Rather, the point is that we 
cannot discern exactly how our preferences operate.)  
So, to sum up this section, contra Holroyd and Kelly, I think that we can 
have a form of deliberate, direct, intervention control over our implicitly biased 
actions. Furthermore, there are cases in which this deliberate, direct, intervention 
control is necessary for controlling at least some of our everyday belief-guided 
actions. That at least some implicitly biased actions are amenable to the same kind 
of control as everyday belief-guided actions is inconsistent with the substantial 
distinction theory, and may only be accounted for on a model on which implicitly 
biased actions and belief-guided actions overlap on a continuum with respect to 
our control over them. So, the substantial distinction theory fails (again). Further, 
I argued that Holroyd and Kelly’s suggestion that an implicitly biased interviewer 
cannot discern how her implicit bias influences her evaluation is as much a 
problem for agents influenced by agential preferences (such as the fondness for a 
job applicant who is also one’s friend) as it is for the implicitly biased panellist.  
 We’ve now seen two sorts of cases where substantial distinction accounts 
on the basis of control over action fail: it turns out that we have both indirect, 
intervention control, and, direct, intervention control over implicitly biased 
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actions and belief-guided actions. There’s a third and final sort of control that we 
have over implicitly biased and belief-guided actions, this time, a non-deliberative 
strategy for taking direct, intervention control, which I will now present in the 
final part of this section. 
 
(ii) Non-deliberative, direct, intervention control 
Agents may employ strategies to control their implicitly biased responses without 
knowing anything about the research on implicit bias. I suggest that these 
examples are best understood as cases of non-deliberative, direct, intervention 
control, as I will argue shortly. I will also outline some recent findings which 
indicate the neurological basis of a capacity to intervene (without the need for 
introspective awareness or deliberation) on motor processes that are already in 
motion when changes in the environment mean that a current action is no-longer 
inline with an agent’s active goals (Aron, 2011). This shows that non-deliberative, 
direct, intervention control, which operates below the level of introspective 
awareness, may also play a crucial role in many of our agential actions. 
 A number of studies show that the extent to which agents manifest implicit 
bias in their actions covaries with various agential factors. For instance, Devine et 
al. (2002) show that agents who are already motivated to refrain from prejudice 
because they think that doing so is inherently valuable (Devine et al. call this an 
‘internalised’ motivation) exhibit less implicit bias than agents who profess to 
thinking that refraining from prejudice is valuable because they are worried about 
how they are perceived, and less still than those who are not motivated at all. In 
fact, Devine et al. suggest that “the more internalized or self-determined a goal or 
value is, the more successful people are at responding consistently with the goal 
or value,” (2002: 836). Succinctly, people who value responding without 
prejudice for the very reason that doing so is valuable in itself manifest less 
implicit bias in their actions than those who are motivated for instrumental 
reasons, or not motivated at all. Agents do not need to know anything about 
implicit bias, or related research on control strategies, to already be responding 
without prejudice as above, they just need to be motivated by the notion that 
prejudice is an inherently bad thing, which is, arguably, an agential characteristic. 
 Other research shows that agents with genuine long-term commitments to 
non-prejudice also manifest less implicit bias in their actions than those without 
such commitments (Moskowitz et al.,1999). This finding relies on earlier research 
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in which it was shown that when participants are made to engage in behaviour 
which violates what they indicate on self-report measures to be a genuinely held 
long-term commitment, they try to alleviate the conflict felt by overcompensating 
in line with their commitment later on—performing what have been termed 
‘incompleteness behaviours’ (Gollwitzer et al., 1982). As measuring long-term 
commitments in this way requires that the commitments in question are exercised 
to bring about commitment-congruent behaviour, it provides a more direct record 
of the commitment at issue than measures which rely on participants’ own reports 
about their commitments (Moskowitz et al., 1999: 169). Speaking of long-term 
commitments to non-prejudice, Moskowitz et al. maintain that: 
 
If people commit themselves to such self-defining goals, they are expected 
to make use of available opportunities to express the goal and to hold on to it 
even in the face of hindrances, barriers, and difficulties. (1999, 169) 
 
Moskowitz et al. hypothesised that agents who perform egalitarian 
incompleteness behaviours after being made to participate in a non-egalitarian 
task would also tend to manifest less implicit bias in action. In this case, the non-
egalitarian task was a questionnaire on which participants were only able to give 
stereotypical answers about women, and the incompleteness behaviour was 
measured by their response to a subsequent questionnaire about women (on which 
they could give egalitarian answers). Those considered to be high in 
incompleteness behaviour were those who responded with significantly more 
egalitarian responses after being forced to give stereotypical answers. As 
hypothesised, Moskowitz and colleagues observed a correlation between those 
who performed incompleteness behaviours after engaging in a non-egalitarian 
task (so, those with long-term commitments to egalitarianism) and those who 
manifested less implicit bias on another test. So, holding long-term egalitarian 
commitments enable agents to control their implicit social responses accordingly. 
A later study from Moskowiz and Li (2011) reveals that egalitarian commitments 
may be ‘triggered’ in participants without their realising, which then inhibit the 
manifestation of implicit bias in later behaviour.56 
                                                
 
56 These commitments were triggered in participants by making them contemplate a past event in 
which they failed to be egalitarian towards an African American man. 
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 Interestingly, Moskowitz et al. (1999) maintain that the processes which 
bring implicit responses in line with an agent’s long-term commitments are not 
conscious, or effortful, and do not require the agent to consider whether they still 
believe that they should refrain from prejudice whenever the relevant social 
concepts are made salient. Moskowitz et al. propose that the long-term egalitarian 
commitment in question operates automatically to prevent the facilitation of 
stereotypic categories in the presence of the relevant social concepts (1999: 168). 
Accordingly, agents who have cultivated longstanding commitments to 
egalitarianism have done so as a result of already having responded to reasons to 
refrain from prejudice. Such agents, it turns out, do not need to consciously 
consult these reasons each time they find themselves in a situation where they 
could act prejudicially or fairly, in order for the commitment to engender reasons-
congruent behaviour. In this sense, the control implicated in these studies is non-
deliberative in kind. 
 These results put pressure on Levy’s (2014a: 53) claim if attitudes are 
activated in novel circumstances they must be conscious in order to be processed 
consistently with the agent’s consciously held values.57 On the contrary, these 
results show that attitudes may be activated and processed nonconsciously in 
novel circumstances to bring about behaviour that is consistent with the agent’s 
consciously held values. Whilst suppressing bias for the above agents is neither 
the outcome of a deliberative process, nor available to introspection, because it 
correlates with the agent’s internalised or genuine, long-term commitments, I 
suggest that bias suppression is best modelled as an agential action, which puts 
further pressure on the SD claim that implicitly biased actions are not agential on 
the basis of our (apparent) lack of control over them.  
Holroyd and Kelly (2016) maintain that the utilisation of long-term 
commitments to calibrate responses to situational features in line with the agent’s 
values is rightly considered as an agential capacity, even when such responses are 
not guided by attention. Speaking of Moskowitz and Li (2011) they suggest: 
 
                                                
 
57 Levy says “Activating concepts nonconsciously has effects on subjects’ attitudes, but these 
effects are associative and not logical. All of this appears to be evidence of an absence of the 
capacity to integrate the content of representations; whereas nonconscious processing of contents 
may cause the activation of semantically related content, only when the processing is conscious is 
the activation logically coherent” (2014a: 53). I summarised these sentiments in claims NL2 and 
NL3. 
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The agent’s values and goals themselves, then, can play a role qua 
mechanisms that influence and calibrate the subsystems that run without 
reflective or direct control. This is a case of one element of a person’s 
psychological economy influencing another. The agent’s values ‘keep in 
check’ the operation of implicit bias, such that pursuing certain values is one 
way of exercising ecological control even when one is not actively 
monitoring one’s actions with respect to whether they promote (or depart 
from) those values. Crucially, this can be so without the agent expressly 
intending, at any point, to put in place mechanisms for this purpose. 
(Holroyd and Kelly, 2016: 123) 
 
Holroyd and Kelly (2016) claim that this kind of control is an example of indirect 
intervention control. But I am not sure that this is the correct model. Instead, I 
think this is an example of (non-deliberative) direct, intervention control. Indirect 
control, as we defined it above, is when an agent ψ-s in order to bring about that 
she ɸ-s. That is, the act which the agent themselves performs is distinct from that 
which she seeks to bring about. But when an egalitarian goal inhibits the 
activation of a stereotype, I am not sure which act is supposed to be the agent’s ψ-
ing and which her ɸ-ing: it seems to me that we have just one act: the inhibition of 
the stereotype. In §5.2.2, I gave examples of agents (Muhammed, Laura, Naveen, 
and those experiencing flow) who are not consciously aware that an attitude 
guides behaviour, and nor do they intend for this to be the case. I argued that, 
nonetheless, these attitudes are rightly identified as agential. I think that we have a 
similar situation here. If a persistent egalitarian motivation (which seems rightly 
identified as an agential state) guides or suppresses action, then, even if the agent 
in question is not aware that this is the case, and exerts no effort over its being so, 
it still strikes me that this is a case of direct control. There is just one act, the 
suppression of a stereotype and, because this is the result of an agential attitude, I 
think that this is rightly identified as something that agent herself does. Thus, I 
think the findings of Moskowitz et al. (1999), Devine et al. (2002) and 
Moskowitz and Li (2011) demonstrate that agents who are genuinely committed 
to egalitarianism may directly and non-deliberatively intervene on the 
manifestation of implicit bias in action. That said, I agree with Holroyd and 
Kelly’s analysis of the control present in the Moskowitz and Li (2011), and 
similar experiments, insofar as they suggest that even though the agent doesn’t 
introspectively micromanage every detail of how their values and commitments 
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are expressed in their behaviour, the agent is fundamentally implicated at the heart 
of this sort of control—it’s no accident that egalitarian agents can effortlessly 
inhibit implicitly biased responses. 
 Moreover, as well as non-deliberative, direct, intervention control over 
implicitly biased actions, we may well have this kind of control over a variety of 
other agential actions—which is problematic for the SD theorist. Recent 
neuroscientific findings reveal a neurological basis for a form of non-deliberative, 
direct, intervention control over the motor behaviours that constitute many of our 
everyday actions. In a recent study, Aron (2011) observes that people are capable 
of ‘spur of the moment’ inhibitions of behaviour in response to changes in their 
environment. According to Aron, the speed at which study participants adjust 
their behaviour suggests that they are proactively inhibiting a process before it 
begins. Although participants do not deliberately guide the inhibitory response, 
and it occurs without effort, it is activated in a manner that is sensitive to 
participants’ current goals—behaviour is inhibited when there is a sudden change 
in environmental stimuli, such that, had the behaviour in question gone ahead, it 
would contradict the participants’ current goals. Because of this, Aron maintains 
that this inhibitory process is generated automatically in accordance with the 
agent’s current goals (like it would seem to be in the Moskowitz et al. (1999) 
results, as above). Aron calls this “proactive inhibitory control” (2011). 
 Results in the 2011 paper are confined to laboratory tasks, but Aron 
suggests that a ‘real-world’ application of the proactive inhibitory control 
mechanism could be “preventing oneself from stepping into the street when the 
light changes color” (2011: 61). Presumably, the active goal here is something 
like ‘crossing the street safely’. The idea is that if this goal is active, and a red 
light is detected, then the motor processes which generate walking will be 
automatically terminated (non-effortfully, on the part of the subject). Another 
instance in which the proactive inhibitory control mechanism may operate in the 
real world is in “sports requiring fast action control, such as stopping and 
switching movements in response to changing environmental signals” (2011: 61).  
 Such results would seem to paint a picture of agency where actions can 
manifest an agent’s goals, values and commitments, without necessarily requiring 
deliberation, introspective awareness or effortful control. If that is right, then the 
point cuts both ways: if we wish to maintain that participants in the Moskowitz et 
al. (1999), Devine et al. (2002) and Moskowitz and Li (2011) experiments, as 
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well as agents utilising Aron’s “proactive inhibitory control” (2011) act 
agentially, then it is difficult to argue that some agents who fail to suppress their 
implicit biases are not at all implicated as agents when they do: at the very least, 
they are failing to do something that, to judge from what other agents manage, 
they could and should do.  
 
My arguments in this section have shown that, far from it being the case that we 
have no control over the manifestation of implicit bias in our actions, agents have 
three distinct effective strategies for controlling implicitly biased actions: (i) 
indirect, intervention control; (ii) deliberative, direct, intervention control; and 
(iii) non-deliberative, direct, intervention control. Moreover, I have argued that 
these strategies are by no means exclusive to the control of behaviour guided by 
implicit attitudes; rather, they are necessary for the control of at least some 
everyday agential actions, and, besides, these kinds of control are both regularly 
employed by, and even expected of many agents. We can conclude then that the 
SD theorist’s claim that there is a kind of control that we have over all of our 




In the foregoing, I have argued that there is no substantial distinction between (i) 
the acquisition of implicit biases, and the actions that they influence; and (ii) the 
acquisition of agential attitudes, such as beliefs, and the actions that they guide, on 
the basis of the kind of control that we exert over each. In particular, I argued that 
there is no substantial distinction between the control that we exert over the 
acquisition of agential attitudes, such as beliefs, and that which we exert over the 
acquisition of implicit biases. I showed that if one thinks that we exert indirect 
voluntary control over belief acquisition and update, then, following a number of 
empirical findings, implicit bias acquisition and update can also sometimes be 
indirectly voluntary. I then showed that if one is committed to direct doxastic 
control (such as in Hieronymi’s account of ‘answerability’, 2008), then one is also 
committed to direct control of at least some implicit biases. I then argued that 
there is no substantial distinction between the control that we exert over our 
agential actions and that which we exert over our implicitly biased actions. I 
demonstrated that three distinct strategies are effective for controlling implicitly 
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biased actions: indirect, intervention control; deliberative, direct, intervention 
control; and non-deliberative, direct, intervention control. Here, I argued that 
these kinds of control are also the only strategies available to us for controlling at 
least some of our everyday agential actions. 
 This result undercuts SDR arguments which proceed on the assumption 
that (a) we do not exert any control over implicit biases, and their influence on 
action, or that (b) we do not have the kind of control of our implicit biases, and 
their influence on action, that renders such attitudes and actions as agential. I 
showed (b) to be false, and the falsity of (b) includes the falsity of (a). In light of 
this, consider the following claims, summarised from the argument of SDR 
theorist Saul (2013): 
 
JS5:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for having a 
mental state m/for action influenced by a mental state m that the 
agent is able to control the acquisition of m. 
JS6:  It is a necessary condition for moral responsibility for action 
influenced by mental state m, that when an agent becomes 
inferentially aware that she has m, she is instantly able to control 
the influence of m on action. 
 
We are yet to determine the precise account of control that Saul has in mind in the 
above. However, it doesn’t matter: Given that (i) we have some kinds of control 
over the acquisition of our implicitly biases, as well as over our implicitly biased 
actions, and (ii) these kinds of control are also the only strategies available to us 
for controlling at least some of our beliefs and our everyday agential actions, then 
neither JS5 nor JS6 rule out moral responsibility for implicit bias and implicitly 
biased actions—unless they also rule out moral responsibility for a great many 
other seemingly agential actions. 
 Now consider the following from Levy (2014a): 
  
NL1:  …only when we are conscious of the facts that give our actions 
their moral significance are those actions expressive of our 
identities as practical agents and do we possess the kind of control 
that is plausibly required for moral responsibility, (2014a: 1). 
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Levy (2014a) argues that consciousnessPA (his particular account of consciousness 
as personal availability) is necessary for the kind of control that is required for 
moral responsibility. As I argued at the end of Chapter 3, consciousnessPA of the 
morally relevant facts is an overly demanding condition for agents to meet in 
order to be morally responsible, and a condition according to which a lot of 
intuitively responsible agents (such as the explicitly prejudiced) will turn out not 
to be responsible. I think that this is especially true for the agents that I discussed 
in the latter subsection of §5.3.2, whose motivations to refrain from prejudice 
were activated, enabling them to exert a non-effortful, non-deliberative form of 
intervention control over their implicitly biased actions, without any awareness 
that they do so (Moskowitz et al., 1999; see also Devine et al., 2002; and 
Moskowitz and Li, 2011). Intuitively, because an agential state (motivation) 
guides the inhibition of stereotypical responses in line with agents’ commitments, 
these agents act agentially, even though they are not consciousPA of the moral 
significance of their action. If agents whose motivations guide their actions such 
that they refrain from prejudice are appropriate subjects of moral praise, it is not 
clear to me why the agents in the above experiments should be ruled out as 
praiseworthy (and those who fail to be motivated to refrain from prejudice, as 
blameworthy). I therefore conclude that we have grounds for rejecting NL1. 
Accordingly, if agents are not morally responsible for their implicitly biased 
actions, then it will not be because of their lack of control. 
 By this point in the dialectic, however, we have ruled out all of the 
supposedly distinguishing features that were introduced in Chapter 2 as able to 
uphold a substantial distinction between implicit biases, and implicitly biased 
actions; and agential attitudes and actions. This sets the stage for a more positive 
explication of the continuum thesis, and of the sense in which implicit biases, and 
implicitly biased actions, are both agential and morally evaluable. This will be the 
topic of the sixth and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY ON THE 
CONTINUUM THESIS  
 
In the foregoing chapters, I argued that there is no substantial distinction (SD) on 
the basis of awareness, structure and processing, or control, between (i) implicit 
biases and implicitly biased actions; and (ii) beliefs and belief-guided actions. In 
particular, I showed that agents do have some awareness of the influence of their 
implicit biases on action, and further, that agents may lack awareness of their 
attitudes and their influence on action, and yet those attitudes and actions may still 
be agential. I then demonstrated that at least some implicit biases encode 
propositional information and, additionally, that beliefs do not always update in 
light of evidence. Finally, I argued that there is a number of strategies available 
for controlling implicit biases and related actions which are also the only 
strategies by which we control beliefs, and at least some agential actions.  
 In this final chapter, I present a more positive account of the nature of the 
attitudes that, following the arguments in the previous three chapters, we end up 
with. I defend the notion that agential attitudes and actions lie on a continuum in 
accordance with the level of awareness and control that we have over them, a 
continuum which is also populated by implicit attitudes, and the actions that they 
guide (§6.1). There is a large enough overlap on this continuum between the 
former and the latter that we should think that at least some of the latter are 
properly identified as agential. At this section of overlap on the continuum, if it is 
appropriate to hold agents as morally responsible for their agential actions (and I 
show that it is), then it is appropriate to hold agents as morally responsible for 
their implicitly biased actions, with which these agential actions share features. 
The continuum view also enables us to account for at least some of the 
considerations that motivate the SD view in the first place, without committing to 
the problems that it generates, as I will shortly argue. 
 One way that the SD theorist could try to respond to the case that I have 
been building against them is to argue that all of my counter-examples to the 
substantial distinction theory (counter-examples where apparently agential 
attitudes overlap with implicit attitudes along the continuum) are not agential, 
after all. To do this is to effectively raise the bar of agency higher up the attitude 
continuum so that the last implicit attitude (and any associated actions) fall 
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outside the domain of the agential. Call this the ‘bar-raising’ response. In §6.2, I 
argue that the bar-raising response cannot make sense of a number of occurrences 
which surround my counter-examples to the SD theory from the previous three 
chapters. Specifically, (i) it cannot make sense of many or our practices of praise 
or blame; and (ii) it cannot make sense of the notion that we learn something new 
about ourselves when we discover how our implicit preferences manifest (as 
argued by Smith, manuscript). The ‘bar-raising’ response, therefore, forces us to 
adopt an intolerably deficient account of agency, in which a significant set of 
human activities and flourishing turn out to be non-agential. This constitutes 
sufficient grounds for rejecting the bar-raising response, and consequently, the 
continuum thesis of implicit bias offers a superior account of the phenomena at 
hand to the substantial distinction theory. 
 
6.1. THE CONTINUUM THEORY OF AGENCY AND MORAL  
RESPONSIBILITY 
In light of the failure of the substantial distinction account, what are we to say 
about the nature of implicit biases? I propose that the continuum thesis—on which 
implicit biases and agential attitudes such as beliefs (and the actions guided by 
each) do not have a fundamentally different nature—naturally accommodates the 
data presented in the last three chapters. Further, the continuum thesis is also able 
to account for a notion that I think motivated the SD argument in the first place: 
the idea that there is something like a ‘gold standard’ of agential attitude and 
action. However, the continuum thesis can do this without also jettisoning a range 
of other attitudes and actions which do not meet this standard, but which, 
intuitively, seem to be agential nonetheless. It is therefore a preferable account to 
the SD theory, as I demonstrate in the following. 
 
6.1.1 Implicit biases and beliefs are not substantially distinguishable 
During the course of this thesis, I have established that a considerable set of 
implicit biases and beliefs (and the actions guided by each) in fact share the very 
properties which other philosophers have tried to utilise to distinguish them as 
fundamentally different in kind. As a result, there is no principled way to draw a 
distinction between all implicit biases and all beliefs, and so what I have been 
calling the substantial distinction account fails. As such, it does not make sense to 
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maintain that implicit biases are a fundamentally different kind of attitude to 
beliefs. 
 This is not to have shown that implicit biases and beliefs are identical. 
Instead, it is consistent with what I have shown in the foregoing chapters that 
some beliefs may, for instance, figure frequently in an agent’s introspective 
reasoning and planning; whilst some implicit biases may be incredibly difficult to 
observe, or to introspect on, without considerable deliberate self-reflection. But, 
what I have shown is that, in the middle of these two extremes, there are a number 
of beliefs and implicit biases of which agents have not yet become introspectively 
aware, but which share enough of their properties with attitudes which we do 
think of as agential that we do not have sufficient grounds for rejecting the former 
from the set of agential attitudes.  
Further, it is consistent with what I have presented here that there are some 
belief-guided actions which proceed from episodes of careful conscious 
deliberation, and over which we exercise immediate direct, initiation control, 
whilst many implicitly biased actions occur in the absence of deliberation about 
performing such an action, and it may take considerable effort before they are 
amenable to any kind of control. Nonetheless, in the middle of each of these two 
extremes, are a number of belief-guided actions, and implicitly biased actions, 
which are not the result of effortful, introspective processes but which share 
enough of their properties with actions which we do think of as agential that we 
do not have sufficient grounds for rejecting the former from the set of agential 
actions. 
This area of overlap between implicit biases and beliefs (and their 
associated actions) is considerable: such an area was found for every potentially 
distinguishing feature proposed by prominent SD theorists, such that the feature in 
question failed to uphold a substantial distinction between implicit biases and 
beliefs (and their associated actions). As we have seen, as regards awareness, 
agents may have introspective awareness of their implicit biases (such as 
Borgoni’s case of Emilia from Chapter 3), or, if one rejects Borgoni’s account of 
introspective awareness, then agents will fail to have introspective awareness of at 
least some of their agential attitudes (those which constitute their everyday 
observable class preferences). Further, agents may have observational awareness 
of many implicit biases (and agential preferences) in virtue of reflecting on how 
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these manifest in behaviour. So awareness will not deliver the desired distinction 
for the SD theorist. 
 We also saw that at least some implicit biases are structured 
propositionally, and may figure in inferential transitions, just as beliefs do 
(Chapter 4). This being so gives us reason to doubt the predictions of the 
theoretical model (dual process theory) on which implicit biases were thought to 
be associative in the first place. Further, it is not clear what inferential sensitivity 
has to do with agency and moral responsibility. Recall that Liz, the agent with a 
recalcitrant (explicit) racist prejudice from the end of Chapter 4, seems to be a 
target for moral condemnation precisely because her attitude has a very low 
degree of inferential sensitivity, and she fails frequently to update her racial 
prejudices in light of counter-evidence. (For this reason, I don’t think that the 
level of inferential sensitivity of an attitude is reliable criteria by which to judge 
whether it is agential or not.) 
 Furthermore, we saw that we can have the same kind of control over the 
acquisition and maintenance of implicit biases (whether that is indirect voluntary 
control, or direct control in the form of answerability) as we do over the 
acquisition and maintenance of beliefs. Finally, there are three kinds of control 
strategies which are effective over implicitly biased actions, which are also the 
only strategies that we may use to control a number of everyday agential actions: 
indirect, intervention control; deliberate, direct, intervention control; and non-
deliberate, direct, intervention control. So, even after testing multiple notions, 
control will not deliver the desired distinction for the SD theorist. 
One might think that there may be other potential SD arguments out there 
that I have not assessed in this thesis, and point out that the claim that there are no 
distinguishing criteria between all implicit biases and beliefs (and their associated 
actions) hasn’t quite yet been established. If so, there might be hope for the SD 
theory yet. But I am not hopeful that the SD theory can be saved with any further 
possible distinctions. Part of the thrust of my argument has been to show that 
implicit biases are, fundamentally, not that unlike beliefs. But, perhaps even more 
importantly, over the course of this thesis we have seen that beliefs themselves are 
a somewhat messy class of attitudes, and far from all of them measure up to the 
thoroughly rationalistic picture that philosophers such as Gendler and Levy 
espouse. So, I think that some of the same cases of as yet unobserved, 
inferentially-insensitive beliefs, as well as the not directly controllable actions that 
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they guide, will prove to be problematic for any further potentially distinguishing 
criteria which I have not directly assessed in the last three chapters. 
So, for any possible distinguishing criteria, we are left with a substantial 
area of overlap between implicit biases and agential attitudes. Either at least some 
putatively agential attitudes in fact fail to have the criteria which would 
distinguish them as agential, or at least some implicit attitudes turn out to have 
criteria which render them agential after all. This marks the failure of the 
substantial distinction account. In the next section, I outline an account that can 
make sense of the picture that we are left with: the continuum thesis. 
 
6.1.2. The continuum thesis 
The proposal, then, is this: Agency is a property that comes in degrees, and there 
is a continuum along which attitudes and actions are ordered, from the least 
agential, to the most agential. That agency comes in degrees is not a particularly 
radical idea, and has been defended previously by Nahimas, (2006). Nahimas 
suggests that the idea that agency comes in degrees fits naturally with some of our 
established concepts and practices. For instance, it makes sense of our notion of 
children as developing agents, and our practice of responding to others in 
accordance with varying degrees of praise and blame with respect to the (moral) 
severity of an action.  
On the continuum that I propose, there are two main dimensions; those of 
awareness and control (as I indicated above, I don’t think that inferential 
sensitivity is a particularly informative heuristic to agency, because highly 
recalcitrant explicit prejudice will end up being non-agential, but, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, the inferential sensitivity of an explicit racial 
prejudice, for instance, seems to have little to do with whether the attitude is 
agential, and whether we blame the agent in question). Attitudes are ordered along 
these two dimensions such that those closer to the higher end of the awareness 
scale, or the control scale, are to be understood as proportionally more agential 
than those toward the lower end of the awareness or control scales. Many agential 
attitudes and actions will occupy roughly equivalent co-ordinates on the 
awareness dimension as they do on the control dimension, but this is not the case 
for all examples: for instance, cases of ‘flow’ will be much higher on the control 
dimension than they are on the awareness dimension. 
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Some highly calculated moral wrongdoings will lie at the higher end of the 
awareness and control dimensions, and some behaviours which are influenced 
automatically by attitudes of which it is very difficult to become aware without a 
great introspective or observational effort lie at the lower end. In the middle, 
however, there is a significant area of overlap between implicit biases (and the 
actions that they guide) and beliefs (and the actions that they guide): In this area 
we find the set of in principle observable (but currently unobserved) everyday 
class preferences (Chapter 3), as well as some implicit biases that are observable 
class preferences. We also find the everyday unrestriction cases and examples of 
flow (Chapter 5), as well as some implicitly biased actions. The extent to which 
these states and actions are agential, and the severity of our reactive attitudes 
when such states guide moral wrongdoings depend on the position that they 
occupy on the continuum.  
In this region of overlap between what has been called the ‘implicit’ and 
what has been called the ‘explicit’, if it is appropriate to hold agents as morally 
responsible for their agential actions, then it is appropriate to hold agents as 
morally responsible for their implicitly biased actions, with which these agential 
actions share features. I argued that there are plenty of cases in which agents both 
can, and are in fact expected, to, for instance, (i) notice that their preferences 
automatically guide their actions in a fashion inconsistent with their aims; and (ii) 
redirect their future behaviour in line with a non-preferential course of action (in 
Chapter 5). For example, when the student council chair’s left-wing preference 
manifests in the selection of questions from known left-wingers at a higher rate 
than questions from known right-wingers during a council meeting, it is possible 
for (and expected of) her to notice this, and to (directly) intervene and actively 
look for questions from known right-wingers.  
Similar expectations would then appear to apply to the implicitly biased 
seminar chair, whose case shares characteristics with respect to awareness and 
control with that of the student council chair (Chapter 5): It is also quite possible 
for the seminar chair to notice his predominant selection of questions from men, 
and to directly intervene on the manifestation of this preference, by actively 
looking for questions from women and people of colour. Individuals in these 
cases are the proper subjects of our reactive moral attitudes, insofar as they are in 
positions of power where they are expected to act fairly. When they fail to do so, 
even if this failure is neither voluntary, nor the product of deliberate, direct, 
186 
initiation control, (and, rather, is explained by the automatic manifestation of a 
preference) it seems entirely appropriate to ask these agents to account for their 
actions, as well as to respond to these agents with attributions of blame. That is, 
although these actions may be the product of automatic processes, our reactive 
attitudes address the agent, we ask the agent to account for these actions. So, 
whilst we might not think that actions in the overlap region, should they violate 
some moral norm, demand the same severity of blame as highly calculated 
actions, there is still room for holding agents morally responsible for acting as 
they do, at least to some extent. 
At this point, let me say a few words about Washington and Kelly’s (2016) 
account of moral responsibility for implicit bias, in order for me to acknowledge 
some similarities, and to also demonstrate how my suggestions above differ to the 
account that they put forward. Washington and Kelly argue that what people 
ought to be aware of with respect to implicit bias (and to therefore employ control 
strategies against) is indexed to the kind of role that they play in society. 
Specifically, they are interested in the notion of inferential awareness (as Holroyd 
2015 uses the term): that is, awareness of the empirical findings on implicit bias. 
Specifically, Washington and Kelly argue that people in what they term ‘gate 
keeper’ positions, such as those involved in hiring committees, education or social 
work, for instance—positions which involve the fair distribution of social 
resources, enabling other people to self-determine—ought to have inferential 
awareness of the relevant empirical findings on implicit bias, and ought to employ 
suitable mitigation strategies in their actions. To the extent that they fail to do this, 
they may be held morally responsible.  
Holroyd (2015) argues that Washington and Kelly’s proposal is 
implausible, because:  
 
Many people make decisions about…who to grant a loan to, where to live, 
who to stop and search, who to give a lift to, what news stories to report (and 
how), who to write prescriptions for, who to sit by on a train, how to 
evaluate co-workers, who to smile at, what grades to assign or references to 
write, who to cross the road to avoid, who to believe, who to befriend…and 
so on (2015: 517).  
 
Accordingly, almost everyone will turn out to play a ‘gate-keeper’ role in a 
variety of social interactions, but it is unreasonable to suggest that, therefore, 
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everyone ought to have inferential awareness of a particular set of findings in 
cognitive science as regards implicit bias (Holroyd, 2015: 517).  
I agree with Holroyd’s (2015) contention here, but insofar as my proposal 
differs from Washington and Kelly’s (2016), this does not affect my argument. 
My argument above requires that the student council chair and the seminar leader 
are able to have observational awareness of the manifestation of their preferences. 
I think that it is quite plausible that they can have this sort of awareness, as I 
argued in Chapter 5. (Further, if you are convinced by Borgoni’s (2015) 
‘ordinary’ account, then it is possible that they have introspective awareness of 
their preferences.) As such, it doesn’t matter if it is implausible to expect the 
seminar leader, and others like him, to know about the relevant empirical findings 
of implicit bias, because it is relatively easy for him to observe that he is only 
selecting questions from white men, particularly when the brief of his role is to 
select questions fairly. So, if it is plausible to expect the politically biased student 
council chair to observe and correct the bias in her own behaviour, and to hold her 
to account if she fails to (and, as I have argued, I think that it is) then it is equally 
plausible to hold the seminar chair to account for his biased question selection.  
So, the continuum account does offer a framework on which, at least 
sometimes, agents will be morally responsible for their implicitly biased actions: 
They will be morally responsible when it is appropriate to hold other agents 
whose actions share fundamental features with the implicitly biased actions in 
question as morally responsible for their actions. Both sets of agents will be 
morally responsible to a similar degree, and appropriate subjects of the same level 
of moral condemnation.  
 There is a further benefit for continuum theorists. As well as being able to 
account for the examples that I presented in Chapters 3-5, examples that the 
substantial distinction view cannot account for, that beliefs and implicit biases lie 
on a continuum also enables us to acknowledge at least some of the considerations 
that I think motivated the substantial distinction view in the first place: One may 
be attracted to the idea that there is (a) a ‘gold-standard’ of agential attitude, in 
which attitudes are acquired and updated in accordance with evidence, and under 
the guidance of occurrent, introspective awareness; as well as (b) a ‘gold-
standard’ of agential action, in which agents deliberate about how to act, whilst 
being occurrently, introspectively aware of the relevant set of attitudes, and the 
guiding role that they play in directly initiating an action. One might then also 
188 
think that when these sorts of actions result in the violation of moral norms, then 
particularly severe reactive attitudes, which emphasise the deliberateness of the 
norm-violating action, are appropriate from others. However, a commitment to the 
notion that agential actions which violate moral norms in this way are rightly to be 
met with severe moral condemnation, is fully consistent with the acknowledgment 
that both agency and moral responsibility may be a matter of degree, determined 
by the position of the relevant attitudes and actions on the continuum. These kinds 
of actions will appear high up the continuum, and so may be met with severe 
moral condemnation. Continuum theorists can acknowledge, and account for this 
idea, without also being committed to a substantial distinction which has proved 
so problematic to maintain in a principled way. 
 So, on the continuum view, the term ‘implicit’ does not pick out any 
particular characteristics of an attitude, it merely indicates the region in which it is 
likely to lie on the continuum. One end of the ordered of the set of things which 
we have been calling ‘implicit’ is independent of one of the ends of the ordered 
set of things that we have been calling ‘explicit’. However, these sets overlap 
significantly at their other ends. As such, our best model of the phenomena is that, 
as categories of attitude, the implicit and the explicit are not discontinuous from 
one another, and indeed, have a considerable intersection. Further, at least 
sometimes, agents will turn out to be morally responsible for implicitly biased 
actions: when those actions share fundamental characteristics with other attitudes 
for which we already have a precedent for holding agents as morally responsible.  
I acknowledge that SD theorists might still not be convinced, and may 
have a last line of defence. I consider, and respond to this in the final section of 
this chapter.   
 
6.2. THE BAR-RAISING RESPONSE  
In light of the foregoing, it remains a dialectical possibility that SD theorists will 
respond by insisting that the argument that I have presented in this thesis sets the 
bar of agency too low. The suggestion might be that none of the attitudes and 
actions that I present which do not meet the ‘gold-standard’ of agency really count 
as genuinely agential. If that is so, then my argument that there is no substantial 
distinction between implicit biases and agential attitudes (and the actions guided 
by each) does not have the required consequence for it will then turn out that no 
implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions, count as agential after all.  
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 However, this response demands that we reject an intolerably large variety 
of human attitudes and actions from the category of the agential. Let us now look 
at all of the attitudes and actions that the bar-raising response requires us to reject 
as agential in summation: 
 
(i) agents who have as yet unobserved, but nonetheless observable 
class preferences, which, as I argued in Chapter 3, characterise not 
just some of our implicit biases, but a great many of our everyday 
aesthetic and prudential preferences as well;  
(ii) agents with recalcitrant beliefs which do not update in light of 
evidence, which characterises a great many explicit prejudicial 
beliefs, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4;  
(iii) agents who put in place implementation intentions to indirectly 
control everyday actions as we saw in Chapter 5, for example to 
enhance their emotional expression (such as actors) or to steel 
themselves in traumatic situations (such as accident and emergency 
doctors); 
(iv) agents who recognise and redirect the automatic manifestation of 
personal preferences in their behaviour in situations in which they 
ought to be acting non-preferentially, such as the student council 
chair, and the TV planner from §5.2.2; 
(v) sports players and musicians performing highly skilled, novel 
action sequences without deliberative or introspective guidance 
during episodes of ‘flow’, such as in §5.2.2.  
 
On the bar-raising response, these agents are neither acting agentially, nor are they 
praiseworthy or blameworthy (as appropriate) for their actions. I contend that this 
is an intolerably large set of human behaviour to jettison from the class of agential 
attitudes and actions. It contains behaviour that regularly characterises everyday 
actions, and further, behaviour that we might think represents some of the 
pinnacles of human flourishing and achievement (such as skilled musicianship 
and sporting accomplishments).  
But we have a further problem should we jettison the above examples from 
the set of agential actions: doing so renders much agential practice that often 
accompanies many of the above actions as inappropriate or meaningless. For 
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instance, on the bar-raising response, it would be inappropriate to praise the 
skilled trumpet player for her incredible, complex, virtuosic ten-minute solo. And 
yet, we regularly do praise musicians for such feats. Further, our praise seems to 
be almost entirely independent of whether or not the musician in question was in a 
‘flow’ state (without occurrent, introspective awareness of the non-deliberate 
processes which guide their playing) or not. If they were in a flow state, it is not 
clear how, if at all, this would impact our appraisal of their playing. Nor does the 
bar-raising response make sense of at least some of our blame practices: according 
to the bar-raising response, it is inappropriate to hold the student council chair as 
both morally and politically accountable for favouring her allies, and 
inappropriate to blame the climate skeptic TV planner for programming 
significantly more airtime for climate skeptics than climate scientists, (Chapter 5). 
But, as I argued in the previous section, we do hold such agents to account, and so 
the bar-raising response does not make sense of our practices here. The bar-raising 
response fairs no better in the moral realm: According to this response, it is 
inappropriate to blame Liz, the recalcitrant racist from Chapter 4, for failing to 
update her attitudes in light of the evidence that she takes herself to have for doing 
so. And yet, as I suggested in Chapter 4, and above, the degree of evidence 
sensitivity of an attitude is not obviously related to moral responsibility in the case 
of agents with a recalcitrant explicit prejudice. 
 Smith (manuscript) points out a further problem for those who think that 
attitudes and actions like those listed at the start of this section are non-agential. 
Smith maintains that we feel like we learn something new about ourselves when 
we notice a previously unconscious preference, and how it manifests in behaviour 
(manuscript). She suggests that “[s]uch discoveries are very different from 
coming to discover that we have cancer, or high blood pressure, or any other 
physical ailment or condition” (Smith: manuscript: 20). Whilst in these latter 
cases, we are making discoveries about the operation of non-voluntary, non-
deliberative processes, they are a different kind of discovery to recognising non-
voluntary, non-deliberative aspects of one’s evaluations. Even though these 
evaluations may be non-voluntary, and non-deliberative, they still “embody our 
take on the world” as Hieronymi would say, (2008: 370) in a way that a physical 
ailment does not.  
Indeed, agents who observe their (until that moment) unobserved class 
preferences, as well as agents who realise that an already observed preference 
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manifests automatically in contexts in which they did not intend it to, would seem 
to learn something new about what matters to them, and about what they act on as 
valuable. For instance, the student council chair learns something about herself 
when she recognises that she favours questions from known left-wingers during a 
council session—perhaps she learns something about the depth of her 
commitment to the left-wing of politics, her desire for her political allies to be 
heard, and how these desires can overshadow her commitment to fair a debate. 
Similarly, it would seem that the seminar chair learns something important about 
himself when he realises that he predominantly selects questions from white 
men—that he doesn’t value the contributions of women and people of colour as 
much as he does from white men. It might be as uncomfortable for him to learn 
this as it is for Clare (from Chapter 3) to discover that that genre of music that she 
likes from her recent festival experience is the very same genre that her friends 
abhor, but, nonetheless, both Clare, and the seminar leader, discover aspects of 
their own evaluative agency when they observe the manifestation of their 
preferences. As Smith argues, if we really are mistaken in attributing the above 
attitudes and actions to ourselves as agents, “then these impressions of self-
discovery and increased self-knowledge must be illusory” (manuscript: 20) and 
this is an outcome that is hard to reconcile with the phenomena at hand.   
The bar-raising response also seems inadequate to capture our regular, 
everyday moral practice, where, as Smith points out (manuscript), our reactive 
attitudes and attributions of blame are not restricted to actions which are the 
products of deliberate, direct, initiation control. Nonetheless, such reactions are 
comprehensible. She maintains that: 
 
…we sometimes ask people to justify their failures to notice, to remember, 
or to take into consideration certain factors at the time they acted, when such 
failures were clearly neither “conscious” nor the result of prior conscious 
activities… But I think it is interesting that we generally do not regard such 
requests for justification as obviously infelicitous or bizarre when they are 
directed to us in response to such unconscious failures.  “Didn’t you realize 
how inappropriate that joke was in that context?,” “How could you have 
missed the obvious warning signs in her behavior”?,” “What could have 
been so important this afternoon that you forgot to pick up our daughter from 
school?”  These are types of justificatory request we regularly make and 
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receive, which suggests that there is nothing conceptually untoward about 
them. (Smith, manuscript: 18-9) 
 
In light of this, we should reject the ‘bar-raising’ response. The theoretically 
preferable option, that is, the option that best explains the phenomena from our 
moral and agential practices as regards the belief-implicit bias overlap of the 
continuum, is to accept that these attitudes and actions are agential after all, and 
that, at least sometimes, it is appropriate to praise or blame the agents in question. 
If that is the case, then, as I argued in Chapters 3-5, at least some implicit biases, 
and implicitly biased actions, are agential—as agential as the attitudes and actions 
in examples listed at the start of this section, and it is therefore appropriate to hold 
the agents in question as morally responsible for them. This is not to be 
committed to the notion that it is inappropriate for the moral community to meet a 
calculated and deliberate violation of moral norms with particularly severe 
sanctions in accordance with the moral severity of the action in question. As I 
outlined in the previous section, the continuum account is consistent with the 
notion that motivates the SD theorist, that when agents deliberately and 
calculatedly violate (moral) norms, they are to be met with a particularly severe 
level of riposte. However, we need not commit to an intolerably restrictive 
account of agency—the account of agency of the bar-raising response—to 
accommodate this intuition.  
On this rejoinder to the bar-raising response, agents who perform 
involuntary, non-deliberate actions (including some implicitly biased agents) may 
also, at least sometimes, act agentially, and be the proper subjects of moral praise 
and blame. So, we ought to reject the bar-raising response to the continuum thesis, 
and maintain that the continuum thesis is the best interpretation of the phenomena 
that have been the focus of this discussion.  
 
CONCLUSION 
A significant body of empirical evidence reveals that people often act as if they 
have negatively evaluated members of a particular social group, even though they 
seem to be unaware that this is the case, and do not intend to exhibit such 
disfavouring treatment (Chapter 1). Psychologists and philosophers alike have 
treated these so called ‘implicit’ biases, and the actions that they influence, as 
distinct in kind from our beliefs and belief-guided actions, and a subset of 
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philosophers have argued that implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions, are 
therefore not agential (Chapter 2).  
 In this thesis, I demonstrated that there is no principled way to maintain a 
substantial distinction between implicit biases and implicitly biased actions, and 
agential attitudes and actions, such that all of the former fall on one side of the 
distinction, whilst all of the latter fall on the other. I looked at the possible 
distinguishing features put forward by various substantial distinction theorists: 
those on the basis of (i) awareness; (ii) structure and processing; and (iii) control, 
and found that there is no single characteristic that all agential attitudes and 
actions have, that all implicit biases, and implicitly biased actions lack. I argued 
that we often have observational awareness (and, perhaps, introspective 
awareness) of those implicit biases which constitute observable class preferences 
(Chapter 3); that at least some implicit biases are sensitive to propositional 
information, and additionally, that beliefs do not always update in light of 
evidence (Chapter 4); and that there are a number of strategies available for 
controlling implicit biases and implicitly biased actions which are also the only 
strategies by which we control beliefs, and at least some agential actions (Chapter 
5).  
 In showing the substantial distinction account to be inadequate, I defended 
a continuum thesis, on which implicit biases and implicitly biased actions, and 
agential attitudes and actions lie on a continuum. There is a significantly large 
overlap between these two categories on this continuum that we should think that 
at least some implicit biases and implicitly biased actions are properly identified 
as agential. At this point on the continuum, if it is appropriate to hold agents as 
morally responsible for their agential actions, then it is appropriate to hold agents 
as morally responsible for their implicitly biased actions, with which these 
agential actions share features. I argued that, to the extent that we do hold agents 
to account, and praise or blame them for agential actions which lie in the overlap 
zone of the continuum, it is therefore appropriate to hold agents as morally 
responsible for the implicitly biased actions which also populate that section of 
the continuum (Chapter 6). I then considered a possible dialectical move open to 
the SD theorist which I called the ‘bar-raising’ response, and argued that this 
response ought to be rejected because it commits us to an inadequate picture of 
agency, and cannot make sense of a number of the agential practices which 
accompany the discovery and manifestation of mid-continuum attitudes. As such, 
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the continuum thesis remains the account that is best able to accommodate both 
the findings on implicit bias and our moral practices regarding similar attitudes 
and actions.  
 On my account, implicit biases need not be viewed as central or defining 
features of our evaluative agency. However, it would be wrong to suggest that, 
therefore, they lie determinately outside the boundaries of agency, and that we, as 
agents, are wholly absolved from harbouring or acting upon them. This account 
encourages us to reflect upon the more recalcitrant aspects of our psychology, as 
well as to observe our behaviour to learn about the things that we value (and those 
that we do not value quite so much) in order to bring our attitudes and actions 
better in line with the motivations and values that we do take to be the defining 
aspects of ourselves. 
 
AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The account that I have presented in this thesis generates a number of avenues for 
further research, as well as having implications for positive changes in practice as 
regards educating people about, and aiming to reduce, implicit bias.   
In this thesis, I have defended a continuum view with respect to implicit 
bias. But cognitive science reveals that we harbour a great many attitudes, in 
addition to our implicit biases, which do not reflect the highly rationalistic picture 
of the mind that some philosophers have previously assumed, as well as revealing 
that we utilise these attitudes frequently in daily decision making and action. For 
example, self-deception, distorted memories, confabulatory explanations, and 
cognitive and informational biases more generally, are as widespread and 
ubiquitous as implicit social biases. Some have assumed that insofar as these 
cognitions are irrational, or ill-grounded, that they are not agential. Given the 
account that I have just presented, however, it is far from obvious that we are not 
acting agentially when these imperfect cognitions inform our behaviour. So, the 
continuum view may well have wider application, and be informative in at least 
some, if not all, of the above cases.  
There are also implications for psychological theory. For example, in 
Chapter 4, I mentioned in footnote 34 that if implicit biases turn out to be 
propositionally structured, then this might have general implications for the dual 
process theory, because many dual process theorists maintain that implicit biases 
are paradigm associative states. I did not have room to explore this in the thesis, 
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but the rise of propositionalist interpretations of much of the dual process 
theorist’s results (such as those of De Houwer, 2014 and Mandelbaum, 
forthcoming) opens up the possibility that the propositionalist model may well 
provide a better explanation of the non-social implicit attitude data than the dual 
process theory.  
Finally, there is a more general practical significance to the outcome of 
this thesis, that has to do with communicating what implicit biases are to people 
who have never heard of them. The result that implicit biases aren’t just quirks of 
our psychology that have little to do with us as agents, but instead, are not 
fundamentally different to the attitudes and values that we take ourselves to have, 
may have important motivational implications for how individuals and institutions 
tackle implicit bias. As we saw in the thesis, some methods for controlling 
implicit bias require more effort than others. However, if people see themselves as 
implicated in their implicit prejudices, then this may motivate them to take 
effortful steps to control the manifestation of implicit bias in action, as well as to 
aim to eliminate their implicit biases altogether. If institutions have to accept that 
their staff, and so themselves, are implicated in any implicit prejudices that arise 
within the workplace, then it might motivate them to investigate avenues for 
reducing implicit bias, as well as for instigating implicit bias training, if they 
haven’t already, and to regularly review the effectiveness of these procedures, 
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